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Foreword
I am pleased to add a brief foreword to this book, for it represents
the culmination of a project that I initiated in the fall of 1989. My
view was, and continues to be, that Western economists could con-
tribute to formulating plans for the very difficult transition of the
Soviet economy to a market system. I further thought that the Inter-
national Institute for Applied Systems Analysis would be the best
forum for providing such assistance.
The record of the last eighteen months has vindicated my views.
This Institute was able to attract distinguished Western economists
to study and to write about the problems of the transition. During
several conferences, they engaged in a true dialogue with my Soviet
colleagues that we found very helpful. In their preliminary reports
presented in the summer of 1990, these Western economists pro-
vided valuable materials for the report of the Working Group
formed by the joint decision of M. S. Gorbachev and B. N. Yeltsin. I
was the head of the task force that wrote the report, also known as
the Five-Hundred-Day Plan.
This book is the final report of the Western economists who were
enlisted in this project by the Institute. It offers the best analysis by
Western economists of the problems of economic reform in the
Soviet Union, and it presents proposals that would create an effec-
tive market system for our economy.
This book, written in a lively style, is a major contribution to the
scholarly literature concerning the transition of centrally planned
economies to a market system. Economists, policy makers, journal-
ists, and all those who are concerned with how the largest European
nation can share in and contribute to world prosperity should read
it. I highly recommend it.
Stanislav S. Shatalin
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Introduction
Merton J. Peck
The Soviet economy is engulfed in a crisis. One of its manifestations
is the breakdown of retail distribution. Television viewers in the West
have repeatedly been shown the empty shelves in the state stores and
the long lines. One product after another is no longer freely
available-first, meat and sugar, then cigarettes, soap, toilet paper
and, most recently, watches. The grim saying in Moscow is that only
socialism can create a shortage ofalmost everything. What depresses
Soviet citizens is notjust the shortages but also their unpredictability;
goods here today are gone tomorrow. Essentially, the ruble has not
been freely convertible into foreign currencies since the outbreak of
World War I. Now the ruble cannot easily buy even those consumer
goods and services produced in the Soviet Union, and this internal
inconvertibility is increasing daily.
The breakdown of the state's wholesale distribution network-
supplies from one enterprise to another-is a less visible but equally
critical manifestation. Factories are idle because they lack materials,
and this shortage leads to a slowdown in production. For the first
time since World War II, Soviet industrial production declined in
1990. Again the breakdown in distribution reflects a flight from the
ruble. Allocation through the state supply system (Gossnab) is no
longer effective, and enterprises are reluctant to sell directly to one
another because the rubles they receive cannot assure them of mate-
rials. In the traditional Soviet system, materials are supposed to flow
from one enterprise to another according to government plans or,
more recently, state orders (goszakazy). Yet planning directives are
often ignored and state orders unfulfilled. Thus the Soviet economy
is said to have neither plan nor market.
2BARTER TRADE AND HOARDING
Merton J. Peck
With the decline in the internal convertibility of the ruble for
consumer goods, barter trade is increasing. Consumers survive by
exchanging goods and services with one another. John LeCarre's
novel, Russia House, gives some sense of how complex and time con-
suming such barter trade can be:
As soon as she got to the office ... [Katya] would collect the
two tickets for the Philharmonic which the editor Barzin had
promised her as amends for his drunken advances at the May
Day party.... At lunchtime after shopping she would trade
the tickets with the porter Morozov who had pledged her twenty-
four bars of imported soap wrapped in decorative paper. With
the fancy soap she would buy the bolt of green check cloth of
pure wool that the manager of the clothing shop was keeping
locked in his storeroom for her. ... This afternoon after the
Hungarian reception she would hand the cloth to Olga Stanislav-
sky who, in return for favours to be negotiated, would make
two cowboy shirts, ... one for each twin in time for their birth-
day.... 1
A fictional account to be sure, but it captures well the complexities of
barter trade that Soviet consumers face daily.
Barter trade is also common among enterprises. Many have spe-
cialists (tol/UU;hi) who engage in many-sided trade with other enter-
prises, offering their output either for materials to keep the enter-
prise running or for consumer goods to distribute to their workers.
Enterprises often have a twice weekly distribution of food products
to their employees, and some have set up small canteens to sell
otherwise hard-to-get products. Many consumer durables-
noticeably automobiles-are distributed through enterprises rather
than freely sold in the market. Special stores with a restricted clien-
tele have long been a feature of Soviet society. Formerly these were
limited to a small elite clientele; now many enterprises engage in
distribution of goods for most of their employees.
Barter trade extends beyond enterprises and consumers to in-
l. John LeCarre, Russia House (New York: Knopf, 1989), 113-14.
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clude republics and local governments. With the breakdown of dis-
tribution, heads of governments have acted aggressively to protect
their residents and local enterprises. They have taken control of
local production and then concluded agreements with other lo-
calities to exchange that production for materials and consumer
goods. Thus the mayor of Leningrad trades textiles for milk with the
head of the Estonian Republic.
With barter trade has come hoarding. The uncertainties of the
state supply system have always forced firms to maintain large inven-
tories. But in recent months, the increasing reliance on barter trade
has led both households and enterprises to hold still greater stocks of
goods rather than rubles. Even more significant is hoarding in antic-
ipation of both further reductions in availability and increases in
prices. Holding goods is also a protection against such actions as the
recent confiscation of 50 and 100 ruble notes and the freezing of
large bank accounts. Saving now takes the form of stockpiling goods
rather than rubles.
Money, the textbooks say, serves as a medium of exchange and a
store of value. Its evolution dates back to the Middle Ages when
money was found to be much more efficient than the cumbersome
use of goods for trade. Since then bartering as a basis for trade has
survived only in primitive economies or in times of economic crisis.
The rise of bartering is the most obvious and pervasive indicator of
an economic crisis.
THE CRISIS AND SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS
The current manifestations of the recent deterioration of Soviet
economic performance are striking. Yet as the appendix by Petr
Aven makes clear, Soviet economic growth rates have been steadily
declining since the early seventies and by the mid-seventies were well
below those of the industrialized market economies. Per capita gross
national product (GNP) comparisons place the Soviet Union in the
upper-middle income range in terms of the categories established by
the World Bank Development Report-that is, with such countries
as Greece, Portugal, Brazil, or Malaysia.2 In 1990 Soviet per capita
2. Calculations by the author and data from the World Development Report, 1987 (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 202-3.
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GNP was 5,060 in U.S. dollars compared with 21,000 for the United
States.3
Industrialization came late to the Soviet Union. Some other na-
tions that were late to industrialize have caught up with the early
industrializing countries in the years since World War II, the striking
example being Japan. The Soviet Union ceased catching up in the
early seventies, and since then it has fallen further behind the indus-
trialized market economies.
International comparisons of per capita GNP overstate the wel-
fare of Soviet citizens in several important respects. First, these com-
parisons make no allowance for the low quality of most Soviet goods
relative to those available in market economies. Second, they make
no allowance for the unavailability of goods, the time spent in shop-
ping queues, as well as the general hassle and frustration involved in
obtaining goods and services. Finally, they make no allowance for the
low percentage of GNP that goes to household final consumption.
In 1987 that figure was 54 percent for the Soviet Union compared to
66 percent for the United States, 62 percent for the United King-
dom, 61 percent for France, and 58 percent for Japan. Soviet
citizens live significantly poorer than their per capita GNP
indicates.4
Averages do not, of course, identify the extent of poverty. Using
official Soviet definitions, between 43 million and 80 million persons
are below the poverty line, depending on where it is drawn. Here
poor means poor, for using roughly comparable definitions, around
30 to 40 percent of the population in developing countries are below
the poverty line used in the Soviet Union.5
Such data indicate that several longer-run systemic problems
have damaged Soviet economic performance. First, when compared
to a market system, the economic planning system has proven a
cumbersome and markedly inefficient way to coordinate a complex
modern industrial economy. A modern economy involves many
3. PlanEcon Report, vol. 6, no. 52, December 28, 1990, 17. Since many goods were un-
available at official prices, purchasing power parity calculations overstate Soviet per
capita GNP.
4. SSSR i Zarubewnie strany, v 1988 (The USSR and foreign countries in 1988)
(Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1989).
5. A Study of the Suviet Economy (Paris: International Monetary Fund, World Bank,
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, 1991),2:154-55.
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firms selling to one another, thus providing inputs for the output of
final goods. The inputs must match up with the outputs. In the
Soviet economy this was achieved by mandatory planning. By con-
trast, in a market system coordination is achieved by the price sys-
tem, which balances demand with supply. A market system allows
decentralization of decision making to enterprises and individuals
and has proved to be a vastly superior way of coordinating the needs
of customers and suppliers. The incentives provided by self-interest
have proved to be more effective than directives issued by the plan-
ners. Furthermore, a market system allows for choice by both enter-
prises and households among competing suppliers. As we empha-
size repeatedly in this book, the spur ofcompetition has no substitute
in promoting economic efficiency in all its dimensions.
Second, the planning system has failed badly with respect to inno-
vation. Postwar economic growth in the West has primarily resulted
from the technological development of new products and processes.
Innovation is inherently unpredictable and requires flexibility. That
is something that the planning system cannot easily provide, but the
decentralized market system is well equipped to handle. The flex-
ibility to adapt to changingdemands cannot be routinized or planned.
Lack of flexibility was less of a drawback when growth in the Soviet
economy depended on adding more steel mills. It is a critical failing
when growth requires introducing new microchips.
Third, the planned economy does not allow for easy integration
into the world economy where the market economies are the major
players. Rather the planners act as gatekeepers carefully controlling
access from abroad to the domestic economy. This control precludes
the decentralized import and export characteristic of the market
economies, as well as the spur of competition of imports and the
impact of technological change occurring elsewhere. In the postwar
economic growth of market economies, the increasing role of inter-
national trade has been considered a major factor. Trade increases
competition, permits economies of scale to be realized, and allows
nations to specialize in what they do best. Adherence to the planning
system has kept the Soviet Union isolated from one of the major
sources of economic growth for other industrialized nations.
Fourth, the planning system serves the preferences of the plan-
ners rather than of the consumers, who are considered sovereign in
a market economy. Of course, in theory planners are thought to
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represent the long-run interests of society, but in reality they re-
spond to political pressures, bureaucratic interests, passing fashions,
and the desires of the top leadership. More fundamentally, in the
absence of markets, planners lack accurate information concerning
consumer preferences. Governments in market economies find
themselves politically overloaded by the more modest tasks of main-
taining macroeconomic stability, taking care of various nonmarket
institutions such as education and providing a social safety net for
individuals inadequately provided for by the market economy. This
political overload is increased by several orders of magnitude when
the state tries to run the economy and almost everything else. Of
course, the practice ofcentral planning has never been quite as fully
directed by central commands as the concept suggests. In reality, it
has involved major elements of bargaining-enterprises with their
ministries, ministries with one another and with the central planning
agency, and even enterprises with one another. Within the Soviet
governmental structure, localities bargain with the republics and the
republics with the center. The Communist Party has had a pervasive
role as mediator and arbitrator, for its members have been influen-
tial throughout the bureaucracy. The Party was indeed the glue that
held the Soviet economy together.
In the absence of complete information, Soviet planners had to
rely on their subordinates for planning data, thus giving those sub-
ordinates bargaining power in the planning process. This bargain-
ing power weakened the central planning mechanism, imposing
costs and efficiency losses that are, to a greater extent, ameliorated
in a decentralized market system.
Finally, the Soviet economy has suffered from a progressively
worsening macroeconomic disequilibrium. This imbalance is the
most striking feature of the current crisis and the one on which our
opening paragraphs have focused. Some would say that the critical
macroeconomic situation is not a systemic fault. Although repressed
inflation in which aggregate demand exceeds supply is a long-
standing characteristic of the Soviet economy, it has become severe
only in the last few years. The problem could be attributed to a series
of bad macroeconomic decisions of the kind that have occurred in
market economies.
We are inclined to an alternative view-that macroeconomic dis-
equilibrium is systemic rather than the consequence of particular
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policy errors. In the Soviet system, the banking system serves as a
passive instrument to finance the government deficit and the eco-
nomic plan. The structure provides no clear and immediate signals
warning of a macroeconomic disequilibrium nor does it make its
adverse consequences immediately apparent. In market economies,
macroeconomic disequilibrium becomes apparent in the open infla-
tion of rising prices and the depreciation of the exchange rate.
These signals lead to a political backlash that forces policymakers to
take note.
The systemic character of the macroeconomic disequilibrium is
confirmed by the fact that this imbalance occurs in almost all
centrally planned economies from Yugoslavia to China. However, its
prevalence still does not explain why macroeconomic disequilibrium
became worse in the seventies and eighties. The answer may lie in
the fact that by that time slack resources could no longer be mobi-
lized by the planning system and that political changes of those
decades created pressures for rising monetary income in excess of
productivity gains.
The following chapters and the policy proposals they make are
directed in the first instance to resolving the current crisis. Yet the
proposals-all part of a transition to a market economy-are also
solutions to the long-run systemic problem. We have taken as a start-
ing point the current crisis only because it is so visible and pressing.
This statement in the Shatalin Report may be a bit strong, but we
agree with it:
Mankind has not created anything more efficient than the market
system. It gives strong incentives to materialize man's abilities, to
activate labor and business and to expedite greatly the progress of
science and technology. Its own self-adjustment and self-
regulation gears take care of the best possible coordination of
activities of all economic subjects [and the] rational use of labor,
material and financial resources [to] balance the national
economy.6
6. Transition to the Market: A Report ofa Working Group Formed fry M. S. Gorbachev and B.
N. Yeltsin, Part I: The Concept and Program (Moscow: Cultural Initiative Foundation,
1990), 7. This report is also known as the Five-Hundred-Day Plan or the Shatalin Report
after the Chairman of the Task Force, Academician Stanislav Shatalin, and is hence-
forth cited as the Shatalin Report.
8FROM CRISIS TO COLLAPSE
MertonJ. Peck
Although President Gorbachev originally introduced perestroika
as a way to deal with the precrisis situation inherited from the
Brezhnev era, the last six years have culminated in what can only be
called a crisis. This crisis could now become a collapse. The remain-
ing ruble trade could disappear so that transactions would be largely
by barter. Industrial production could decline precipitously as mate-
rials become harder to obtain. Food supplies for urban areas could
become a problem as farmers withhold their output, which they
might do if consumer goods from the cities become less available.
Republics and regions could become increasingly autarkic. The po-
litical consequences of a collapse could be dramatic. Some observers
see such a collapse occurring in as little as twelve to twenty-four
months.
It is more likely that the Soviet economy will lumber along in its
present state of crisis. Forces of inertia are strong in any indus-
trialized economy. Emergency decrees may cope with the worst of
the problems. Partial reform measures such as the administrative
reform to raise prices and the just-completed abortive currency re-
form will be repeated. Such measures, for reasons to be discussed,
will not eliminate the crisis, but they may keep the economy afloat.
Yet even if the crisis does not become a collapse, the present condi-
tion of the Soviet economy is so perilous that it seems unlikely to
continue indefinitely.
The least likely outcome is for the old planned economy to be
restored. Its restoration would require that thousands ofenterprises
cooperate with directives from the center. Until recently, enterprises
did more or less fulfill their assigned roles. Central planning did
allow the Soviet economy to function, albeit inefficiently. A planned
economy, however, requires obedience, or as Soviet conservatives
say, discipline. That is now in short supply, particularly as the various
republics assert their sovereignty and annul directives from Moscow.
The centrally planned economy can be restored only with the kind
of repression that would reverse the political changes of the last six
years.
Introduction
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In the next chapter, we propose five measures to resolve the crisis.
I. Liberalize prices.
2. Corporatize enterprises.
3. Stabilize government spending and restrict credit.
4. Moderate the social costs of unemployment.
5. Open the economy to competition, both internally and inter-
nationally.
These measures are presented as a comprehensive program. We
consider these five steps the minimal conditions necessary for creat-
ing an effective market economy. The success of each depends on
the others. If adopted singly or over time, they are likely to fail; if
adopted promptly and introduced simultaneously on what we call
D-day (D for deregulation), they promise a resolution of the present
cnSiS.
The measures we propose are similar to those described in two
other proposed programs of reform: the Five-Hundred-Day, or
Shatalin, Plan, and the plan developed by international agencies in
response to the Houston Summit. 7 Our program differs from the
other two by being bolder and by reflecting a greater sense of
urgency. Our proposals are more integrated and consistent with one
another and, of course, they differ from the other plans in details.
We make the case for simultaneous action in greater detail than do
previous authors. Yet our suggestions share with the other two re-
form proposals the ultimate goal of creating a market economy.
THE HISTORY OF THE PROJECT ON
ECONOMIC REFORM
The proposals set forth here are the result of an eighteen-month
collaboration involving many economists. The story is complicated
enough that it is best told chronologically.
7. The Shatalin plan is outlined in the Skatalin Report. The plan from the Houston
summit is contained in The Economy ofthe USSR: Summary and Recommendations, a study
undertaken in response to a request by the Houston Summit (Washington, D.C.:
International Monetary Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1990).
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In the fall of 1989, Academician Stanislav Shatalin, then a senior
economic adviser to President Gorbachev, approached the Interna-
tional Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg,
Austria, with a request for recommendations on Soviet economic
reform. IIASA is a unique international organization that applies
systems analysis to policy problems. It has fifteen national member
organizations including those from four formerly centrally planned
countries as well as the Soviet Union, the United States, Japan,
Canada, and seven Western European countries.
In asking for IIASA's involvement, Academician Shatalin noted:
The experience of Western specialists is invaluable both in our
efforts to achieve structural adjustment in socialist economies and
in ensuring other countries are fully informed about and can
adjust to the changes being made. IIASA is ideally placed to estab-
lish a neutral and objective dialogue between economic experts in
the East and West to translate perestroika into tangible economic
results. s
Several points require underscoring and elaboration. We would
stress the word dialogue, for the project was conducted on the basis of
free and frank interchange among Soviet economists and econo-
mists from other nations. The intent was to create a forum for joint
problem solving, not for presentations in which one group would
lecture the other. IIASA was instrumental in providing a setting in
which economists from a wide range of countries felt comfortable
and where tradition encouraged a problem-solving orientation. It
was also an environment that allowed economists to let their imag-
inations run freely. (Contrary to popular belief, economists do have
imaginations!) IIASA was, then, the setting that this work required.
Once the formal proposal was made by the USSR State Commis-
sion on Economic Reform and approved by IIASA officials, events
moved quickly. Professor Schmidt-Bleek of IIASA convened the
first planning meeting in December 1989 and another in March
1990. At the March meeting, Merton]. Peck of Yale University was
appointed project leader and five study groups were established.
The groups and their chairmen were as follows:
8. Quoted in an lIASA News Release, May 17, 1990.
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1. Prices and Competition: Alfred E. Kahn, Cornell University
(USA)
2. Economic Stabilization: William D. Nordhaus, Yale University
(USA)
3. Opening of the Economy: Richard N. Cooper, Harvard Uni-
versity (USA)
4. Labor Markets and Employment: Wil Albeda, Universities of
Utrecht and Limberg (Netherlands)
5. Capital Markets and Privatization: Kimio Uno, Keio University
at Shomaw Fujisawa Uapan)
The March conference was still an exploratory one, but it initiated
substantive discussions of the problems of economic reform. Soviet
experts presented papers that served as starting points for the dis-
cussions at this conference.
The planning began immediately for the next conference, to be
held in Sopron, Hungary, inJuly and August 1990. This conference
was to be organized by study groups, each consisting of about nine
members, from the United States,Japan, Western Europe, and East-
ern Europe. Particular mention should be given to the contributions
made by economists from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and
Bulgaria. Economists in these countries have been forced to think
long and hard about economic reform. The successes and failures of
previous reforms in these four countries were particularly relevant
to the problems facing the Soviet Union.
Two to four Soviet experts joined each study group, having pre-
pared papers as a background for the study group discussions.9
Appendix B lists the participants at the Sopron meetings.
During the Sopron meetings, word arrived from Moscow con-
cerning a significant change. A joint decision reached by Mikhail
Gorbachev, Soviet president, and Boris Yeltsin, chairman of the Rus-
sian Parliament, led to the formation of a new joint task force to be
headed by Academician Shatalin, with a staff of experts to be drawn
in large part from the economists who had been associated with the
USSR State Commission on Economic Reform. (Three of the eleven
9. Five of these papers are to be published in a volume edited by Petr O. Aven and
ThomasJ. Richardson, Essays in the Saviet Transition to the Market (Laxenburg, Austria:
llASA, forthcoming). The reader is urged to consult this forthcoming book for
further details of the transition as well as for insights into how Soviet experts ap-
proach the problems of transition.
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members of the Shatalin task force were at Sopron, and two others
had attended the March conference.)
We were asked to prepare preliminary reports as soon as possible
for use by the Shatalin task force. The diligence of the chairmen
resulted in preliminary reports that were completed by mid-August
and were discussed by the Shatalin group in the process of prepar-
ing their report.
We had decided that the reports would be the work of the chair-
men who wrote them. There was surprising agreement within the
study groups on the major points-thus contradicting the old saying
that economists never agree. Still, it would have been pushing our
luck to produce an agreed report and the schedule precluded it. The
chairmen were asked to write their reports on the basis of the group
discussions, but the report was to express their personal view.
The study group chairmen met again in New Haven, Connecti-
cut, in November 1990. (They were joined by myself and fellow
editor Thomas Richardson; Petr Aven; Barry Bosworth, of the
Brookings Institution; and Professor Evgenyi Yasin, department
chief of the USSR State Commission on Economic Reform.) The
original purpose of the meeting was to make plans to revise the
preliminary reports. Professor Yasin, however, asked that the West-
ern experts instead prepare a policy memorandum of fewer than
twenty pages that would set forth our views on the essential eco-
nomic reforms to deal with the current economic crisis in the Soviet
Union.
We did this, although given our geographical dispersion doing so
required considerable use of fax technology. The memorandum was
sent to Moscow and translated into Russian, and in December, the
Russian translation was given to President Gorbachev. This policy
memorandum has since been published as an IIASA report lO and
has been the subject of articles in several publications in the Soviet
Union and in the West. The policy memorandum is chapter 2 of this
book, and it is followed by the five final reports of the study group
chairmen, which elaborate the reform proposals in the policy mem-
orandum. In varying degrees these later chapters also add further
proposals that are consistent with the principal ones described in the
policy memorandum.
10. The Soviet Economic Crisis: Steps to Avert Collapse, Execulive Report 19 (Laxenburg,
Auslria: BASA, February 1991).
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The five chapters presented here differ from the preliminary
reports of August 1990. In part these changes reflect modifications
made when the chairmen reconsidered their preliminary reports
and incorporated the discussions of the November meeting. These
five chapters also contain data drawn from Economy oftke USSR and
the Skatalin Report, all published after the preliminary reports were
finished. 11 We have not systematically drawn on the extensive litera-
ture on the Soviet economy, preferring timeliness over comprehen-
siveness. We have responded to those that urged the value of early
publication, and particularly to those in the Soviet Union to whom
we promised publication at this time.
Despite the changes, the remaining chapters contain the imprint
of the discussions at Sopron and could not have been written without
that conference. Chapters 3 to 7 were written in February and
March 1991, and chapter 2, the policy memorandum, was written in
November 1990. Obviously much will have happened in the Soviet
Union by the time the book is published, but it was not feasible to
make revisions to reflect the latest events. We think, however, that
little will have happened that would change the general character of
our proposals.
The proposals in chapters 3 to 7 are consistent with one another
in their main outlines with one exception: chapter 6 assigns con-
siderable importance to incomes policies whereas chapter 4 is skepti-
cal about their value. This difference reflects the division of views
among Western economists and, indeed, experience in market econ-
omies concerning the use of incomes policies. The degree of con-
sistency elsewhere is striking, although the careful reader may also
find some differences in details among the chapters. We take com-
fort in the saying, "Consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds."
The chapters generally reflect the views expressed in the discus-
sions of the study groups at the Sopron Conference. Nonetheless,
the chairmen in writing their chapters have not considered them-
selves bound by these discussions and in a few cases they have de-
parted widely from what was expressed there. 12
11. After the manuscript for this book was substantially completed, we received the
three-volume work A Study ofthe Saviet Economy. This work contains a wealth of detail
on the Soviet economy that we were able to incorporate in the present work only to a
very limited extent. Readers who wish more details are urged to consult these three
volumes.
12. The reader should note that the term price liberalization is used in the policy
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THE OUTLOOK FOR ECONOMIC REFORM
Merton J. Peck
When this project began in December 1989, there was a high
probability of significant economic reform in the Soviet Union. The
economists involved from both East and West had a great sense of
excitement and enthusiasm. Many of the Soviet economists working
with us had been assigned major responsibility for working out plans
for economic reform. The top leadership of the Soviet Union ap-
peared to be committed to economic reform. The conflict between
the union and the republics was not so marked or at least not so
apparent at that time.
A little more than a year later, the political situation has changed
dramatically. The Shatalin plan was devised and then rejected by
President Gorbachev, and another reform plan was approved by the
Supreme Soviet. 13 A new prime minister, Valentin Pavlov, took of-
fice in January 1991. He has followed quite different policies than
the ones we have set forth; he is apparently committed to the gradual
introduction of a regulated market economy whatever that may
mean. In his first month in office he announced a version of the plan
set forth by his predecessor, Nikolai Ryzhkov, in May 1990 and
rejected at that time by the Supreme Soviet. Its main feature is an
administrative increase in retail prices, with controls on retail prices
still retained. The price increase is to be compensated for by increas-
ing everyone's income by a significant fraction of the losses due to
the price increases. The reader need not go beyond our policy mem-
orandum to see why we think this measure is bad economics. His
other major initiative is a monetary reform that invalidated 50 and
100 ruble notes and limited withdrawals from bank accounts. Chap-
ter 4 shows why that measure was again bad economics.
The outlook for economic reform is uncertain. Yet we believe that
uncertainty does not diminish the value of this book. First, economic
memorandum in chapter 2, whereas in the subsequent chapters the term is price
deregulation. Deregulation is the more accurate term, since what is involved is remov-
ing the state control of prices. Nonetheless we have retained the term liberalization in
the policy memorandum because we wish to keep that memorandum in the form in
which it was presented to President Gorbachev in December 1989.
13. From time to time throughout the book we refer simply to the Soviet parliament
when the distinction between the Supreme Soviet and the larger Congress of People's
Deputies is not important.
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events in the Soviet Union affect the welfare of almost 300 million
people. They also have an impact on the welfare of the rest of us,
particularly those people who live in the formerly centrally planned
economies of Eastern Europe for whom the USSR is a major trading
partner. We hope this book will provide a better understanding of
the complexities of the transition from a centrally planned economy
to a market system as well as some insight into the specific problems
facing the Soviet Union. Second, we feel an obligation to those Soviet
colleagues who worked with us. Most have left their government
posts and returned to their research institutes and universities. They
continue, however, to work on problems of economic reform. They
expect us to do likewise and finish the tasks we set for ourselves.
The final reason we think this book is of interest is due to our
conviction that in the long run economic reform will come to the
Soviet Union. Politics cannot keep Soviet citizens forever from the
gains of a market economy or the advantages of integration into the
international economy. One might say that it has done so since 1917
but that ignores two factors; the last six years have changed the
political landscape in an irreversible fashion and one would have to
return to 1920, the era of war communism, to find the economy in
such disarray. The worse the economy, the greater the pressure for
reform.
The authors are economists, and we have tried to avoid political
questions and speculation, beyond the occasional asides and the few
preceding paragraphs. Much of economic policy is ultimately politi-
cal, with the decisions to be made by the Soviet government and
people. Still, a market economy has a certain logic and obeys certain
rules whether the economy is located in Latin America, Asia, or
Eastern Europe. Culture and politics matter, but so do economics.
We recognize that almost any economic policy measure creates
winners and losers, some of whom are powerful interest groups.
The task of policymakers is to persuade, conciliate, outmaneuver,
and provide concessions to opponents sufficient to neutralize their
opposition. The transition to a market economy surely threatens the
many who thrive under the present system: It is a classic case of
measures for the general good invoking the opposition of specific
losers.
It is said that the losers in economic reform go well beyond those
thriving in the present system to include almost everyone. The prob-
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lem of reform is considered one of enduring widespread short-run
losses from declining production, falling real income, unemploy-
ment, and industrial unrest to achieve the long-run gains of greater
efficiency and improved economic growth. Such a view is based on
Latin America's experience with economic reform, as well as the
experience of market economies with the elimination of budget
deficits and shifts from easy to tight monetary policy. Such policy
shifts often result in a short-run decline in output, real income, and
employment. Yet, this conventional view may be inaccurate for the
present Soviet situation. 14
The reason is that the Soviet Union is already in an economic
crisis, as the opening pages indicate. Hence, doing nothing is the
right measure of the short-run cost of the proposals contained here.
The current crisis is already producing the usual consequences of a
sharp shift in economic policy. Soviet net material product (the
closest Soviet measure to GNP) is down 10 percent in the first quar-
ter of 1991 compared to the first quarter of 1990, and the decline for
all of 1991 is estimated to be 15 to 20 percent. 15 Economic reform is
also said to result in rising unemployment and strikes, but the pre-
sent course of the Soviet economy is creating both. 16 Indeed, the
Soviet estimates of economic decline are comparable to those for
14. Some distinguished Western economists have voiced that view. Hence, they be-
lieve the proposals made here for reducing the budget deficit and tightening mone-
tary policy will reduce real output. That is the usual outcome in market economies,
where real output is typically limited by aggregate demand and thus its reduction by
macroeconomic policies leads to falling output. The situation in the Soviet Union-
extreme inflationary pressures coupled with sharply falling real output-is un-
characteristic of market systems. Output in the Soviet case is falling because consumer
goods and industrial inputs are no longer reliably available for rubles; individuals and
enterprises are instead hoarding commodities and resorting to barter trade, a form of
trading that reduces the efficiency of exchange.
The measures proposed here aim quickly to restore the internal convertibility of
the ruble for domestic goods and services and thus to permit real output to return to
its 1989 level. In a market economic every good cannot simultaneously be in short
supply, but the USSR has a special kind of shortage economy.
15. The net decline in net material product for the first quarter of 1991 is reported in
Izvestiia, April 10, 1991, and in Pravda, April 23, 1991. Estimates of 15 to 20 percent
for all of 1991 are based on discussions with Soviet economists. See also Dirk W.
Damaru, John C. Reed, John F. H. Purcell, and Joyce Chang, The Saviet Union:
Appro(J£hing Crisis (New York: Salomon Brothers, 1991), 4-5, which estimates a de-
cline of 15 percent.
16. See Study of the Saviet Economy, 1:44-45.
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Poland in the early months of its dramatic economic reforms.!?
Polish policy is termed shock therapy; present Soviet policy is then a
shock without the therapy.
The measures proposed here are intended to reverse the present
decline of the Soviet economy. To the extent they do so, they may
represent a short-run gain, instead ofa short-run cost. The chapters
that follow set forth the analysis that demonstrates why the pro-
posed measures are likely to stem the economic decline in the short
term and provide the basis for economic growth in the long term.
The existence of specific losers from the proposed measures,
however, means that exceptional leadership and political skill will be
required for their adoption. Fortunately, a market economy is
robust enough to tolerate a fair number of concessions to particular
interest groups. Nevertheless, overuse of concessions can eliminate
most of the gains of economic reform.
We do not spell out the political tactics for achieving reform, for
that is not where our expertise lies. We do caution, however, against
too quick ajudgment that the measures proposed here are politically
infeasible, since events of the past decades have shown that what is
called infeasible today often happens easily tomorrow.
That brings us to our second caveat. There is little experience
with the massive task of converting a large centrally planned econ-
omy into a market one. Economic reform in Latin America and in
postwar Europe and Japan faced somewhat similar issues of stabiliz-
ation, but not the task of creating a market system ab initio. The
guidance from economic analysis can only be the most general.
Finally, economic reform takes time, particularly when the re-
forms involve creating new institutions. We do not mean to paint a
picture in rosy hues of instant bliss or to suggest that the shift to a
market economy will solve all economic problems. Indeed, a market
economy provides its own continuing problems of maintaining mac-
roeconomic stability and creating a rising standard of living. The
17. Comparisons between Poland and the Soviet Union are necessarily impressionis-
tic, given the lack of comparable data. The Polish Ministry of Finance reports indus-
trial output fell 20 percent in the ten months following the reform, a rate of decline
per quarter comparable to that in the Soviet Union in the first quarter of 199 I and to
estimates for 199 l. Polish data reponed in David Lipton and Jeffery Sachs, "Creating
a Market Economy in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland," Brookings Papers on
Economy Activity, no. I (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990), 124.
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transition to a market economy should be considered a new begin-
ning rather than the end of economic problems and controversies.
We offer, then, ou r proposals with some inner qualms that are not
quite captured by our rhetoric. Vet we believe economic history and
theory supports the proposition that an effective market economy
gives the best chance for the Soviet people, educated and resource-
ful as they are, to realize their potential and to move toward the
living standards of the other industrialized countries.
Postscript
As this volume was about to go to the printer, dramatic events unfolded
in Moscow. On August 19, 1991, a group of eight hard-liners formed a
State Committee on the Extraordinary Situation, arrested President
Gorbachev, and declared a State of Emergency. They did not, however,
arrest Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation, and two days
later the coup collapsed.
For fifty-six hours the prospects looked bleak for a radical economic
reform any time soon; now they seem quite promising. The failure of
the coup may eliminate much of the high-level opposition to a reform of
the sort outlined in this book, since these were the people and the forces
that have blocked radical reform for almost a year. Although the situa-
tion in Moscow is still fluid, it seems possible that the democratic, pro-
reform forces may prevail, and this would make the need for Western
economic advice more pressing than ever. We thus reiterate our hope
that the suggestions contained in this volume will prove useful to our
Soviet colleagues as they begin what now may be a real transition to the
market.
Chapter Two
The Soviet Economic Crisis
Steps to Avert Collapse
The Soviet economy faces a worsening economic crisis that makes it
essential to take steps immediately to complete market reforms,
stabilize the budget and credit, and open the economy. This memo-
randum lays out the reforms that must be taken in the next few
months if the Soviet economy is to arrest and reverse the economic
collapse that is underway.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Current Situation
The symptoms of repressed inflation become more acute every
day. The state shops have empty shelves, citizens and enterprises are
hoarding goods and materials, trade within the Soviet Union deteri-
orates toward barter, and the ruble buys little. The real gross na-
tional product has fallen sharply in 1990.
Creating a Market Economy
The question is, what is to be done? Reform measures have been
frequent in the last five years but the result has been neither to create
a market nor to improve the planning system. Any economic system
needs a mechanism to coordinate and discipline its enterprise. No
effective system now exists. Enterprises have been partially freed,
but the incentives and competition necessary for an effective market
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the study group chairmen, Barry
Bosworth, Merton J. Peck, and Thomas J. Richardson, in November 1990 and in
cooperation with Evgenii G. Yasin and Petr O. Aven. It was submitted to President
Gorbachev in Russian translation in early December 1990. The original text has not
been changed since we wish to preserve it in the original form in which it was submit-
ted to the USSR State Commission and the form in which it was translated into
Russian. The memorandum was given to senior officials, including President Gor-
bachev, in December 1990. In subsequent chapters it is cited as chapter 2.
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have not been introduced. The banking system accommodates the
demands ofenterprises in a way that allows ballooning credit and no
constraints on enterprise spending.
Prices at the procurement and wholesale level have been raised,
but retail prices are still frozen. Such partial liberalization means that
state subsidies have increased substantially. The increase in subsidies
from freeing wholesale prices is likely to add 100 billion rubles or
more to a government deficit that is already over ten percent of the
gross national product.
The solution lies in abandoning the search for halfway houses, in
abandoning the dream of a regulated market economy. It is crucial
to move quickly to an effective market system. The need for a mar-
ket system is widely recognized in all the reform plans considered in
the last year. What has not been recognized is that it takes a few bold
but simple steps to make it effective. Otherwise a market system
cannot deliver the benefits that the economic texts promise and the
Western economies have achieved.
The Soviet Union now has a large market with a common cur-
rency and almost 300 million people in its boundaries. Thus it al-
ready has the unified market that has been so successful in America
and has taken Western Europe decades to achieve. The forces of
separatism, now so pervasive, threaten to destroy it. Trade barriers
would be particularly costly for the Soviet Union because its plants
and facilities have been built on the basis of geographic specializa-
tion and exchange across the unified market. All of the republics
have a large fraction of their economic activity dedicated to inter-
republic trade.
Proposals for Economic Refonn
Economic reforms must be adopted quickly if the current eco-
nomic crisis is to end. The policies must be simple and effective; they
must provide at least the minimum essentials for an effective market
system.
One of the characteristics of a market economy is its interdepen-
dence. What happens in one sector feeds back to other sectors. The
failure to recognize this interdependence doomed earlier partial
reforms.
The minimum measures are five:
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I. Liberalize prices.
2. Corporatize enterprises.
3. Stabilize government spending and restrict credit.
4. Moderate the social costs of unemployment.
5. Open the economy to competition, both internally and interna-
tionally.
The five measures must be taken simultaneously and, in view of
the present crisis, as soon as possible, that is, early in 1991. The time
for careful sequencing of reform plans is past. Furthermore, as
discussed below, each of the five measures reinforces the others. If
adopted together, the five can be successful; if adopted only singly
or over time, they are doomed to failure.
II. LIBERALIZE PRICES
Definitions
To "liberalize" means freeing prices so that sellers can set what-
ever prices they choose. Sellers will then set prices at "market-
dearing" levels-that is, prices will equate the demand of buyers
with the supply of sellers. Thus freeing prices means goods in the
shops, albeit at higher prices. It also means sellers will set prices that
will cover their costs, so that they will no longer require state sub-
sidies to operate.
The Soviet Union has already freed many prices. As of November
IS, 1990, retail prices are now free ofcentral control on such items as
television sets, higher quality furniture, and such luxury items as
jewelry. On January 1, 1991, all wholesale prices are to be freed of
central control, along with prices at which enterprises sell to one
another.
Retail prices, however, remain controlled for more than 80% of
total retail sales. With retail prices fixed below market-dearing lev-
els, the government must provide subsidies for the difference be-
tween wholesale and retail prices. In 1991, such subsidies will greatly
add to the already excessive government deficit. The deficit is fi-
nanced with new money, so the consequence of freeing wholesale
prices without freeing retail prices is that even more rubles will be
chasing the goods in the shops.
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The Failures of Administrative Reform
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To equate supply and demand without ever increasing govern-
ment deficits, retail prices must be increased in the near future. But
that change can occur effectively only if prices are set free, rather
than by administrative decree.
This is true for several reasons. First, administrative reforms typ-
ically fail to raise prices to market-clearing levels. As a result, con-
sumers are not compensated for increased prices by goods becom-
ing plentiful on the shelves.
Second, it is simply impossible to calculate the correct set of rela-
tive prices for several thousand commodities; economic conditions
simply change too often, and in unpredictable ways, for a correct
administrative reform to be possible.
Third, administrative reform results in a succession of price
jumps; before each jump, which will be much discussed in parlia-
ment and the media, consumers will anticipate the price increases by
hoarding. The result will be periodic shortages that will further
strain the public's patience. In contrast, freeing market prices will
result in thousands of frequent and small price adjustments that
consumers and producers will not anticipate with extensive hoarding.
The Impact of Price Liberalization
The freeing of all retail and wholesale prices will lead to immedi-
ate price increases for most goods, threatening to trigger inflation,
and possibly lowering the real income of many households.
1. There are a number of ways to estimate the size of the increase
in prices. One technique examines the increase in household money
balances, and produces an estimate that prices are likely to rise by
about 50 percent after they are freed. Some estimates suggest a rise
of 150 percent, while other estimates are based on prices in free
markets, which in mid-1990 were around three times the official
prices. Much depends on the amount by which wages are allowed to
rise in step with prices. If they increase fully as much as do prices, an
explosion is possible. While there is no way of choosing definitively
among these estimates, there is no doubt that liberalization will re-
sult in a price increase of serious proportions.
It is important to recognize, however, that these are estimates of
the increase in official prices. By contrast, grey- or black-market
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prices are already at market-clearing levels, and they are likely to fall
with liberalization while official retail prices increase sharply. Hence
for consumers the price increase will be on only a portion of their
purchases. Consumers who currently buy only in the state shops will,
of course, experience the entire burden of the rise in official prices.
It is true that rationing by price means that consumers will face a
reduction in their real wages. But they will also benefit from reduced
time spent in lines, as the current system of rationing by queues
requires. The ruble will buy less but it will buy something.
2. The serious threat to the Soviet economy is not the one-time
price jump but the possibility that this jump would set off a wage-
price spiral in which price increases lead to wage increases that in
turn lead to further price increases. A price-wage spiral can turn
into hyperinflation, as prices and wages chase one another at an
accelerating rate. Only with tough macroeconomic stabilization
measures can the government keep the one-time price jump follow-
ing upon price liberalization from turning into hyperinflation.
3. The price increase will lower the incomes and reduce the real
value of the savings of some households. There are two measures
that could moderate the social costs of price changes. First, some
basic necessities can be guaranteed to low-income households and
pensioners at prices they can afford to pay. This can be accom-
plished through the distribution of coupons for specific minimum
quantities of selected items, or by controlling the prices of a few
items such as bread, milk and cheap meat. It is important, however,
to keep the fraction of items subject to price controls few; otherwise
the required subsidies will vastly increase the budget deficit and
cause inflation to soar. In view of the geographic diversity of the
Soviet Union, such controls might be best administered by the Re-
publics or localities.
The Benefits of Liberalization
First and foremost, by freeing prices to equate supply and de-
mand, liberalization means that people's rubles will be able to buy
things. Currently that is not so. Goods are disappearing from
shelves, and Republics and localities are driven to ration basic goods
like soap, meat, bread, and cigarettes. The ruble is less and less
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convertible internally by Soviet residents into Soviet goods and ser-
vices. Free prices will make the ruble once again convertible into
domestic goods.
One advantage of the Soviet economy was that it had a common
currency used in all the fifteen Republics. But that advantage be-
comes a liability when the common currency is no longer acceptable
because prices are severely distorted. With the ruble not freely con-
vertible into goods internally, trade between enterprises and lo-
calities has shifted to a complex and inefficient barter system.
By bringing goods back on to the shelves of the shops, the de-
control of prices eliminates the long lines waiting to make purchases.
It brings goods from the back of the shop, where they are sold
illegally for high prices to a select few, to the front, available to all
willing to pay the now higher prices. Under the pressure of low
official prices that do not equate demand and supply, alternative
distribution channels have developed. A recent study found that
only 40 percent of the food is currently distributed in state stores,
with the balance distributed in enterprise stores, farm markets and
special stores serving veterans, invalids and pensioners. Such a
breakdown of the normal distribution channels is a dear sign of
repressed inflation and unrealistic official prices.
Second, liberalization makes an important contribution to stabil-
ization. Stabilization requires reducing the growth of money in-
comes. That requires first reducing the government deficit that is
financed by printing more rubles. Price liberalization eliminates or
reduces the need for subsidies for enterprises which now make up a
large part of government expenditures.
Finally, price liberalization sets the stage for greater economic
efficiency, by giving enterprises the incentive to serve the con-
sumers, on whom they will now be totally dependent. They will no
longer need to obey the Ministries who provide their subsidies, and
who pay for whatever they produce, however poor the quality.
Competition among enterprises will begin to develop, leading to
improved productivity. Though the process will take time, it will be a
major benefit of moving to a market economy, and the only possible
basis for improving the standard of living of the people of the Soviet
Union.
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To be most effective, liberalization of prices requires that enter-
prises be converted into independent, self-financing, and profit-
maximizing organizations. The most important step, which we call
corporatization, immediately establishes enterprises as independent
and financially autonomous entities; once corporatized, enterprises
must no longer be under the direction of the Ministries or depen-
dent on the government budget for subsidies and investment funds.
This step is distinct from privatization, which will require more time.
The two key elements of corporatization are independence and
self-financing for all the enterprises. Independence means the direc-
tors of an enterprise must have the authority to set prices, output,
and wages, as well as determine inputs and financing. Corporatiza-
tion would ensure the legal and actual separation of the enterprise
from the state.
Self-financing, or financial autonomy, means the enterprise can
obtain money to pay its workers, build plants, buy equipment, and to
pay its suppliers from only three sources: sales of its products, bor-
rowing from banks at realistic rates of interest, or by the sale of its
assets. The objective of self-finance is to impose hard budget con-
straints on all enterprises. An enterprise operating under a hard
budget constraint must accept the fact that it cannot turn to the
Union, the Republics, localities, or banks for subsidies or unlimited
credit. The enterprise must know that unprofitability ultimately
means bankruptcy for the firm and economic ruin for the managers.
The possibility of bankruptcy provides a market system with the
stick that makes enterprises efficient.
A market system also needs a carrot; enterprises must retain a
portion of their profits for bonuses to managers and to expand and
to improve their facilities. While a tax on corporate profits is consis-
tent with a market system, the rate must be uniform across enter-
prises, non-negotiable with the tax authorities, and must be set at
levels that still leave a significant reward for success.
Preconditions for Corporatization
Corporatization requires the government to create certain addi-
tional conditions:
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1. The government must enact and enforce laws of property.
There must be clear rules for ownership transfer and a system of
contract enforcement to encourage longer term agreements and
the development of capital markets. Creditors must have the
right to seize quickly the assets of debtors who are unwilling or
unable to meet their obligations.
2. Banks must refuse to issue credit to enterprises that have poor
economic prospects. [This issue is discussed further in chapter 4.)
3. There must be rules of bankruptcy and liquidation to govern
what happens when the claims on an enterprise exceed its liquida-
tion value.
The Steps in Corporatization of Large State Enterprises
Thejoint-stock company is the best organizational form for mak-
ing large state enterprises independent and self-financing. The ex-
isting management could serve as the initial directors.
As the initial owners of the capital stock, governments should
create Property Management Agencies (PMA) of the Union, Re-
publics, and localities. The appropriate governmental level would
depend in part on the type of company and in part on a political
decision as to the distribution ofownership among the present levels
of government.
The PMA will hold all the stock and collect the dividends. It
should have an interest in seeing that its corporations maximize
profits. The PMA will have important duties, which basically are to
behave as a traditional stockholder. I t must select directors on the
basis of their competence; it must provide as much protection as
possible against abuses of managerial discretion while avoiding in-
terference with day-to-day operations; it must resist political inter-
ference with the firm; it must not seek subsidies for its failing cor-
porations. This asks much of governmental property agencies, but
fulfilling these responsibilities is essential to a market economy, and
will help produce the benefits it alone is capable of providing.
An enterprise so transformed into ajoint-stock company, with its
stock initially assigned to the PMA, will have the ability to decide on
prices, production, product mix; on the inputs of labor, materials,
and capital, as well as the prices it will offer for these inputs; and on
the level and financing of investment. I t will have the right to enter
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freely into contracts with the government, other enterprises, and
foreign entities. It will have the right to hire and fire workers. All
these rights will, of course, be subject to the laws of the land, but
those laws must not preclude the kinds of discretion and behavior
generally provided businesses in market economies.
At the outset, enterprises would be government-owned corpora-
tions. While corporatization is an imperfect substitute for private
ownership, it is a crucial and useful first step. Corporatization can be
done quickly-in a month if necessary-once the division of owner-
ship between various levels ofgovernment has been resolved and the
property to be assigned to each enterprise has been established.
Privatization should be the ultimate goal, but privatization takes
time. To wait for privatization would delay the reforms which are so
urgent. In the short run, corporatization is a necessary compromise
that will bring a measure of independence and self-financing.
The Monopoly Problem
Many of the state enterprises are monopolies. By freeing them
from government restraint, the combination of corporatization and
price decontrol will create the possibility of monopolistic behavior
and monopoly profits. Yet reform should not be postponed until
effective competition is established. Nor should most monopolies be
subject to special price controls at the time of liberalization.
In a market system, high profits attract the entry of new rivals,
and thereby sow the seeds of destruction of the monopoly power
that made them possible. The retention of price controls for these
enterprises would interfere with that healthy competitive process,
and preserve all the distortions created by the present ubiquitous
administrative price controls. The best remedy, therefore, is encour-
agement of competition itself.
The most crucial element of such a policy is to ensure legally free
entry of enterprises into whatever markets they wish to enter.
Opening the economy to the competition of imports will further
effectively limit monopoly power, and it will do so promptly. In
addition, laws can be enacted, like the American antitrust laws, pro-
hibiting enterprises from combining or agreeing among themselves
to limit competition.
The one exception to this general principle would be the natural
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monopolies, such as the railroads, some communications services, or
the local distribution ofelectricity, water, or gas. In these cases, either
the technological advantages of large scale or the existence of mo-
nopoly bottlenecks give a single firm a cost advantage over all possi-
ble rivals. For such natural monopolies, and for them only, the kinds
of price regulation practiced in most market economies would con-
tinue to be necessary in the Soviet Union as well.
The Soviet economy is unlikely to become consistently and perva-
sively competitive overnight. A successful demonopolization effort
will take time. That is one of the most important reasons why we
emphasize the necessity for opening the economy to international
trade at the earliest possible moment. It is also one possible reason to
delay ultimate privatization, since private owners may successfully
resist demonopolization. Still, we think that thorough conversion of
the Soviet economy into a competitive one cannot be considered an
essential precondition for the reforms recommended here. They
cannot be delayed.
Small Business and Agriculture
Corporatization applies largely to large state enterprises. A dif-
ferent approach can apply to small businesses. Retailing, services,
and small-scale manufacturing are activities that can be quickly pri-
vatized by sale or leasing. This denationalization can probably best
be done by local governments. Improving retailing and services by
introducing competition is a step that can improve consumer wel-
fare quickly at little cost in resources.
Entry of new enterprises is likely in these activities. All require-
ments to enter new markets or activities should be abolished except
the minimum necessary to protect public health and safety (e.g.,
sanitary standards for restaurants and food stores).
Agriculture is a special case in which a mix of corporatization and
small-scale individual ownership may prove most appropriate. Indi-
vidual farmers should have the opportunity to own or lease land to
engage in small-scale farming-mainly in fruit, vegetables, meat
and dairy production. Large-scale agricultural organizations are
likely to be most efficient in grain production, and such units should
be converted to joint-stock companies along the lines discussed
above.
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The Problem Today
In addition to the microeconomic issues of pricing, the Soviet
Union today faces a huge and growing government budget deficit,
money incomes that are rising much more rapidly than output,
worsening open and repressed inflation, and a flight from the ruble.
In a free market, rising incomes and stagnant production would
result in a rise in prices-inflation-sufficient to ration out the in-
creased demand. Since most retail prices are fixed in the Soviet
Union, the increased demand manifests itself in barer and barer
shelves in state stores and lines that get longer and longer. The few
goods left in the state stores are rusty tins and rotten cabbages. Free-
market or black-market prices rise sharply, and the street price of
hard currency diverges even more from the official rate.
Once shortages appear, the dynamics of hoarding take over as
people begin to worry about the value of their rubles and begin to
use goods as a store of value. Republics are driven to ration basic
goods like soap, meat, cigarettes, and sugar. Overvalued rubles drive
out undervalued goods. In other words, the ruble is less and less
convertible internally by Soviet residents into Soviet goods and
services.
Diagnosis
All of these are the familiar symptoms of severe repressed inflation.
It is a syndrome that has been seen in many countries over the
twentieth century. In understanding the issue, we separate the
causes into three categories:
• Ruble overhang. The "ruble overhang" signifies that households
have excess spending power in currency and savings accounts.
This is the result of past budget deficits.
• Budget deficit. The current budget deficit adds continuously to
the ruble overhang. The official budget deficit (expenditures less
receipts) is on the order of 10 percent of GNP. This deficit will
explode in 1991 if retail prices are not raised when wholesale
prices are liberalized. Because of the structure of the Soviet finan-
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cial system, budget deficits are effectively monetized imme-
diately; they are turned automatically into cash or savings
accounts .
• Hoarding. As people come to expect price increases, there oc-
curs an outbreak of hoarding and attempts to flee the ruble.
Particularly after the announcement of future price increases in
May 1990, the shelves in state stores were cleaned out of goods.
The black-market exchange rate of the ruble has fallen in 1990,
another indication of price disequilibrium and widespread
hoarding. More recently, there has been considerable "dollariza-
tion," or use of foreign currencies inside the Soviet Union-a
further indication of a deteriorating confidence in the ruble and
of a repressed inflation.
Stabilization Policies in the Short Run
As late as last summer, it might have been possible to stabilize the
economy-bringing total demand in line with total supply by mone-
tary and fiscal measures-prior to taking some of the other steps.
This is no longer possible; the crisis is too severe, and stabilization
now requires the support of the other measures.
The immediate threat is that the deterioration of economic ac-
tivity and the disruption of the distribution system will get worse:
fewer goods in state stores, more dollarization, greater divergence
between official and black-market prices, and spiraling inflation. In
response to the breakdown of the price system, Republics and lo-
calities will turn increasingly to rationing, coupons, substitute cur-
rencies, border controls, and restrictions on movement of goods.
The major goal of stabilization policy should be to restrain the
growth of money incomes. The primary tools for accomplishing this
are through reducing the budget deficit, tightening credit, and lib-
eralizing prices.
Given the existing budget policies and the "ruble overhang," it
will be difficult to avoid a major increase in the average price level in
the period ahead. If liberalization of prices is postponed, the flight
from the ruble will intensify, inflation will accelerate, and hyper-
inflation will become a real possibility. The best hope for avoiding
this kind of total breakdown is price liberalization and a tough curb
on budget and credit policies. The sooner prices are liberalized, the
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smaller will be the pricejump and the less will be the risk of hyperin-
flation.
The following steps will help stabilize the economy and prevent
runaway inflation:
1. The first priority is to reduce the budget deficit. A balanced
budget would effectively control the growth of incomes. If the bud-
get is not controlled, incomes will continue to rise, and an uncon-
trolled price-wage-price spiral may begin.
The priorities for reducing the budget deficit are, in every coun-
try, subject to controversy and political debate, but we have a few
concrete recommendations. The most important action in the short
run would be to liberalize prices and remove subsidies; without such
a measure, the budget deficit will rise by at least 100 billion rubles.
Liberalization today is an essential step toward stabilization.
More generally, we recommend focusing on spending reductions
rather than tax increases. There is clear room for reduction of sub-
sidies to unprofitable industries; this is in any event essential to
establish market discipline. Central investments are thought to be
highly inefficient and can be cut. The allocation of hard currency
might be immediately reformed, say by hard-currency auctions; this
would reduce the budget deficit substantially.
2. We believe that a substantial tightening of credit is essential to
subject enterprises to hard budget constraints. It is neither possible
nor necessary in the short run to privatize the banking system in
order to have tough credit policies. In the longer run, however,
creating a private banking system will help ensure that result.
In the near term, Gosbank must make enterprises financially
independent by extending credit only to firms that can repay it; this
implies curbing credits to unprofitable enterprises. In addition, the
banking system must place overall credit limits on the enterprise
sector, much as western central banks do today. We envision that
banks will charge high interest rates to enterprises under a regime of
tight credit. In the period surrounding liberalization, real interest
rates (equal to money interest rates less the rate of inflation) must be
positive; this implies that money interest rates must be well above
today's level. After inflation has stabilized, interest rates can be re-
duced to levels prevailing in market economies.
3. We believe that the current structure of taxes is on the whole
viable for the immediate future. However, one major point is vitally
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important: all "specific" turnover or other taxes (i.e., taxes denomi-
nated in ruble terms per unit) must be replaced with percentage or
"ad valorem" taxes (i.e., taxes set as a percent of the product price).
This step will prevent the erosion of real taxes as prices rise. We
understand this proposal is under consideration and endorse it
strongly. More generally, government expenditures should be bud-
geted in rubles rather than in real terms so as to prevent the develop-
ment of an inflationary psychology and to slow any inflationary
spiral.
Some economists advocate a monetary reform to solve the stabil-
ization problem. For example, existing rubles might be exchanged
for new rubles at, say, 2-to-l or 3-to-l; other suggestions are "paral-
lel rubles" or "gold rubles." We believe these approaches should be
avoided unless budget and monetary stability are absolutely guaran-
teed. If a monetary reform fails, as it surely will in the absence of
strict fiscal and monetary discipline, the government will lose most
of its remaining credibility. On the other hand, if monetary stability
is achieved, then monetary reform is likely to be unnecessary.
A major question is whether it is desirable, by indexing, to com-
pensate various groups for price increases. We recommend mini-
mizing the amount of automatic indexation. There is no way to
index the entire economy. Indexation cannot produce goods; it sim-
ply redistributes real resources from one group to another. The
more the system is indexed, the greater is the threat of hyperinfla-
tion. Many countries have indexed their economies and have lived to
regret it; indeed, in the country with the greatest price stability, the
Federal Republic of Germany, wage indexation is illegal.
The only exception we would recommend is for transfer pay-
ments to low-income households, like pensioners, who must be pro-
tected against the hardships of a severe inflation. Indexation of
wages should be altogether avoided if at all possible.
What about the possibility of "incomes policies," designed to con-
trol wages and prices directly? We believe that tight fiscal and credit
policies are the crucial ingredient for the containment of inflation.
The only certain way to check inflation is the threat of unemploy-
ment and bankruptcy that prevents firms from raising prices; for
this, tight budget and credit policies are essential. Incomes policies
The Soviet Economic Crisis 33
may help, but they must not be used as a substitute for fiscal and
monetary discipline.
v. MODERATE THE SOCIAL COSTS
OF UNEMPLOYMENT
Perhaps the most serious adverse consequence of the essential
reforms we identify here will be a sharp increase in open unemploy-
ment. The weaning of State enterprises from governmental sub-
sidies and easy credit, the authority and incentives managers will and
must have to reduce costs and increase efficiency, the introduction of
competition both domestic and foreign and the elimination of infla-
tion, will all inevitably mean the displacement of large numbers of
workers from their current employments.
In a dynamic economy, the resources released in this way will be
absorbed in the expansion ofoutput, the springing into existence of
new enterprises, the opening up ofopportunities for exports, and in
the increase in effective consumer demand and real income that
improvements in productivity make possible. And that kind of eco-
nomic progress is impossible if every worker is instead given a one
hundred percent guarantee of retaining his or her job in its present
location.
Unemployment compensation is the only possible way of recon-
ciling this requirement of reversing the present disintegration and
stagnation of the Soviet economy with the prevention of severe
hardships for workers in the transition. Such a system will provide
workers who are laid off with temporary support. However, that
support must be substantially below the wages of those who continue
to work and should decrease with the length of unemployment, in
order to preserve incentives for workers to relocate, retrain, and
accept alternative employment.
Given the geographic diversity in the Soviet Union in terms of
wage levels and the cost of living, it would be desirable to have the
unemployment compensation system administered by the Republics
and localities. Of course, these levels of government must have the
tax revenues necessary to meet the costs of an unemployment com-
pensation system.
34 The Study Group Chainnen
VI. OPEN THE ECONOMY INTERNATIONALLY
In a sense, the several steps we have recommended to this point
are all steps to create an open, competitive market economy within
the Soviet Union. These also require avoiding the imposition of
trade barriers among the several republics.
In addition, as the Soviet Union liberalizes and stabilizes its econ-
omy, opening the economy internationally can playa critical role. We
recommend moving to a convertible currency and removing import
and export restrictions very quickly. Opening the economy will pro-
vide consumer goods, will speed the introduction of foreign technol-
ogy, will ensure that prices reflect competitive world market prices,
and will restrain monopolistic forces inside the Soviet Union.
We recommend that the ruble be made freely convertible for all
imports and exports, with limitations only on "capital-account"
transactions. In addition, we recommend that all quantitative re-
strictions be replaced by low and uniform tariffs, in the neighbor-
hood of 10 percent. 1
Reasons for Opening the Economy
There are several reasons for opening the economy very quickly.
The principal reason is that it would expose the Soviet Union to the
competitive world marketplace. The Soviet economy must make the
transition to new lines of production and more efficient productive
techniques. History shows that the quickest way to achieve an effi-
cient pattern of production is to allow the price signals of the market
to get transmitted to domestic enterprises. By removing quantitative
restrictions on imports and allowing ruble convertibility, Soviet en-
terprises will have a price and quality standard that they must match
in order to sell at home or abroad.
Second, currency convertibility will ensure that Soviet prices will
move to market-clearing levels. Foreign firms are adept at finding
the combination of prices, quantity, and quality appropriate to each
I. The reader should also note that chapter 5 recommends additional transitional
tariffs for industries that are not initially internationally competitive but have the
potential to become so. We do not intend so rapid a dismantling of protection as this
sentence, standing alone, might imply. The original text has not been changed be-
cause, as noted earlier, we wish to retain the form in which it was submitted to the
USSR State Commission. (Footnote added by the editors.)
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country; they will force the newly corporatized Soviet firms to align
internal prices with the world prices of tradable goods, adjusted for
quality differences. The sooner convertibility is introduced, the
quicker will be this alignment.
Third, opening the economy will provide goods to Soviet workers
whose incentive to produce is at present severely undermined by
shortages and the unavailability of domestic and foreign goods and
services. Opening the economy will offer a wide array of new goods,
albeit at high prices; ironically, however, these prices are likely to be
lower than the ones prevailing in today's black markets.
Finally, as noted earlier, corporatization and price liberalization
will allow some Soviet enterprises to charge high prices. Introd uc-
tion of foreign competition will be the most effective and imme-
diately available method of restraining the exercise of monopoly
power for tradable goods. Easy entry by foreign firms into the Soviet
market will provide some check on nontradable sectors as well.
These are compelling reasons to place opening the economy near
the top ofany serious move to a market economy. We propose taking
these steps as soon as possible, either simultaneously with or very
quickly after most prices are liberalized.
Concrete Steps
I. The ruble should become freely convertible into other curren-
cies for all "current" transactions. Current account convertibility
means that Soviet enterprises and individuals have free access to
foreign exchange for the purchase of foreign goods and services,
and that foreigners have free access to sell in the Soviet market. All
Soviet and foreign enterprises will be allowed to buy and sell rubles
and foreign currencies for the purposes of export and import of
goods and services. Foreign firms should be allowed to hold ruble
accounts and to repatriate their profits. We propose an initiallimita-
tion on "capital" transactions, however. Soviet residents would not be
permitted to hold foreign securities or large quantities of foreign
currencies.
2. In the long run, it would be desirable to have a fixed exchange
rate for Western currencies. In the near term, this will not be feasi-
ble, because of the prospect ofsevere inflation. It is therefore recom-
mended that the ruble be allowed to float, although the government
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will probably want to intervene to prevent excessive short-term
exchange-rate fluctuations. 2
A freely floating ruble will initially move to a level between the
official rate and the black-market rate. Thus, depreciation upon
floating is both inevitable and desirable. A lower exchange rate will
balance supply and demand for foreign exchange, will ensure that
enterprises can buy foreign goods when that is most efficient, and
will provide a wider variety of goods and services to consumers.
We warn against an overvalued exchange rate. It would be better
to have the ruble priced too low than too high. An undervalued ruble
ensures that doing business in the Soviet Union would become a
bargain, and foreign firms and technology would be attracted to set
up production there.
3. We recommend replacement of all quantitative restrictions on
imports with a uniform tariff on all imports in the neighborhood of
10 percent. Tariffs are more evenhanded than quotas as a way of
protecting domestic industry, and they avoid the administrative sys-
tem that currently dominates and distorts Soviet foreign trade. In
addition, tariffs can provide a source of valuable government reve-
nues. It may be desirable to subsidize importation as well as domestic
production of some food products, such as bread and vegetable oils,
which are exceptionally important to households. Energy exports,
particularly oil and gas, may need to have a temporary export tax to
cushion domestic consumers from large price increases, although
permitting domestic energy prices eventually to increase to world
levels-which we strongly recommend-will free up resources for
exports and generate an important source of export earnings.
Economic Union
One of the critical issues facing Soviet policymakers concerns the
economic relationships between the Union and the Republics. From
an economic point of view, maintaining free trade among the differ-
ent regions would contribute to an efficient division oflabor and use
of resources. In many ways, the existence of the United States as a
continental free trade zone has contributed to the success of the
2. The reader should note that in chapter 5 we recommend adopting a fixed ex-
change rate. As explained there, a floating exchange rate is presented here as a
second-best proposal because the macroeconomic stability that a fixed exchange rate
requires is unlikely to be achieved in the near future. (Footnote added by the editors.)
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American economy, and the European Community is moving to-
ward a free-trade region.
The centrifugal forces leading Republics and localities to seize
control and demand autonomy arise from the breakdown of the
current administrative system. When administrative prices deviate
so far from realistic prices, nobody wants to sell and everybody wants
to keep goods at home. It is futile to try to negotiate agreements
between the Union and the Republics in a world where the terms of
trade-the prices-are so distorted, where trade is involuntary, and
where everyone feels exploited.
There are powerful gains from maintaining a free-trade zone
when the price mechanism is functioning effectively. However, only
when prices are freed and reflect genuine scarcities and costs, and
the ruble regains value and stability, will the economic conditions be
propitious for forging a political consensus about the shape of the
new Soviet Union.
VII. CONCLUSION
To succeed, these measures must be explained to the parliament,
to the media, and to the people. Successful adoption will require a
firm, wholehearted, and consistent commitment by Soviet leaders
and the reaching of an accord with the leaders of the Republics.
We recognize that the proposals will be painful and controversial.
They impose major social costs in the short run as the Soviet society
makes the transition from a centralized administrative approach to
the decentralized direction of individuals through markets. More-
over, it is not possible to provide an ironclad guarantee that these
measures will cure the nation's ailments. But we can say with confi-
dence that history shows again and again that allowing markets to
direct an economy offers the best hope for resuscitating the sick
economy and for raising living standards toward those in Western
Europe and the United States.
Chapter Three
Price Deregulation, Corporatization,
and Competition
Alfred E. Kahn and Merton J. Peck
This chapter is an elaboration of two of the key proposals sum-
marized in the policy memorandum (chapter 2)-the deregulation
of prices l and the corporatization of large state enterprises, along
with their logical complement, the promotion of competition.
DEREGULATE PRICES
The intent of our recommendation is that sellers throughout the
economy, with a limited number ofexceptions, be allowed to set their
prices wherever they choose-or wherever the market will permit-
free of direct state control. Along with our corporatization proposal-
that is, simultaneously converting the present state enterprises into
financially and managerially independent organizations-we would
expect the liberated enterprises to be guided, in setting prices, by the
profits they would be expected to produce: ideally, their goal should
be to maximize profits.
Note: Although our report is based in part on the discussions of the study group that
metat Sopron, Hungary inJuly 1990 and the study group chairmen's meeting held in
New Haven, Connecticut, in November 1990, and on the papers prepared by Soviet
colleagues for the Sopron Conference, we alone are responsible for the present
version. We wish to thank Dr. V. Shironin ofthe AII- Union InstituteofSystem Studies in
Moscow for his provision of statistics previously unavailable, as well as his suggestions
on an earlier draft.
1. In the policy memorandum, we characterized our recommendation in terms of price
"liberalization."That characterization could be misleading, because itcould be taken to
mean only the relaxation of governmental controls, whereas the intention of our
recommendations is that prices be.totally liberated from such controls.
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The Benefits of Deregulation
The essence of an effectively functioning market system is that
the prices of all products are determined by the interaction of com-
petitive supply and demand. Prices set in this way equate the quan-
tities sellers offer for sale and the quantities buyers demand: at those
prices there are no unsatisfied would-be buyers or sellers. Buyers are
free to choose among all products and services, guided only by their
own evaluations of them and by the necessity of having to pay prices
that reflect the costs to society of meeting their demands. This en-
courages buyers to economize in the use of their limited incomes,
and producers, under pressure of competition and the need to at-
tract buyers, to strive for efficiency. The overall consequence is
that-income distributional considerations aside2-society extracts
the maximum level of satisfaction from its limited total resources.
We are aware, of course, that the transition from a tightly con-
trolled to a market economy can involve severe disruptions and
hardships. Indeed, as of April 1991, the union government evi-
dently thinks that because of the present economic crisis, genuine
and comprehensive decontrol of prices is out of the question. We
draw exactly the opposite conclusion: the current crisis in the Soviet
Union is primarily the result of the halting and incomplete nature of
the reforms to date. Greater autonomy for the state enterprises has
led to an explosion of wages, but because corporatization is in-
complete and prices still state-controlled, the result has been a corre-
sponding explosion of state subsidies and soft credits. Similarly, sub-
stantial decontrol of wholesale prices and channels of distribution
has further multiplied the need for state subsidies to hold retail
prices down and has led to large-scale diversion of products from
normal channels, recourse to barter, breakdown of interrepublic
trade and a firestorm of hoarding.
2. It is possible to believe that the market does what it does with extremely great
efficiency, as we do, while also recognizing that the distribution of income and social
benefits that it yields is inconsistent with widely held conceptions of fairness. Most
Western economists, therefore, would qualify this endorsement of a market economy
by recognizing the desirability of governmental interventions in the interest of
greater fairness-whether by direct redistributions of income, or by protecting indi-
viduals from the vicissitudes of the market, or by providing to all citizens some
minimum standard of living and, at the very least, to ensure a greater degree of
equality of opportunity.
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The present crisis has many aspects and causes, but its most visible
and painful manifestation is the breakdown of retail and wholesale
distribution. 3 Official prices are so far below market-clearing levels
that everyone is loath to sell and everyone wants to buy. The result is
hoarding and widespread recourse to inefficient barter. Supplies
are diverted from the established channels into more profitable
black markets. The shelves in the state retail stores are empty and the
queues long, and production is down as factories find materials
difficult to obtain. The present economic disintegration provides
the clearest possible evidence that an economy partly liberalized but
in major part still centrally controlled does not work.
In these circumstances, there are only two real alternatives-to
return to thoroughgoing central control or to proceed with immedi-
ate and comprehensive price deregulation. We have already made
clear our conviction that the latter is far preferable to the former.
Price deregulation would make sellers eager once again to sell for
rubles. To achieve this end it must be comprehensive: individual sellers
will want to accept rubles only if they can in turn use them to buy
both consumer products and the raw and intermediate materials
they need to continue producing and distributing products. This
means that prices throughout the economy must be market-
clearing: people and enterprises that have rubles must be able to
purchase what they want, as long as they are prepared to pay prices
fully reflecting the costs of supplying them.
The way in which prices are determined in an economy is inti-
mately connected with all the other ways in which its economic ac-
tivities are coordinated. Comprehensive price decontrol is therefore
a necessary condition ofall the other reforms that we advocate in the
policy memorandum (chapter 2); and these reforms, in turn, are
necessary to make price deregulation effective.
For example, corporatization, as we have already pointed out,
cannot work as long as prices are rigidly controlled: the liberated
enterprises can be neither independent nor self-financing if the
government determines the prices they can charge. Corporatiza-
tion, in turn, is necessary if enterprises are to respond to profit
opportunities and price signals, and thus make a free market econ-
3. Wholesale distribution is used here, as in the USSR, to include sales ofall intermedi-
ate inputs between enterprises rather than, as in the West, only sales by manufacturers
and distributors to retailers.
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omy work. Similarly for macroeconomic stabilization: price de-
control will eliminate the justification for subsidies to enterprises,
which have in turn been a major source of inflation. There are
estimates that the enterprise subsidies accounted for as much as 10
percent of gross national product (GNP) in 1990 and may double in
1991.4 Under corporatization, the former state enterprises will have
to cover their costs through the revenues they can generate in an
uncontrolled market or go out of business. Elimination of the
subsidies-which will be possible only if prices are comprehensively
deregulated-would therefore make a major contribution toward
fulfilling the most important component ofany macroeconomic sta-
bilization program-the reduction of government spending, as is
emphasized in chapter 4.
Control of inflationary pressures will be essential, in turn, if the
one-shot general upward surge in prices that is likely to follow de-
control is not to be converted into a runaway inflation-which would
discredit price reform and prevent a market economy from func-
tioning efficiently.
Once again, opening the economy of the Soviet Union to world
trade would be both pointless and ineffective if it were not accom-
panied by a freeing of its price-making mechanisms. Only then will
both businesses and buyers receive the signals that will result in the
country specializing in areas in which it has inherent competitive
advantages and having recourse to imports of goods and services in
the supply of which it is at a competitive disadvantage. On the other
hand, opening the economy to imports is an essential part of the
program to subject domestic enterprises to the constraints of com-
petition, thereby mitigating the danger that corporatization and
price decontrol will merely result in monopolistic exploitation of
consumers.
Similarly, both privatization and the establishment of capital mar-
kets, the subject of chapter 7, obviously require the liberation of
prices from government control; private investment is simply not
going to be forthcoming if the state continues to fix prices. And,
once again, the causal connection runs in the opposite direction as
4. The Economy of the USSR: Summary and Recommendations, a study undertaken in
response to a request by the Houston Summit (Washington, D.C.: International
Monetary Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development, and European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development, 1990), 17.
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well: private enterprise and well-organized capital markets are nec-
essary if the economy is to respond efficiently to the signals provided
by free market prices.
Finally, although the decontrol of prices is not a necessary condi-
tion for enacting our various proposals for alleviating unemploy-
ment, it is inconceivable that prices could be freed, state subsidies to
enterprises eliminated, and the economy opened to competition
were these reforms not accompanied by some system of transitional
social support for the people who are likely to be thrown out ofwork
as a result of them.
In short, in any society or economy, everything depends on every-
thing else; and this is certainly the case with respect to a market
economy. For this reason, our several reform proposals are inex-
tricably interdependent.
The Costs of Liberalization
If the deregulation of prices were painless, it would have been
accomplished a long time ago, in view of the enormous long-term
benefits it promises. Unfortunately, it will also inevitably involve
severe costs, especially in the short-term. Because of the severe sup-
pressed inflation now afflicting the Soviet economy, reasonable esti-
mates of the probable average increase in official prices upon de-
control range between 50 and 300 percent: it is impossible to
estimate more precisely, since the size of the increase will depend on
how consumers and enterprises respond. The more they respond by
rushing to spend their accumulated monetary holdings, the more
prices will rise.
It is necessary immediately to qualify these frightening estimates
in two very important ways. The first is that these estimates concern
the expected increase in official prices. If the ceilings on those prices
are lifted, prices in the farmers' and black markets are very likely to
fall. 5 The free market price ofchickens in Moscow in December 1990
5. It is worth pointing out that there are a whole range of markets in the USSR. only
some ofwhich are legal. The state stores sell goods at heavily regulated prices and are,
ofcourse, perfectly legal. Prices on the illegal black market are unregulated, as are the
prices on the legal collective farm market. In addition, as the official distribution
system has grown less effective, the last few years have witnessed increasing reliance
on distribution and sale of hard-to-get goods through individual places of
employment.
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was ten times the official price in the state stores-where chicken
was seldom available. Once the state stores are free to pay the free
market price, farmers and distributors will no longer have an incen-
tive to divert their sales to the free or black market, or to hold them
on the farm for use in bartering transactions; and buyers who today
can satisfy their wants only outside official channels-and can af-
ford it-will no longer find it necessary to do so, and in so doing to
drive up those prices. As a result, although decontrol could mean a
threefold increase in the price in the state stores, it is highly likely to
mean a decrease for consumers who today patronize the free or
black markets.
The same is true of the prices that enterprises are likely to have to
pay for their raw materials or semifinished inputs. The ones that are
able today to obtain those supplies at the official prices will undoubt-
edly experience a substantial price increase; those who now have to
do so through complicated barter arrangements are likely to experi-
ence decreases.
Moreover, the present dual distribution system, on top of a great
deal of simple barter, is extraordinarily inefficient. The return to an
effectively functioning money economy, in which goods are freely
bought and sold for rubles, will have a powerful salutary influence in
holding down price increases generally.
The second consideration is that an increase-even a substantial
increase-in the prices of goods and services that consumers will
then find readily available in the shops, as compared with the official
prices of those same goods that were previously simply unavailable,
is in a very real sense no price increase at al1.6 This beneficial aspect
of deregulation-increased availability of goods in the shops-is
likely to be very large. As of the summer of 1990, 42 percent of the
meat and meat products, 55 percent of the vegetables, 20 percent of
the milk, 75 percent of the potatoes, and 44 percent ofthe eggs were
sold outside the state retail distribution system.7 At the very least,
6. One is reminded of the story during World War II of the customer who, upon being
quoted a price of a dollar a pound for coffee by a shopkeeper, complained that the
price in the shop across the street was only half that; when the shopkeeper asked him,
then, why he didn't buy his coffee across the street, the customer responded, "But
they don't have any coffee."
7. Transition to the Market: A Report ofa Working Group Formed by M. S. Gorbochev and B.
N. Yeltsin, Part I: The Concept and Program (Moscow: Cultural Initiative Foundation,
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against the negative effect on consumer welfare of the increase in
official prices, consequent on the freeing of markets, must surely be
weighed the complexities, uncertainties, and arbitrariness of the
present system; the anger that it understandably generates; the vex-
ations of having to wait in long queues for long periods of time and
finding the shelves bare; the stark choices Soviet consumers find
themselves forced to make between shoddy merchandise and no
merchandise at all; and the time and energy expended in bartering
goods and services that could thenceforth simply be bought with
rubles.
All these things must be said, without any intention to minimize
the distress that the price increases in the state stores will inflict on
low-income consumers to whom the vexations of long lines, empty
shelves, and wasted time are of less moment than the higher prices
they would have to pay in the future.
The one-time jump in official prices, then, is a necessary and
inescapable cost of moving to a market economy. The critical neces-
sity will be to keep that one-time inflationaryjump from turning into
hyperinflation, in which prices and wages chase one another at an
increasing rate. That would be a disaster; and that is why the freeing
of prices must be accompanied by the kinds of macroeconomic mea-
sures to control inflation that are discussed in chapter 4.
Exceptions and Measures to Ease the Transition
Although the case for freeing prices from controls applies to all
goods and services except ones supplied under conditions where
effective competition is impossible, we conceive the probable neces-
sity of a more gradual transition in a few very limited cases, along
with other measures to mitigate the severe distress that total de-
control could inflict on low-income families.
Decontrol would necessarily result in wide variations among
goods and services in the extent to which their prices increase above
their present official levels. One important reason for this is that the
present state subsidies are not spread evenly across all products, and,
since in a free market prices must cover costs, this obviously means
1990),67. The task force was headed by Academician S. Shatalin, and it is henceforth
cited as the Shatalin Report. The document is also known as the Report on the Five-
Hundred-Day Plan.
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Table 3.1
Ratio of Input Costs to Producers' Price for Selected Consumer Goods, 1989
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Subsidized Items
Housing and utilities
Communication
Meat
Milk
Transportation
Fruits and vegetables
Unsubsidized Items That Are
Profitable or Taxed
Confectionery
Clothes
Durables
Wine
Vodka
Input Costs/Price
6.02
2.67
1.86
1.81
1.62
1.22
0.76
0.74
0.54
0.43
0.10
Source: V. Shironin. "Product Prices in the USSR" (Paper presented at the llASA
Conference on Economic Reform and Integration in Sopron, Hungary, July-
August 1990).
that highly subsidized products will experience greater increases
than unsubsidized ones.
Table 3.1, which compares the input costs of various products
with their regulated producer prices, provides a rough indication of
the kinds of variations that are likely to be experienced. The table
was calculated by adjusting prices of inputs by the tax or subsidy
applied to them, including the taxes and subsidies on the inputs used
to produce the inputs. Producer prices are the equivalent ofwhat are
called elsewhere wholesale prices, that is, the prices to retail estab-
lishments.
A ratio of input costs to price of more than one indicates a subsidy,
less than one, taxes or profits: the 6.02 for housing and utilities
suggests costs are an astounding six times the official price; at the
other extreme, the 0.10 ratio for vodka clearly reflects prices far in
excess of costs.
Housing is obviously very heavily subsidized; this is not surpris-
ing, considering that Soviet families on average pay only 3 percent of
their income for rent; the roughly comparable ratio in market econ-
omies is on the order of 30 percent. Meat, milk, fruit, and vegetables
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are also heavily subsidized.s When a consumer buys milk at a state
store, the price covers only 55 percent of its cost.
These facts strongly suggest the advisability of gradualism in de-
controlling the prices of goods and services that are of importance,
either symbolic or real, to low-income groups. These families live
under desperately difficult conditions and must have some protec-
tion from sudden and extreme price increases, such as seem likely to
occur in housing, meat, milk, and public transportation, particularly
since they are the most dependent upon the official sources of sup-
ply. Decontrol of rents, similarly, must clearly be permitted to take
place only over a number of years.
Confinement of state subsidies to this very important but rela-
tively small bundle of goods and services will still permit very sharp
reductions in their total, and therefore not be inconsistent with mac-
roeconomic stabilization.
On the other hand, price controls are a very inefficient way of
helping poor people. Many in the lowest income group are pen-
sioners; the most straightforward way of protecting them would be
to raise their pensions-a possibility discussed in chapter 6. Another
option would be for local governments to provide people with low
incomes ration coupons carrying the right to purchase a fixed quan-
tity of selected items at a low price, although the International Mon-
etary Fund report suggests that such a means-tested program might
be too complicated to administer.9 A less efficient and more costly
alternative would be to give everyone such ration coupons, with
purchases above the quantities covered by the coupons having to be
made at market prices.
Another way of making the transition to higher market prices
more acceptable to consumers would be to ensure adequate invento-
ries at the time of deregulation. The pain of higher prices would
then be offset to some extent by the greater availability of goods in
the shops. The inventory build-up might be accomplished by in-
creased imports, using foreign exchange reserves; such imports
8. The best-known subsidized price was that of bread, which, until its recent trebling,
had remained unchanged since 1962, at 20 kopecks. The subsidy for bread would not
have been reflected in the calculations reproduced in table 3.1 because it is provided
at the retail level; table 3.1 captures only subsidies at the wholesale level-that is,
before the products or services reach the retailer.
9. Economy of the USSR, 5.
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would also be excellent candidates for temporary foreign aid. Pro-
viding ample stocks in retail stores at the time of deregulation should
moderate panic buying. We emphasize that such a recourse to bor-
rowing or foreign aid for this purpose should be a one-time mea-
sure, as part of an effort to build confidence in the economic
reforms.
Low-income families can also be helped by other kinds of direct
subsidy, without the distortions of price control. We assume, for
example, that medical care and education will continue to be pro-
vided by the state at nominal or no charges.
Although they are not directly reflected in table 3.1, except inso-
far as they are included in the category "housing and utilities," en-
ergy prices in the Soviet Union are far below market-clearing levels.
It might appear that these prices, too, provide a case for retaining
price controls, considering the importance of energy prices in the
economy at large: the USSR hardly needs an oil shock such as af-
flicted most countries of the world in 1973-74 and 1979-81.
On the other hand, precisely because oil is so very important in
the economy and conservation in its use so necessary-partly be-
cause of the importance ofoil exports as a source of precious foreign
exchange-we would be inclined to resist the retention of price
controls-which encourage wasteful consumption, breed shortages
and queues, and are extremely inefficient. The way to help poor
families with their utility bills, for example, would be to have special
means-tested lifeline rates, such as many electric and gas utilities
offer in the United States. Similarly, the way to cushion low-income
families from soaring rents and prices of essential foods is, as in
Western countries, to provide means-tested rent subsidies, food
stamps and the like.
Chapter 5 proposes an attractive transitional compromise, in con-
sideration of its estimate that the present prices of oil and gas in the
Soviet Union are at only about 20 percent of the world levels, and
simple deregulation and an immediate opening of the Soviet econ-
omy would impart a very painful shock to all energy-consuming
enterprises. Its proposed solution is a large export tax on oil, suffi-
cient at the outset to maintain the present relationship between do-
mestic and world prices, but scheduled to be reduced regularly over
a five- to seven-year period-conceivably, if the supply is believed to
be sufficiently elastic, to zero.
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We reemphasize the importance of keeping the exceptions to
price decontrol few. Market economies can function reasonably well
if a few items are singled out for controls; but the controls that are
defensible are, typically, of commodities supplied under conditions
of natural monopoly, whose purpose is to prevent monopolistic ex-
ploitation rather than to hold prices below cost. And so while it may
be necessary to phase out controls on the prices ofhousing, milk, and
meat, it is far better to help poor people through the transition in
ways that do not prevent prices from fulfilling their essential role of
eliciting supply-for example, by specific subsidies to the low-
income groups, or by free or subsidized provision of food, rental
accommodations, and modest quantities of utility services.
Partial, Gradual, and Administered Liberalization
It is widely recognized in the Soviet Union that the present struc-
ture of prices is grossly distorted-that is to say, that the prices of its
millions of individual goods and services are in widely varying de-
grees out of line with their respective costs, and therefore with one
another. It is widely recognized also that official prices at both the
retail and producer level are too low. The official response has been
partial deregulations and gradual correction by administrative de-
cree, rather than the immediate, close to universal decontrol that we
propose.
This emphasis on gradualism and the reluctance to dismantle the
entire framework ofgovernmental price controls that it reflects is, of
course, understandable. As we have already recognized, the price
increases following total removal of governmental restraints are
likely to be very large, particularly at the retail level. And while the
historic regime of stable, artificially suppressed official prices has
had as its inevitable accompaniment long lines at the shops, shoddy
quality, and empty shelves, that is the tradeoff to which the Soviet
public has been accustomed; violent departures from it, however
large the offsetting advantages and promise of long-term benefits,
are likely to generate a severe political reaction.
The fact remains-and we cannot emphasize it too strongly-
that any attempts to move only partially or gradually, under con-
tinued governmental management, are almost certainly going to
create new distortions, shortages, and hardships-as, we submit, the
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experience of the last five years has clearly demonstrated-while at
the same time at best delaying and at worst putting off indefinite
achievement of the ultimate free market system that holds the key to
genuine improvement in living standards.
There are several fundamental reasons why governmentally ad-
ministered price reform, within a framework of continued com-
prehensive price controls, can only make matters worse rather than
better-indeed, has demonstrably already done so.
The first reason is that administrative price reform or correction
will inevitably be extended over a considerable period of time. An
effective market economy requires that the price of every good and
service be set at levels that equate its demand and supply. The sheer
size of the administrative problem of achieving such a result by
governmental correction is staggering. Ed Hewett reports that Gos-
komtsen, the price control agency, reviews annually about 200,000
proposals for price changes-700 each working day. An estimated
300,000 more are handled by the economic ministries or other
authorities. 10
Moreover, the continued responsibility of the government for
prices, under such a process, means that the decisions will continue
to be subject to political considerations and pressures. In circum-
stances in which commodities and services are almost all in short
supply, these pressures will inevitably constrain administrative cor-
rections to relatively modest levels; II as a result, the price reforms, as
long as the will to continue them persists-and that itself is subject to
doubt-will inevitably consist ofa series of successive increases, each
one too little and too late. As long as the government is responsible
for setting prices, it will inevitably introduce unpopular changes
only grudgingly, so that when adjustments finally become inevitable,
they are likely to come in big and painfuljumps. Moreover, as long as
prices are not free to equate supply and demand, administratively
enacted increases cannot reliably be offset by full availability of
10. Ed A. Hewett, Reforming the Saviet Economy: Equality versus Efficiency (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1988), 192.
II. This statement, which was written before the price reforms that went into effect
during the first week of April 1991 ,would seem to be belied by the extremity of some
of those corrections: as we have already observed, for example, the price of bread is
reported to have been tripled. The fact remains that the new levels are evidently still
substantially below market-clearing levels.
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goods at those prices. Only market-set prices can provide that kind
of assurance.
Indeed, piecemeal, administered reform will probably aggravate
shortages rather than mitigate them. This is because each of the
corrections will necessarily be debated in parliament, reported in the
press, and therefore be widely anticipated. The result will inevitably
be refusals to sell, panic buying, and hoarding, as buyers-ultimate
consumers and enterprises both-stock up in anticipation of the
increase. The result will be continued obstruction of normal chan-
nels of sale, bartering, and shortages of supplies in open markets,
which will further discredit the process. Moreover, such repeated
price increases give rise to widespread inflationary expectations,
which are hard to combat, and severely aggravate the problem of
macroeconomic stability.
Apart from the political pressures, this result is inescapable be-
cause a system of economywide price controls can never get the
complex and constantly changing relationships among prices even
remotely close to right. The price control agency in the USSR may be
reviewing a few hundred thousand proposals for changes each year,
but the number of prices in a modern economy is hundreds of times
as large as that. In the United States, the trucking industry alone
quotes prices numbering in the millions: this should not be surpris-
ing, considering the almost limitless variety of products carried and
routes served for each.
Moreover, prices in a market economy are interdependent in the
most complicated ways. Some goods and services complement one
another; others are substitutes; in both cases, purchasers of anyone
are therefore influenced not just by its price but also by the prices of
its substitutes or complements. Producers are-and economic effi-
ciency requires that they be-guided by the prices of their various
inputs relative to the wholesale prices at which they can sell; by the
price of aluminum relative to that of copper, oflabor relative to that
of capital (and in a market economy, capital must have a price that
reflects its opportunity cost-that is, of what it can add to output in
alternative uses), by the price ofcoal and gas relative to that ofoil and
by the price ofeach relative to the cost of transporting it; traders and
arbitragers must be guided by the prices of products at one geo-
graphic location relative to the prices of those same products at
other locations, along with the costs of moving them from where
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they are relatively cheap to where they are relatively scarce or costly;
consumers must be guided by the price of television sets relative to
the charges for movies, and so on in an infinite set of combinations.
There is simply no way in which the administrative agency can get
these interdependencies right.
Moreover, prices in free markets are constantly changing under
the influence of changing balances between supply and demand.
Regulated prices, which are inevitably set preponderantly on the
basis ofaverage costs, cannot possibly be adjusted flexibly in the same
way. Efficient, market-clearing prices will at some times and places
have to be far above average costs, at others far below, depending on
whether supplies are short or capacity is excessive. 12 "Administra-
tive price reform" is almost a contradiction in terms.
Ofcourse, this kind ofwholly flexible, market-driven pricing is by
no means the universal rule in Western economies either: many of
our prices too are set at standard or average cost and held relatively
stable over time. But even in concentrated industries like auto-
mobiles and steel, the effective prices are far from totally rigid: when
demand drops, the automobile companies break into low-interest
rate financing promotions and rebating wars, steel companies find
various ways ofprovidingextra fabricating and other services without
charge, and large customers successfully bargain for discounts. 13
12. A striking example of the failure ofadministered prices to recognize these differ-
ences is provided by the intense public protests in Minsk against the sharp price
increases enacted in April 1991. According to the account in the New York Times:
"Commentators pointed out that su pplies there had been relatively stable, leaving the
public unprepared for the sudden doubling and trebling of prices on basic foods and
commodities." The New York Times quotes the vice president of the Byelorussian
parliament as pointing out: "Unlike Moscow or other capitals we maintain a supply of
meat, flour and other essentials. These prices were an explosion." (See New York Times,
April II, 1991, pp. AI-9.)
The administered price increases had the fatal flaw ofbeing uniform across the entire
Soviet Union, evidently ignoring wide disparities in local balances between supply and
demand. In an effectively functioning market economy those disparities automatically
produce corresponding differences in prices, which in turn encourage both the flow of
goods from where they are relatively plentiful to where they are relatively scarce and
regional specialization in production.
13. Moreover, it is in precisely those areas that American industries have performed
most badly in the past. The upward wage-price spiral in the American automobile and
steel industries in the late 1970s and early 1980s, in the face of declining demand,
epitomized the problem of stagflation, which Western economies have not entirely
solved to this day. At the same time, it was the introduction of market competition,
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Finally-and in a sense most fundamentally-as long as it is the
government that sets prices, it will be impossible to put into effect all
the other major institutional changes that are a necessary part of
moving to a free market economy, and so the hardships of the transi-
tion will be unnecessarily extended and multiplied.
To take a single example, if enterprises must continue to turn to
the governmental authorities for approval of their prices, they can-
not enjoy the autonomy that is an essential aspect ofcorporatization;
they will continue to be subject to the historic planning and com-
mand system. Nor, in these circumstances, can they be cut loose
from subsidies; if they suffer losses, they can blame excessively rigid
price controls, and the government will be unable to resist their
demand and that of their employees for continued subsidization. As
a result, the critical goals of corporatization-independence of each
enterprise and responsibility for its own destiny-and the sharp
reduction in governmental subsidies essential to the control of infla-
tion will be unachievable. (Of course, that may be one of the reasons
that administrative rather than market-driven price reform is popu-
lar among Soviet officials: it enables them to retain their control over
the economy, whereas the purpose of true economic reform is to
liberate the economy from these officials.)
Just as is true of gradual administrative price reform, so the de-
control of only some prices and not others, in the hope of easing the
pains of the transition, is likely to create more problems than it
solves. In November 1990, the prices of"luxury items"-amounting
to about 20 percent of retail sales-were liberated from state con-
trol. Although the reason for retaining price controls on the remain-
ing products-to protect citizens with modest incomes from the
burden of price increases-was both understandable and laudable,
this selective decontrol had the inescapable effect of exacerbating
the problem of availability of the latter goods to those same people.
For example, it made production of expensive furniture, the prices
of which were deregulated, much more profitable than inexpensive
furniture, which remained subject to price ceilings; the result, as any
stemming from foreign manufacturers, that both protected American consumers
from suffering the full consequences of the deteriorating performance of their own
industries and exerted very powerful pressures on domestic suppliers to improve
both their productivity and the quality of their products-another example of the
superior performance of competitive markets.
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economist would have predicted, was that manufacturers shifted
their production from the latter to the former.
It was the purpose of the various economic plans and state orders
to prevent that outcome, but, as the experience of the last several
years clearly demonstrates, they are largely ineffective because they
run contrary to the incentives of producers. Moreover, they neces-
sarily preserve the old command-and-control system, in ways flatly
inconsistent with the independence of enterprises, which is in turn
necessary if production is to become more efficient. 14
Another variant of partial liberalization, as the foregoing discus-
sion suggests, has been to permit enterprises to sell some fraction of
their output in the free market, with the remainder still subject to
official prices, plans, and state orders. This kind of "reform" in-
volves problems similar to freeing the prices of luxury items: the
partial decontrol gives enterprises strong incentives to divert all
their output to the more profitable, decontrolled markets; as a re-
sult. ever more intensive controls and enforcement are required to
prevent them from doing so. The virtue of a competitive market
economy is of course that private incentives coincide with the public
interest, rather than conflict with it.
Yet another method of gradual deregulation that has been pro-
posed is to liberate one industry at a time, while continuing to con-
trol prices of the others. There is indeed a case to be made for
proceeding sector-by-sector. Some industries have considerable
numbers of enterprises in them and are less capital and technology
intensive than others-both conditions facilitating entry and effec-
tive competition. One of the many benefits of their quick deregula-
tion would be that it would open up opportunities for large numbers
of entrepreneurs, which would help spread the idea and enhance
the acceptability of private entrepreneurship. Obvious candidates
for such treatment are agriculture, services, and small-scale
manufacturing.
The critical flaw of the sector-by-sector approach, however, is that
14. State orders (gOSUlkazy) are mandatory production assignments, obligatory on the
enterprises in exactly the same way as the old planning targets were obligatory. They
were created under the 1987 Law on State Enterprises, and were intended to cover
only a fraction of the firms' output, the rest being available for sale on the relatively
free wholesale market. In practice, the fraction was usually close to 100 percent, and
the wholesale market did not develop.
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it ignores the complex interdependence of all sectors of the econ-
omy. Consider the situation of a small clothing manufacturer, itself
freed of controls but functioning in an otherwise controlled econ-
omy. How does it obtain all the inputs it needs-textiles, factory
space, machines, electricity, trucks? And how does it sell its products
in a free market, unless wholesalers and retailers are likewise de-
controlled? The liberated manufacturer would have to operate out-
side the system of state orders, which ordinarily provides the re-
quired inputs and controlled distribution: however profitable its
business, it could not legally use money to bid for items whose dis-
tribution and prices are controlled. The manufacturer might be able
to barter some of the clothing it makes with suppliers, which would
use them in turn to reward their workers; but barter is a very ineffi-
cient way of doing business. In the context of a generally controlled
economy, evasion of controlled channels of distribution will also
seem (indeed, may actually be) corrupt or illegitimate. In free mar-
kets, in contrast, the clothing manufacturer could always obtain the
inputs and services it needed by offering the market price; and this
would be the normal and accepted way of doing business.
One question that needs to be answered about the transition is the
extent to which long-term contracts among enterprises in existence
at the time of deregulation should continue to be honored and
enforced. The Skatalin Report proposed that "the existing economic
ties will be unconditionally maintained until July 1, 1991"-that is,
approximately six months after the price deregulation it advocated
would have gone into effect. The Report rightly points out that "by
preserving all existing ties (for a long period) we would run the risk
of hindering market development and free exchange of com-
modities between enterprises."15
Although we are in no position to say whether or not six months is
the right transition period, we agree that it must be short. A long
period is obviously inconsistent with immediate price decontrol.
Conceivably, indeed, enforcement of existing long-term contracts
should simply cease the moment general price deregulation occurs:
since those contracts were entered upon in the context of a com-
prehensively controlled economy, comprehensive decontrol would
constitute such a radical change in circumstances as to justify inval-
idating any such preexisting obligations, leaving it to enterprises
15. Shatalin Report, 26.
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either to reestablish these relationships or to drop them, depending
upon their conception of their own interests.
We have encountered concern over the rapid changes and confu-
sion that release of enterprises from long-term contractual commit-
ments may occasion, as sellers seek new customers and buyers new
sources of supply. Of course, there will be some milling about and
uncertainty; but in a market economy sellers tend to serve customers
for long periods of time, and economic ties are abandoned only for
good reason. We expect that upon liberalization most enterprises
will continue to maintain their previous economic interrelation-
ships; and where they do not, it will be because the ties established
under central planning were economically irrational, for both the
enterprise and the economy, and are best abandoned.
Governments at all levels will still need to purchase goods and
services to fulfill their various responsibilities, as governments do in
all market economies. Their "orders" will, however, have no more
standing or power than those of other purchasers. This means that
all such contracts will be voluntary; governments will make their
acquisitions at market prices, not by commands and controls.
Liberalization at the Several Levels of Government
Until recently the Soviet Union was a vast common market of
close to 300 million people, and trade across republic borders was
extensive. Eight of the fifteen republics delivered over half, and six
others between 30 and 50 percent of their net material product to
other republics. The exception was the Russian Republic, which is so
large and diverse that it can meet more of its needs within its
borders. 16 The comprehensive economic planning system has as-
sumed, historically, that the USSR was to be one unified economy;
investment in production facilities reflected that principle.
The progressive failures of that system in recent years-the ap-
pearance of pervasive shortages, the increasing severity of repressed
inflation and the consequent decreasing ability of the ruble to com-
mand goods and services-have given rise to powerful centrifugal
forces, both political and economic. Trade among the republics is
breaking down and being replaced increasingly by crude barter: just
as within the republics, so among them, the ruble has been less and
less relied upon as the medium of exchange.
16. Economy oflhe USSR, 51.
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With prices fixed at artificially low levels and goods in scarce supply,
localities and republics have tended to take control of the goods they
prod uce, either for the use of their own citizens and enterprises or to
barter with other localities and republics. Various republics have
signed trade agreements with one another providing for the bilat-
eral exchange of goods. Decontrol of prices, by making it profitable
once again to sell goods and services in the open market, would
reestablish the conditions for free trade: because the ruble would
once again effectively command goods and services, enterprises and
republics would willingly sell their own products for rubles, without
regard to whether the buyers were located within the republic or
outside.
In short, comprehensive price deregulation would restore to the
Soviet Union the benefits of the common market-the efficiencies
of specialization and the benefits of competition. The history of the
United States economy and, more recently, of the European Eco-
nomic Community both clearly demonstrate the advantages of a
free-trading continental market in producing high and growing
standards of living.
These benefits will be most fully achieved only if the extent and
pace of liberalization are uniform among the fifteen republics. If
some of them continue to control prices while others deregulate,
there will be a tendency for goods to flow from the former to the
latter, and, to prevent that occurring, the former will impose restric-
tions on trade-restrictions that will tend to spread, as other re-
publics retaliate. Achievement of a common market therefore re-
quires coordination of the pertinent economic reforms across the
entire union.
Our own strong recommendation would be to adopt the model of
the American Constitution, which flatly prohibits direct restraints by
individual states on interstate trade. As the Skatalin Report puts it:
"No quotas, limitations or Custom barriers shall be allowed within
the Union for goods defined by inter-Republican agreement."17
The coordination of price deregulation among the republics
would not necessarily preclude local or regional regulation of essen-
tially local services. Regulation of public utility services in the United
States at the state level has created some problems, resolvable only by
interstate coordination, as the operations of the telecommunica-
17. Shatalin Report, 12.
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tions, electric, and gas companies have increasingly extended across
state lines. This coordination does not operate perfectly, but it pro-
duces acceptable results. Similarly, individual government units
may, without creating serious problems, enact their own labor and
public health standards-to the extent, again, that the activities in
question are primarily local, and their regulation therefore does not
distort or interfere with interregional and interrepublic specializa-
tion and trade.
CORPORATIZATION
The policy memorandum (chapter 2) proposes that large state
enterprises be corporatized-cast loose from state ownership and
control and converted into managerially and financially autono-
mous entities-at the earliest possible moment. We propose that this
be done comprehensively and simultaneously with the enactment of
the other proposed reforms, including, of course, price deregula-
tion. Each enterprise must be required to stand on its own feet,
financially, making a profit or failing to do so on the basis of its own
success in satisfying market demand. This means also that credit
must be made available, but only on a commercial basis, with all
elements of subsidy removed-a topic discussed more fully in chap-
ter 7.
Corporatization will require the elimination of both government
subsidies and differential taxes. The former is an extremely impor-
tant component of any program of overall economic stabilization.
The latter is necessary if the Soviet Union is to achieve the benefits of
a market economy: successful firms must be rewarded for their
success and unsuccessful ones must be penalized, not insulated from
the consequences of their failures. Although we cannot claim to have
resolved to our satisfaction all important aspects of the corporatiza-
tion process, there are a few that we discuss in more detail here than
in the policy paper.
Corporatization and Privatization
Effective functioning of a market economy clearly requires pri-
vate ownership of productive enterprises. Unless and until the inter-
ests of the managers and owners are made somehow to coincide-
with management effectively responsible to the owners-the for-
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mer will never have the incentive, essential to the functioning of a
market economy, to maximize the present value of the enterprises.
It seems very clear, however, that privatization is going to take
time. Despite a commitment to the concept of private ownership,
perhaps stronger than in the USSR, Hungary, Poland, and the
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic have made little progress in
privatizing their large state enterprises.
The Soviet Union has about 46,000 industrial and about 760,000
retail and service enterprises, all owned by the state. 18 That is a
staggering number for which to find private owners quickly, even if
the many political issues associated with that process were resolved.
But, in point of fact, there has as yet been no consensus reached
about the levels of government at which the privatization should be
carried out, or how the ultimate owners shall be selected and owner-
ship distributed among them.
As for the first, there is as yet no consensus about which enter-
prises are to be regarded as initially owned by which levels of govern-
ment: the Soviet Union has no clear rules to serve as a starting point.
Enterprises are assigned to union or republic ministries or to local
governments for planning and supervision, but these assignments
can be changed easily. Industrial and commercial property is re-
garded as owned by society and its citizens, but when everybody is an
owner, none of them is in effective control. To complicate the situa-
tion further, there is considerable support within the Soviet Union
for distributing ownership of the enterprises among their own
workers; in view of their widely varying prospects for success, how-
ever, that method of distribution would produce gross inequities
among workers, depending upon where they happened to be
working.
In view of the diversity and size of the USSR, we are inclined to
favor assigning most enterprises to the republics in which they are
located, giving each republic the right to reassign ownership of
smaller and locally oriented enterprises to lower levels of govern-
ment. We recognize the danger that those governments might sim-
ply accept that favor and not move on to distribute the stock to
private owners; but as long as they are not in a position to obstruct
the entry of competing providers of the goods and services, it seems
to us the injury to the public would be acceptable in that event.
18. Ibid., 53.
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As for the question of how ownership is to be distributed, the
form of corporatization that we propose-converting the state en-
terprises into joint-stock companies-would permit a wide range of
ultimate decisions when that question is resolved. The shares might
be sold to citizens or distributed to them without charge, sold to
foreign investors or other Soviet enterprises and institutions, or as-
signed to managers and workers of the enterprises, in any combina-
tions and proportions. Chapter 7 considers in greater detail the
advantages and disadvantages of these various possible methods of
distributing the stock.
The point about our present proposal, in any event, is that by
setting aside for later decision the issues associated with privatiza-
tion, corporatization can be accomplished quickly and simultane-
ously with the deregulation of prices; and for reasons that we have
already set forth, we believe that both of these reforms must be
undertaken synchronously and as quickly as possible. So the cor-
poratization that we recommend is the equivalent of the Economy of
the USSR's proposed "commercialization," that is, "the establishment
of the enterprise without necessarily implying private ownership." 19
Several additional measures will be required if the newly created
joint-stock enterprises are to play their proper role in a market
economy. We list them in our policy memorandum (chapter 2) but
repeat them here because they are so important, and because the
interrelatedness of the several recommendations cannot be overem-
phasized:
1. Governments must enact and enforce laws of property and
must respect property rights in their own actions. The legitimiza-
tion of private ownership and rules providing for its transfer are
necessary ifcapital markets are to develop; legal methods must be
provided for the enforcement of contracts, including obligations
of debtors to creditors, voluntarily entered upon.
2. Rules must be promulgated for the treatment of enterprises
that go bankrupt-for the orderly settling of creditors' claims,
either by restructuring those obligations to permit the firm to
continue to operate, if there is reasonable prospect of its being
able to do so successfully, or for the distribution of its assets, if
there is no such reasonable prospect.
3. Banks must be available to provide credit, but only on commer-
19. Economy of the USSR, 48.
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cial grounds: specifically, they must refuse to issue credit to enter-
prises that are not financially viable and, in their strict commercial
judgment, unlikely to be able to repay.
4. Governments-at the union, republic, and local levels-must
cease to subsidize the enterprises, whether with direct subsidies or
soft credits, except as part oflimited and targeted programs, such
as we have already described, to protect low-income families and
ease the transition to a market economy.
The purpose of all these measures is to place the enterprises
under stringent budget constraints. As we said in the policy
memorandum,
An enterprise must know that unprofitability ultimately means
bankruptcy for the firm and economic ruin for the managers.
The possibility of bankruptcy provides a market system with the
stick that makes enterprises efficient.
A market system also needs a carrot; enterprises must retain a
portion of their profits for bonuses to managers and to expand
their facilities. Although a tax on corporate profits is consistent
with a market system, the tax rate must be uniform across enter-
prises, must be nonnegotiable with tax authorities, and must be
set at levels that still leave a significant reward for success.20
Corporatization involves, at its heart, a total surrender of author-
ity and responsibility for enterprises and industries by the union and
republic branch ministries. Since the skills, attitudes, and policies of
these agencies are all inflexibly oriented to their present functions of
operating a state-owned command and control economy, we see no
way of their playing a productive role in a market economy. We
therefore recommend their abolition.
Control of the Enterprises during the Transition
to Privatization
Since under our conception corporatization, which must be en-
acted promptly, will almost inevitably precede the ultimate disposi-
tion ofownership of the state enterprises, we have proposed a transi-
tional arrangement during which the stock of the newly liberated
20. Page 23 above.
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companies would be held by state property management agencies
(PMAs) of the union, republics, or local governments. Such a transi-
tional arrangement, we recognize, poses the danger that the PMAs
will simply operate like their predecessors, the economic ministries.
The only safeguards we can conceive would have to be incorporated
in the legislation setting up the PMAs, as part of the corporatization
process, clearly stipulating as its primary intention the autonomy of
the enterprises themselves.
We assume the heads of the PMAs and their boards would be
selected by the sponsoring governments, with instructions to pursue
the goal of long-run profit maximization for the enterprises en-
trusted to them. Their role would be limited to selecting directors,
who would in turn select the full-time managers. Directors must be
selected for the contributions they can make to the effective manage-
ment of the corporations, not for their political connections. Some
of the managers may also be directors; but American corporations
have found it valuable to have outsiders as a substantial fraction of
their directors, independent of the full-time managers, serving, in
effect, as trustees representing the interests of the owners. One
possible way of enhancing the incentives of both PMAs and outside
directors to serve the goal of maximizing the value of the enterprises
would be to compensate them with ownership shares.
The PMAs must evaluate the performance of their corporations
just as stockholders do in a market economy. This means they should
focus on profitability as the key criterion ofsuccess, bearing in mind
that this means maximizing not necessarily short-term profits, but
the long-term value (more specifically, the discounted present value)
of the firm. In their role as trustees for the stockholders, they have a
clear responsibility to hold management accountable for its perfor-
mance, alert to the danger of managers using their positions to serve
their own personal interests at the expense of the owners.
Just as important as these positive duties is the list of negative
ones. It is not the obligation of the PMAs to advance such social goals
as the provision of employment, where these conflict with the inter-
ests of the stockholders. Nor should they use the revenues from
profitable operations to subsidize unprofitable ones-either partic-
ular operations of individual firms or unprofitable firms. Nor must
they seek subsidies or preferential tax treatment for companies in
financial difficulty. Nor, as stockholders, should they have the right
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to interfere with the day-to-day operations of the firms. Above all,
they must not assume the role previously played by the economic
ministries.
In view of the large number of state enterprises involved, we
recommend that a number of PMAs be established at each level of
government, particularly since the one plant/one enterprise rule
proposed in the next pages will increase their number. In making
this recommendation, we are influenced by the experience in Ger-
many, where the shares of public corporations in the former Ger-
man Democratic Republic are held by a single agency, the Treuhan-
danstalt, in trust for the German government. The use of one agency
creates a large bureaucracy with tremendous power. It seems to us
better to divide and decentralize this task, perhaps even to the extent
that two or more PMAs might hold stock in one enterprise, acting as
a check on one another-a point discussed further in chapter 7. The
experience in Hungary suggests that PMAs should not have respon-
sibility for demonopolization; that function should be assigned to a
separate agency, as we will recommend below. It may also be useful to
establish intermediate levels of organization, such as joint-stock
holding companies, which could act as shareholders for groups of
companies. This might make the tasks of selecting and overseeing
management simpler, especially during the transition to the one
plant/one enterprise organization that we contemplate. If such an
expedient is adopted, it would be important to avoid organizing the
holding companies by industries-with one such company, for ex-
ample, holding the stock of all the companies in the steel industry;
that would run the risk of the holding companies serving as agencies
for restricting competition, or acting too much like the economic
ministries that we envision them replacing.
THE PROMOTION OF COMPETITION
The Soviet economy is highly monopolistic, reflecting the historic
belief of its founders and of Soviet planners generally that competi-
tion is wasteful and large-scale production units and centralized
planning are the most efficient methods of economic organization.
This inherited structure of Soviet industry poses a severe obstacle
to economic liberalization, since it means that price deregulation
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and corporatization are likely to result in monopoly prices and
profits. This seems indeed to have been one of the effects of the
liberalization of the Polish economy, as a group of Western econo-
mists have recently concluded: "[ T]he evidence points strongly to
the important role of monopoly power.... [P]rofits have been un-
expectedly high, especially in the face of a sharp decrease in domes-
tic demand, ... The constraints on prices from convertibility and a
fixed exchange rate do not appear to have been powerful enough to
have prevented monopoly pricing in large segments of the economy,
at least for the time being."21
We anticipate that high monopoly profits will materialize in the
Soviet Union as well. We believe, however, that it would be a mistake
to postpone deregulation and corporatization until monopolies have
been thoroughly eliminated; on the contrary, we regard these two
fundamental reforms as an important part of the process for reduc-
ing the power of monopoly. At the same time, these considerations
strongly underline the importance of accompanying those reforms
with specific measures aimed at accelerating the introduction of
competition.
The Extent of Monopoly
There are no good measures of the extent of monopoly in the
Soviet Union, or, indeed, in the West. Nor have we been in a position
to undertake an authoritative survey of the available evidence. It is
clear, however, that the phenomenon is very much more widespread
in the Soviet Union than in Western economies.
The Shatalin Report states that 2,000 manufactured products are
produced by a single enterprise.22 This statement may exaggerate
the prevalence of monopoly, because the Report may have defined
products so narrowly as to exclude effective substitutes supplied by
other firms. At the same time, the facts cited in the report, that 96
percent of all diesel locomotives, 100 percent of all air conditioners,
100 percent of all deep water pumps, and 66 percent of all batteries
are supplied by a single enterprise clearly suggest genuine monopoly.
21. Olivier Blanchard, Rudiger Dornbusch, Paul Krugman, Richard Layard, and
Lawrence Summers, "Reform in Eastern Europe," Report of the WIDER World Econ-
omy Group (Cambridge, Mass., 1990, mimeographed), 1-18-19.
22. Shatalin Report, 54.
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Table 3.2
Distribution of Soviet Manufacturing Product Groups According to the Share of
the Largest Producer in Total Output, 1988
Share of Output
Number
of Product
Branches 100-75% 75-50% 50-0% Groups
Power machinery 64.7 14.7 20.6 34
Railroad machinery 23.0 46.2 30.8 13
Lifting and transport machinery 18.1 18.2 63.7 22
Oil and chemical machinery 12.4 18.8 68.8 16
Construction and road machinery 16.7 58.3 25.0 12
Metallurgical equipment 23.5 35.3 41.2 17
Sledge-press machinery 65.8 23.7 10.5 38
Motor cars and bearings 22.7 22.7 54.6 22
Tractors and agricultural machinery 60.5 15.8 23.7 38
Machinery for livestock farming and 63.3 16.7 20.0 30
fodder crops
Electronics 4.7 14.3 81.0 21
Ferrous metallurgy 30.3 51.5 18.2 33
Chemistry and timber industry 6.5 6.5 87.0 31
Consumer goods 23.5 29.4 47.1 17
In all branches 36.6 24.1 39.2 344
Source: Calculations by V. Capelik and A. Yakovlev from 1989 Goskomstat data,
"The Monopolization Problem in the USSR," in P. Aven and T. Richardson, eds.,
Essays in the Suviet Transition to the Market (Laxenburg, Austria: IIASA,
forthcoming).
Our Soviet colleague, V. Capelik, has supplied us with the com-
pilation for table 3.2, showing the distribution of so-called manufac-
turing product groups according to the share of total output ac-
counted for by a single firm. These figures are apparently roughly
comparable with the concentration ratios regularly reported by the
U.S. Census of Manufactures in its "4-digit" industries, which are
frequently used by American economists as rough indicators of the
possible presence of monopoly. (,,4-digit" refers to the numerical
code used by the U.S. Census Bureau to identify industries. Soviet
manufacturing output is divided for reporting purposes into 344
product groups; U.S. manufacturing into 441 4-digit industries.)
Table 3.3 therefore presents a distribution of U.S. manufacturing
industries side by side with the summary (bottom line of table 3.3)
for the Soviet Union. In comparing the two, it is necessary to bear in
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Table 3.3
Distribution of Concentration Ratios: Soviet Product Groups and U.S. 4-Digit
Manufacturing Industries
65
Market Share
0-50
50-75
75-100
Total
Soviet Groups:
Share of Single Largest
Producer, 1988
39.2
24.1
36.6
100.0
U.S. Industries:
Share of Four Largest
Producers, 1982
72.6
21.3
6.1
100.0
Sources: The Soviet data is taken from table 3.2; the U.S. data is calculated from
U.S. Bureau of Census, 1982 Census ofManuf(J£tures, Concentration Ratios in Man-
ufacturing (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of Census, April 1986).
Note: The figures show the percentage distributions of product groups and 4-
digit industries according to the shares of total output counted by the single largest
and four largest producers, respectively. The Soviet column does not add to 100
due to rounding error.
mind the one extremely important difference between the two sets
of statistics: the U.S. ratios show the distribution of industries ac-
cording to the share in total output of the top four companies,
whereas the Soviet figures are for the single largest producer.
This quick comparison shows dramatically how much more con-
centrated Soviet output is than American, and how much more per-
vasive monopoly is therefore likely to be: in almost two-thirds of the
Soviet product groups, a single enterprise accounts for more than
half-between 50 and 100 percent-of total output; in less than
one-third of the U.S. 4-digit industries do the top four companies
account for a comparable percentage of output. Simple interpola-
tion yields a median one-firm concentration ratio of 61 percent for
the Soviet Union and 37 percent for the top four firms in the Ameri-
can case.
It would be preferable to show the distribution of product groups
or industries not by numbers but by the value ofoutput falling within
each percentage range: this would have the effect of weighting the
groupings by their relative importance. These data are unavailable.
At the same time, the data in our two tables are dearly broadly
consistent with the assertion in the Economy ofthe USSR that "30 to 40
percent of total industrial output [in the USSR] is accounted by
products for which there is but a single manufacturer,"23 an estimate
23. Economy of the USSR, 26.
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consistent in turn with the views of Soviet experts with whom we
have worked.
The figures in the foregoing tables underestimate the prevalence
of monopoly power in both countries for one important reason:
because they show the share of total national output accounted for by
either a single producer (in the case of the Soviet V nion) or the top
four (for the Vnited States), they tend to exaggerate the number of
potentially competing sellers available to buyers in markets that are
not nationwide but local or regional, because of the importance of
transportation costs. The cement industry illustrates this phenome-
non very clearly:24 there are ninety such enterprises in the Soviet
V nion, but only about four in each of the nineteen economic re-
gions.25 In eleven of these regions, 80 percent or more of the cement
consumed is produced within the region, and, on average, one en-
terprise accounts for 47 percent of the output.
Whether the tendency of the figures at the national level that we
have used to compare the prevalence of monopoly in the two coun-
tries understates that prevalence more for the one country than the
other cannot be determined a priori. On the one side, the far larger
number of instances in which the national Soviet figures already
show a single firm accounting for the major share of total output
means that regional markets could not be significantly more highly
concentrated: if there is only one supplier nationally, then there is
unlikely to be fewer than one in regional markets (although we
cannot exclude that possibility, in view of the widespread shortages
in the Soviet Vnion); whereas the fact that it may take four suppliers
in the V nited States to account for the major share of total output
clearly does not exclude the possibility that individual regions may
have significantly fewer competitors available to them. On the other
side, however, is the fact that the transportation system in the Soviet
Vnion is far less developed than in the Vnited States; this would
tend to make regional markets more interdependent in the V nited
24. Even in the United States, where the transport system is more highly developed
than in the USSR, 90 percent of all cement is shipped 200 miles or less. F. M. Scherer,
IndlL'itrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1980),
63.
25. A. Yakovlev, "The Monopolization Level of Some Branches and Production Mar-
kets in the USSR" (Paper presented at the IIASA Conference on Economic Reform
and Integration in Sopron, Hungary, July-August 1990), 10.
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States than in the Soviet Union, and regional monopoly therefore
more pervasive in the latter country.
The Inevitability of Monopoly Pricing during
the Transition
It seems clear that the Soviet economy is one of the most monopo-
lized in the world, in important measure because most of the mo-
nopolies are what Soviet economists call "organizational"-that is,
created by an explicit decision of planners-rather than "natural"-
that is, dictated by technology.
This fact poses an undeniable dilemma for us in our advocacy of
comprehensive and immediate decontrol of most prices, because of
course it means that such a policy would open the door to a consider-
able amount of monopoly exploitation. Without in any way minimiz-
ing the severity of this dilemma, we nevertheless reaffirm our ad-
vocacy of comprehensive deregulation-except for the "natural
monopolies," to which we will allude shortly. We do so for a number
of reasons.
The first is our conviction that it is impossible for the Soviet Union
to move promptly to the institution of a market economy while re-
taining comprehensive price controls. In view of the pervasiveness
of monopoly, any policy of retaining controls on the prices of mo-
nopolized industries would effectively block the process ofeconomic
reform. For this reason, we also reject the retention or imposition of
special taxes in an attempt to recapture monopoly profits: there is no
way the government can distinguish profits generated by monopo-
listic exploitation from profits that are the reward for successful
enterprise of precisely the kind that the Soviet Union must en-
courage.
Our second reason is that even monopoly prices are, as a general
rule, preferable to state-regulated ones. Such prices will clear mar-
kets: they will equate demand and supply. In so doing, they will
eliminate queues and incentives to resort to barter; they will there-
fore effectively reestablish the ruble as the medium of exchange.
Moreover, although monopoly prices tend to be higher than com-
petitive ones, the motive of profit maximization itself sets limits on
them: monopolists cannot be unconcerned about exceeding the
point at which higher prices so discourage purchases as to reduce
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their profits. Nor, in an open economy, can they ignore the danger
that excessively high prices or poor quality of product or service will
attract competitors. For this reason, although elements of monopoly
are pervasive in all market economies, they also tend to be transi-
tional and temporary. To a large extent, monopoly power and
profits are the reward for successful innovation and are therefore
also a sign and consequence of successful competition; and they tend
to be eroded as competitors are attracted and attempt to duplicate or
improve upon the original successes.
The fact that so much of the monopoly in the Soviet Union is the
artificial construct of state policy provides additional ground for
optimism that it will be subject to substantial erosion once competi-
tion becomes legally permissible and governmental protections are
removed. So does the frequently expressed concern-to which we
will return-that the state enterprises are generally inefficient and
will be unable to survive, once deprived of state subsidies and ex-
posed to competition.
And so, finally, does the fact that in the supply of consumer and
producer durables, where concentration and the dangers of monop-
oly are likely to be greatest, the availability of a second-hand market
typically provides customers with powerful protection against exces-
sive monopolistic exploitation. If this protection is to be effective,
repair services must be readily available, on reasonable terms; but
this is the kind of service in the supply of which competition is likely
to spring up promptly, once the state removes barriers to entry.
The conclusion that price deregulation should proceed promptly
even in the presence of widespread monopoly has not been an easy
one for us to reach. Effective competition is indispensable to the
effective functioning of a market economy. It is essential also if such
an economy is to have political legitimacy and acceptability. At the
same time, it is also our view that, objectively, private monopoly
under private ownership-with incentives such as only private own-
ership can provide-even if unregulated, is as much superior to the
present Soviet system of organization as competition is to private
monopoly; and we know of no way of breaking through to a market
economy without accepting a good deal of private monopoly during
the transition.
This recommendation does however lend additional urgency to
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the immediate initiation of the most radical efforts possible to make
that transition short, by encouraging the flowering of competition.
We see important, early opportunities for such competition even
within the existing structure of state enterprises, once all govern-
mental limitations on the range of products that each enterprise can
produce are eliminated, as of course they must be, at once.
For example, the industry that produces the chemical fibers used
to make textiles is made up of thirty-three enterprises; the largest,
Mogiliev, accounts for only 16 percent of total output. Since trans-
portation costs are low, the market is unionwide. 26 Such an indus-
trial structure appears to be consistent with effective competition.
Of the 375 different fibers, however, 288 are produced by a single
enterprise; and this situation has remained essentially unchanged
for several five-year plan periods.
Since fibers can in varying degree substitute for one another, we
can provide no definitive, summary view of how much monopoly
power this extreme specialization confers on the separate enter-
prises, but we have little doubt that it is substantial. Some fibers are in
short supply; for others, output has more or less consistently ex-
ceeded demand. In a competitive economy, the prices of the former
would rise, perhaps thereby generating monopoly profits; but these
would in turn induce other enterprises to undertake their produc-
tion, thereby eliminating any such excess returns. We see no reason
why this kind of competitive process could not operate effectively
here: we are skeptical that the present pattern ofextreme specializa-
tion, in which one of the thirty-three enterprises now producing
chemical fibers is the exclusive supplier of 288 of the 375 made in
the Soviet Union, reflects technological or commercial imperatives.
Competition among those several enterprises would operate not
just to hold costs and prices down but to improve quality. The chemi-
cal fibers manufactured in the Soviet Union are inferior to the ones
produced in other countries,27 for no apparent reason other than
the absence of competition.
The production ofpassenger cars in the Soviet Union exhibits the
same kind of extreme specialization and consequent repression of
potential competition. There are seven enterprises in this industry-
26. Ibid.. 8.
27. Ibid., 9.
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a larger number than in any Western economy exceptJapan-yet all
but the largest one, VAZ, which accounts for 58 percent of total
production, manufacture only a single model, directed at a particu-
lar stratum of the market: 28 ZIL, for example, manufactures only
large limousines; and vAZ dominates the very profitable middle-
sized automobile market. Most Western firms, in contrast, make a
large number and variety of models, and so compete with one an-
other across the board. We would certainly expect the other Soviet
manufacturers, once free and motivated to do so, to exploit the
potential production and marketing economies and opportunities
for profit by broadening their product lines, thereby challenging
VAZ itself.
The fear has at times been expressed that cutting-offSoviet enter-
prises from subsidy and exposing them to competition will force so
many of them to close down resulting in more monopoly, not less: it
is estimated that one-third of them now operate at a loss, and survive
only with state subsidies. There are at least two major responses to
that fear.
The first is that the present reliance of so many enterprises on
state subsidies is a consequence of price controls. With deregulation,
prices will rise to whatever level is necessary to elicit supply sufficient
to satisfy demand; and those higher prices will clearly make a much
larger percentage of Soviet enterprises financially viable than is the
case today. For example, the automobile manufacturer AZLK is today
in financial difficulty; but automobiles sell in the second-hand mar-
ket for three times the official price. At such levels, AZLK'S financial
problems would almost certainly be solved.
The second answer is that if, even after price decontrol, some
companies cannot survive in the face of competition, their disap-
pearance would, at least in the first instance, be a manifestation of
the effectiveness of competition. And the Western experience is
that, in the great majority of industries, open competition rarely
ends up eliminating so many competitors as to give way to monopoly.
In view of the pervasiveness of monopoly in the Soviet economy
today, and the fact that so much of it is an artificial construct of state
policy, it would certainly be a perverse policy that continued to ob-
28. Ibid., 6.
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struct the entry of competitors, both domestic and foreign, out of a
fear that competition would prove to be only temporary.
Restructuring the Large State Enterprises
Erosion of the unbridled monopoly power that would be enjoyed
by so many state enterprises upon corporatization, through the op-
eration ofcompetitive processes, may well be insufficient to establish
workable competition within a politically acceptable period of time.
This is particularly likely to be the case in capital-intensive indus-
tries, with high barriers to entry.
For this reason, we consider it likely to be necessary to restructure
those enterprises themselves as close as possible to the time of their
liberation from the economic ministries.
One way of accomplishing this, recommended by the Shatalin
Report, would be for some government agency to decide, enterprise
by enterprise, whether the public interest required that it be broken
up. In our judgment, such a process would be intolerably slow and
would be objectionable also because it would require government
agencies to make an enormous number ofjudgments that they are
probably not competent to make. We strongly prefer a more auto-
matic and comprehensive approach, which would in the last analysis
leave it to the market to determine the most efficient structure for
each industry and the most efficient size and scope of its component
enterprises.
Our proposal is to have each separate physical plant constituted as
a separate enterprise. Although we were unable to obtain data on
how many additional enterprises such a rule would create, it appears
that this would be a prompt and effective way of establishing the
structural prerequisites for competition.
We are encouraged to make this proposal by the assurances of
Soviet experts that the present state enterprises are inefficiently
large. Most studies ofmarket economies conclude that, at least at the
production level, the economies of multiplant operations are not
great. We can think of no more practicable way of quickly creating
the possibility of competition in what are now highly monopolistic
industries.
Our recommendation is that application of the one plant/one
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enterprise rule take place simultaneously with corporatization. If
this proves infeasible, the rule would clearly have to be applied be-
fore privatization can take place-at least if the firms are to be sold-
since the prospective owners will have to know under what condi-
tions the enterprises they acquire will be operating. Purchasers of a
firm with a monopoly would rightly regard themselves as defrauded
if their newly purchased enterprises were broken up after they had
acquired them.
We recognize, of course, that this kind of dissolution might entail
some loss of nonproduction economies of multiplant operation-in
marketing, procurement and other aspects of management. We rec-
ommend therefore that reunification of some of the newly created
enterprises via mergers be permitted, subject to approval by an anti-
trust or antimonopoly agency. Since the newly separated enterprises
would be financially independent, succeeding or failing on the basis
of their own profitability, there would be a greater presumption
after corporatization than exists today that any proposed reintegra-
tion was motivated by a quest for improved efficiency.
This was what we meant when we asserted that under our pro-
posal the market itself, guided by the independent judgment of
firms seeking to maximize profits, would in the last analysis decide to
what extent and where, precisely, multiplant operations were con-
ducive to efficiency.
On the other hand, of course, such reunifications or new com-
binations might be motivated by a desire to regain or achieve mo-
nopoly. For this reason we would make proposed mergers exceeding
some minimum size subject to approval or disapproval by some sort
of antitrust agency, guided by the following general rules:
• Direct horizontal unions of competitors would be presumed
illegal; the applicants would have to demonstrate convincingly
that the mergers would confer economies of integration suffi-
ciently large to override their presumed anticompetitive effects;
• Vertical mergers in which one or more of the parties was a
monopoly would be subject to the same presumption of illegality,
with the same opportunity as in the horizontal cases for the pro-
ponents to override that presumption;
• All other mergers would be presumed legal; in these cases the
antitrust authorities would have the opportunity and burden of
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demonstrating that any possible benefits would be outweighed by
a substantial threat to competition.
In short, the second part of our proposed program for creating
competition with and among big state enterprises-after removal of
all restrictions on what each is permitted to produce and in what
markets it is permitted to sell-would involve simultaneously
(a) breaking them up on a one plant/one enterprise basis while,
(b) readily permitting nonhorizontal reintegration by merger or by
contract.
We would leave two problems to be solved by the enterprises
themselves, under pressure of competition and in quest of higher
profit. Even individual plants in the Soviet Union may be too large
for efficiency: such a possibility is suggested, for example, by the fact
that the average production of their cement plants is two and one-
half times as large as in the United States.29 Any governmental
attempt to try to correct such inefficiencies at the plant level would
involve exactly the same intrusive, judgmental government inter-
ventions we have just rejected in opposing the Shatalin plan for
governmental industry-by-industry restructuring at the enterprise
level. It seems to us far preferable to leave it to competition and the
market to force plant sizes to evolve to efficient scales.
The other problem is that many Soviet enterprises produce many
of their own inputs today merely in order to protect themselves
against the uncertainties of relying on the central plans to provide
them with the supplies they need, even though much ofthis produc-
tion would otherwise be highly inefficient. As it becomes possible to
rely on the market to provide such inputs, in simple exchange for
rubles, the present enterprises-particularly if they are under com-
petitive pressure-can be expected to shed operations that can no
longer be justified on efficiency grounds.
Opening the Economy to Foreign Competition
Although this particular recommendation is fully discussed in a
later chapter, we must mention it here, because opening the Soviet
economy to the world is an essential component of a program to
promote competition. Automobiles, once again, provide a striking
29. Ibid., 12.
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illustration. The VSSR produces 1.3 million cars annually. Imports
are estimated to be about 4,000-not even 1 percent of the market.
In striking contrast, imports account for about 30 percent of sales in
the V.S. market and have, over the last ten to fifteen years, been the
major factor undermining the previous dominance by the three
domestic manufacturers and the primary source of competition in
price and product quality.
Perhaps superfluously, we reemphasize the importance of each of
the two major sources and forms of potential competition-open
entry domestically and internationally. Although in some ways
opening the Soviet economy to international trade offers the pros-
pect of the most immediate source ofcompetitive discipline, because
the competitive producers already exist outside of the Soviet V nion,
it is highly likely, as the Polish experience demonstrates, that imports
will be expensive at the exchange rates likely to prevail under con-
vertibility. But this in turn should provide an important stimulus to
competitive domestic manufacture-provided, once again, that all
restraints on competitive entry and market interpenetrations by do-
mestic Soviet enterprises are removed.
Antimonopoly Policy and Its Enforcement
As we have already suggested, another necessary component of a
policy of fostering competition is the establishment of an anti-
monopoly enforcement agency. Indeed, in view of the division of
responsibility for economic policies between the union and the re-
publics, antitrust agencies will be required at both levels of govern-
ment: the V nited States has a federal assistant attorney general
charged with enforcing the antitrust laws, and so do most of the
individual states. Although this kind of dual authority involves con-
flicts and inconsistencies, agencies at both levels have important
roles to play, and the courts have been generally successful in defin-
ing the boundaries of their several jurisdictions to minimize such
problems.
These agencies require adequate financing and high-quality
staffs who are dedicated to preserving and promoting competition.
This means that they must be kept separate from the state PMAs and
any ministries charged with promoting industry.
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The antitrust agencies would presumably be involved in imple-
menting our proposed one plant/one enterprise rule, depending of
course on when this rule is applied. And, as we have already pro-
posed, these agencies would be involved in approving or disapprov-
ing any proposed reintegrations of separated firms.
Once the structural problems are resolved, antimonopoly agen-
cies will have the same responsibility they have in most market econ-
omies: to be vigilant in prohibiting agreements and combinations
that suppress competition and exercises of monopoly power that
exclude rival enterprises from a fair opportunity to compete.
We urge that these agencies be empowered to go beyond merely
preventing and dissolving suppressions of competition and be given
responsibility for actively promoting it as well. One important way in
which they might do so would be by exerting influence on the deci-
sion making of all other government agencies whose policies may
have pro- or anticompetitive effects-for example, by the way they
dispose of surplus military plants, administer tax policies, or license
enterprises for health or safety reasons. Promotion ofcompetition is
the responsibility of all government agencies; the antimonopoly
agencies could play an important role in encouraging all of them to
fulfill that responsibility.
Small Business
There are some 700,000 state enterprises operating in the service
sectors. These are typically small in scale, require relatively little
capital, employ relatively simple technologies, and therefore pre-
sent relatively few problems of monopoly. For these reasons they are
candidates for direct privatization by public auction, sale to present
managers (perhaps with deferred payment) or lease to individuals
with an option of eventual purchase. In view of the large numbers
involved, these privatizations can best be supervised by local govern-
ments.
Personal attention to customers is an important aspect of how well
the service industries perform; it is precisely in this respect that their
performance in the Soviet Union is notoriously deficient. One of the
greatest benefits of competition is that it would force such firms to
treat customers well; the result would be a very substantial improve-
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ment in general welfare, at very little cost in the use of society's total
resources. For these several reasons, we urge prompt privatization
of service establishments, as well as of small-scale manufacturing.
Privatization is likely to be comparatively easy to effect in these
sectors of the economy, because they are already characterized by a
significant amount of private enterprise. In the provision of repair
services, for example, private activity accounted in 1984 for 45 per-
cent of the repairs in the case ofapartments, 50 percent for clothing,
30 percent for home appliances, and 40 percent for auto repairs.30
At that time much of this activity was of doubtful legality and was
conduct~d largely by state enterprise workers during their evenings
and weekends-a record, incidentally, that refutes the stereotype of
Soviet citizens as lazy and lacking in entrepreneurial spirit. Since
1988, cooperatives have been legal; as of October 1990, there were
200,000 of them, producing an output estimated at 40 billion rubles
annually.31
Our proposal, thus, does little more than incorporate the present
reality and recent trends, except that we would go further and en-
sure complete freedom of entry, by abolishing the present require-
ment of governmental permits authorizing such operations. We
would positively encourage entry by making sure all enterprises
have access to credit on reasonable commercial terms. That is of
course the function of a commercial banking system-perhaps not
limited to the provision of short-term credit, as in the United States,
but permitted also to acquire long-term debt or equity in new ven-
tures. Such banks might also play an important role by providing
useful management advice.
Cooperatives do not enjoy a good reputation in the Soviet Union;
they have frequently been criticized by the media and the parlia-
ment, and are unpopular with many of the people. These criticisms
reflect the fact, however, that they are small islands of free enter-
prise in the sea of a planned economy; they are not fairly reflective
of the kind of role such institutions would play in a genuinely market
economy.
For example, the most vigorous criticism is that the cooperatives
30. Hewett, Reforming the SllViet Economy, 180.
31. Shalalin Report, 57.
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charge prices much higher than the state stores. But that ofcourse is
because the prices of the latter are held artificially low.
For this reason, many cooperatives are highly profitable-
another basis for widespread criticism. But that of course is, once
again, because they provide goods that are not available through
normal distribution channels and are rendered additionally scarce
by the way in which the Soviet economy is now regulated. It is also
because entry into competition with them is obstructed by many
barriers, formal and informal; the solution is to remove all such
barriers.
Cooperatives are also criticized for diverting supplies from the
state-controlled distribution systems, often by bribery; but that, once
again, reflects the distortions of the present system and the absence
of a competitive wholesale distribution system. Some cooperatives
are financed with profits from criminal activity. That can of course
occur in any society; in the Soviet Union it also reflects the difficulty
that private enterprises have in obtaining start-up and working capi-
tal in the absence of a private banking system and capital markets
such as exist in market economies.
Legitimization of competitive private enterprise would eliminate
the basis for most of these criticisms and would permit cooperatives
and other private enterprises to playa productive economic role. It
would also help relieve the present victimization of cooperatives by
protection schemes organized by criminal gangs; the need for such
protection reflects police indifference to their legitimate right to
protection.
In a full-scale market system, these various problems and sources
of criticism would be very substantially mitigated,just as would the
many problems confronting any private enterprises that attempt to
function today in an essentially planned system. Privatization and
liberation ofsmall-scale enterprise will make a major contribution to
the welfare of the Soviet citizens; but it can do so only within the
context of a general market economy.
Agriculture
Agriculture engages 25 percent of the total labor force in the
Soviet Union. Although we have not been able to do justice to its
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special problems, we see no reason to doubt the applicability to
agriculture of the general principles and recommendations we have
enunciated-corporatization of the state farms and open oppor-
tunities for private ownership and operation, where-presumably
mainly in the growing of fruits, vegetables, and possibly meat and
dairy products-small-scale farming is likely to be feasible. Sim-
ilarly, our recommendations for price deregulation and the elimina-
tion of state-controlled distribution are clearly applicable to agri-
cultural products and their inputs: as for the latter, there is obviously
no way in which the production, pricing, and marketing of farm
products could be effectively liberated so long as the production,
prices, and distribution of the necessary inputs, on the one side, and
of processed agricultural products, on the other, continued to be
tightly regulated. A free market for agriculture requires a free mar-
ket in fertilizers, fuel, farm equipment, parts, repair services, trans-
port, processing, and distribution services.
The necessity for comprehensive liberalization is made even
clearer if we consider that although the USSR is the world's largest
producer of wheat, it is nevertheless a large net importer of both
grain and food generally. As the Economy of the USSR explains, "the
need to import arises in large part from the inability to process
efficiently and distribute the substantial domestic production of
food and fiber. Wastage and losses are roughly equal to imports."32
Only elimination of the comprehensive system of state controls and
the institution of competitive markets, in ourjudgment, can remedy
the deplorable situation in which a very large proportion of last
year's record grain harvest failed to reach the market-whether
because of inadequate supplies of fuel and repair parts for farm
equipment or trucking, or because of the neglect under Soviet plan-
ning of efficient systems of distribution.
The Exceptions: Residual Areas of Direct Regulation
and Nonmarket Sectors
There are two sectors of the economy where the possible inade-
quacy ofcompetition and therefore continued price regulation must
be considered. The first would be the concentrated industries-
32. Economy of the USSR, 39.
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primarily newly separated state enterprises-that continue to be
characterized by substantial monopoly power. We have already dis-
cussed and explained our disinclination to recommend price con-
trols in these situations.
The second is the traditional public ulilities-the local telephone
service and the local distribution of electricity, water, and gas-
where competition is probably inefficient. There are no readily
available rules for identifying such "natural monopolies," and their
definition changes over time, as technology changes. It is becoming
increasingly clear in the West, for example, that large segments of
these industries previously treated as naturally monopolistic-the
generation (as distinguished from the transmission and local dis-
tribution) of electricity, the purchase and long-distance transport of
natural gas, many telecommunications services, and railroad
transportation-are probably capable of being effectively competi-
tive; they have therefore been progressively deregulated. Most
Western economists, recognizing that all markets in the real world
are imperfect, are inclined to define the "naturally monopolistic"
sector as narrowly as possible, preferring to let the "naturalness" of
monopoly be tested and demonstrated-or disproved-by the com-
petitive market itself, rather than by some prior governmental deter-
mination that precludes competition from the outset.
We recognize nevertheless that there is some core group of such
utilities, providing essential services, for which neither competition
nor unregulated monopoly is acceptable. We can make no better
suggestion than that the Soviet Union begin its identification of
them on the basis of Western experience.
At the same time, there may well be differences between the two
situations that justify drawing the boundary of regulated utilities
somewhat more broadly in the Soviet Union than in the West. The
most important example that occurs to us is the railroads: the well-
developed highway systems in the West make their transportation
industries generally highly competitive in serving the needs of most
shippers; conceivably in the Soviet Union, with its long distances and
less well developed motor transport industries, the monopoly power
enjoyed by railroads may be much more substantial and ubiquitous,
and therefore require much more comprehensive regulation. The
1980 statute that substantially deregulated the American railroads
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provided for the continued protection of price ceilings for "captive"
shippers-customers lacking any feasible competitive alternatives.
Although recognizing the probable need for regulation to pre-
vent monopoly exploitation of customers of these industries, we
strongly emphasize the opposite danger that regulation may be ex-
cessively tight. It is a familiar phenomenon worldwide that the prices
of basic telephone service or electricity are often held so low as to
discourage investment; as a result, the exploitation of consumers
takes the form not of high prices but of very poor and primitive
service, or an inability to get service at all. This danger is particularly
serious in infrastructure industries such as these, upon which so
much of the rest of the economy and the prospects for its growth,
development, and competitiveness depend.
Even, therefore, if an industry like the railroads must be closely
regulated in the Soviet Union to prevent its earning excessive profits
in the aggregate, it is also clearly desirable that the companies be
given a great deal of flexibility in their pricing of individual
services-in particular, the ability to vary markups above variable
costs depending on the elasticities of demand. This kind of price
discrimination can contribute powerfully to economic efficiency,
while also being essential to put the railroads in a financial condition
to make major investments in rehabilitation and modernization of
their trackage and equipment.
Although residential construction is likely at an early point to be
effectively competitive, we have already recognized how extremely
difficult it would be simply to deregulate residential rents, in view of
the very high degree to which they are now subsidized, and have
recognized that this is one of the few sectors of the economy in which
conversion to a market system is going to have to be gradual. At the
same time, the potential benefits ofcompetitive private enterprise in
the provision of new housing and of price deregulation, with their
promise of increasing supply, improving quality, and eradicating the
present fifteen-year waiting period for apartments, and the supe-
rior incentives for maintenance and upkeep provided by private
ownership are just as important in this industry as in all others.
For these reasons, the local governments, now in charge of hous-
ing, should seriously consider transferring an increasing share of
the present stock to private owners, while at the same time clarifying
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the ownership rights in units that have already been sold-for exam-
ple, by conferring unlimited rights of resale.
Another sector of the economy whose total conversion to an ex-
clusive market basis for organization can only be gradual would be
the entire military-industrial complex. If recent changes in the inter-
national situation do indeed realize their promise of permitting con-
version ofa large proportion of these resources to civilian production-
which would be a great potential boon for the people of the Soviet
Union-that conversion cannot be accomplished immediately. The
estimates are that some 7 to 9 million people in the Soviet Union are at
present employed in military production and the armed forces. Mar-
ket forces alone may not be able to effect the transfer of these re-
sources and people at tolerable social costs: continued government
subsidization would almost certainly be required.
At the same time, here as elsewhere, the greater danger in our
view is that governmental authorities in the Soviet Union will exag-
gerate the costs and difficulties of the transition and the consequent
necessity for continued government planning, and underestimate
the efficiency ofthe market in achieving the necessary conversions-
and by so doing deny the economy generally its huge potential bene-
fits. Near the end of World War II there was a widespread belief in
the United States that the sudden cessation of hostilities and curtail-
ment of military procurement would result in massive unemploy-
ment in the absence of government intervention. In fact, the transi-
tion, essentially unplanned and unregulated, was accomplished with
startling rapidity, as both military personnel and industrial capacity
previously employed in producing armaments responded rapidly to
the pent-up demands of the civilian economy. Similarly, in the Soviet
Union, every opportunity should be given to the industries now
engaged in military production to convert to badly needed civilian
products, in whose production they are already heavily engaged: in
1980, enterprises under the jurisdiction of the military ministries
produced 60 percent of the tramcars in the USSR, 27 percent of the
railroad freight cars, 10 percent of the passenger cars, one-third of
the vacuum cleaners, and almost all of the motor scooters, television
sets, radios, videocassette recorders, and cameras.33
33. Hewell, Reforming the S(JlJiet Economy, 174. For a more detailed discussion of the
conversion problem, see Shata/in Report, 107-13.
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Finally, as we have already pointed out, there are major services
that the Soviet Union now provides free of charge to its citizens that
we expect it would and should continue to do. In the West, education
and health care are supplied by a mixture of market and nonmarket
institutions, in proportions varying widely among the various coun-
tries. Although we see genuine benefits for the Soviet Union from
the introduction of competition and market forces into some of
these sectors of the economy, we see little likelihood of such changes
being either feasible or desirable in the immediate future. There is
simply too much else that urgently needs doing.
Chapter Four
Stabilizing the Soviet Economy
William D. Nordhaus
Unfortunately for a considerable period of time in the USSR
there has been some kind of "taboo" on the very use of the term
inflation which was considered incompatible with the nature of
socialism.
-A. Khandruev
Courses in Marxist-Leninist ideology ... have been
abolished.... The number of required courses has been reduced
and new professors, some back from years in exile, are teaching
new courses like macroeconomics.
-New York Times
The proposals presented in chapter 2-a restrictive monetary policy
and a fiscal policy that eliminates the government deficit-are
shaped by our view that the Soviet Union today faces a mounting
economic crisis. As we emphasized in our discussion in the policy
memorandum (chapter 2), problems include issues of inefficient
economic structures, distorted prices, large macroeconomic im-
balances, divided government, and lack of popular support for steps
Note: Although this chapter is based in part on the discussions of the Study Group
that met in Sopron, Hungary, in August 1990 and on discussions at the Study Group
Chairmen's Meeting held in New Haven, Connecticut, in November 1990, the views
expressed here are the author's responsibility.
A. Khandruev, "In Search of a Reasonable Compromise: Inflation and the Prob-
lems of Soviet Economic Stabilization" (Paper presented at the IIASA Conference on
Economic Reform and Integration, Sopron, Hungary, July-August 1990); "New
Courses and Even Votes at Czechoslovak Universities," New York Times, March 1990.
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to stabilize and restructure the economy. The government budget
deficit is unsustainably large, incomes are rising much more rapidly
than output, open and repressed inflation is worsening, and there is
a flight from currency. For the first time in recent history, national
output is actually falling.
As difficult as these familiar economic ailments appear, they pale
beside the awesome task of making a transition from a centrally
managed to a decentralized market economy and society. In late
1989 and early 1990, the leadership of the Soviet Union had appar-
ently decided to scrap the administrative model ofeconomic organi-
zation and to adopt, as soon as is feasible, a market economy.l But, in
the face of the momentous implications of such a choice, the central
leadership faltered and chose instead to reimpose central political
and administrative controls, relegating the market economy to a
vague and distant vision. Nonetheless, many economists, members
of the intelligentsia, and leaders of the republics believe that adopt-
ing the market model quickly is vital for the economic health of the
Soviet people. The question is not whether, but when and how.
The search for the road to a market economy raises fundamental,
indeed unprecedented, economic questions for the leaders of the
Soviet Union and its republics. Should reform begin with budget
reform or monetary reform to prevent a price-wage-price spiral on
decontrol? Or should price inflation and wage controls be used to
reduce real aggregate demand? Should there be a first step to get
prices close to the market before letting prices go? Or is it hopeless at
this late date to try to guess the "right" market price? Should prices
be decontrolled now, so that incentives to production are enhanced?
l. An early and moderate plan proposed a staged transition from the administrative
system to the market in a process guided by central authorities. (See Radical Economic
Reform: Top Priority and Long Term Measures (Report presented by L. Abalkin, Deputy
Prime Minister, to the Organizing Committee of the All-Union Conference and
Workshop on the Problem of Radical Economic Reform, Moscow, USSR, 1989). See
also E. Yasin, "Modern Market Institutions and Problems of Economic Reform"
(Paper presented at the IlASA Conference on Economic Reform and Integration,
Laxenburg, Austria, March 1990). After the Abalkin Plan had run aground, a more
radical approach was outlined in the ShatalinPlan. This was initially endorsed by both
Gorbachev and Yeltsin, but the former retracted his support and instead tightened
the administrative screws in late 1990. See Transition to the Market: A Report ofa Working
Group Formed by M. S. Gorbachev and B. N. Yeltsin, Part I: The Concept and Program
(Moscow: Cultural Initiative Foundation, 1990). Henceforth cited as the Shatalin
Report after Academician Stanislas Shatalin, head of the task force.
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Or should the monopolies be broken up first to prevent the exercise
of monopoly power? This list could be multiplied indefinitely but
will give the flavor of the unpleasant dilemmas facing Soviet
reformers.
These dilemmas recur in all aspects of the reform process, but
they are particularly relevant to issues of stabilization and underlie
the macroeconomic measures proposed in the policy memorandum
(chapter 2) and elaborated on in this chapter. More than in the other
chapters, we must distinguish between measures immediately pre-
ceding economic reform and those necessary once reforms have
been adopted. As the other chapters stress, the proposals here re-
quire the simultaneous implementation of all the major measures
listed in the policy memorandum presented in chapter 2. As we said
there, "The measures must be taken simultaneously and in view of
the crisis as soon as possible.... Each of the measures reinforces the
others. If adopted together, the five measures can be successful; if
adopted singly or over time, they are doomed to failure."
EXISTING ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
Historical Developments
On the whole, the financial and budgetary situation in the Soviet
Union was relatively healthy until the mid-1980s. 2 Beginning in
1985, and accelerating up until today, there has been an increasing
overall disequilibrium arising from a combination of policy and ex-
ternal factors. The major developments over the last decade were
the worsening budget deficit, the acceleration in the growth of in-
comes, a continued deterioration in the growth of output, and, most
recently, a flight from currency and acute shortages.3
2. The analysis in this section relies in part on the contributions of the Soviet members
of the Sopron study group and on the papers by Gaidar and Kagalovskii and
Khandruev (E. Gaidar, "Financial Crisis and Political Problems of Economic Stabiliza-
tion in the USSR," and K. Kagalovskii and A. Khandruev "Economic Stabilization:
Monetary and Fiscal Policy" [Papers presented at the IIASA Conference on Eco-
nomic Reform and Integration, Sopron, Hungary, July-August 1990]).
3. The literature on the macroeconomics of administrative economies is small but is
doubling every year. A thoughtful essay, filled with interesting data and observations,
is contained in Gur Ofer, "Macroeconomic Issues of Soviet Economic Reforms," in
86 William D. Nordhaus
1. Income growth. A new development during this period was the
acceleration in incomes, primarily due to the rapid rise in wage
payments by enterprises. The growth of wages (measured by the
average monthly pay of workers and employees) rose around 3 per-
cent per year in the period up to 1987; wage rates rose 8 percent in
1988,9 percent in 1989, and 10 percent in 1990. During the period
1980 to 1990, the average wage in the state sector rose from 168 to
265 rubles per month. The reasons for the acceleration in wages are
complex but are essentially grounded in the sharp growth of the
bank balances of enterprises and in the liberalization of controls on
enterprise wage funds. 4
2. Budget. On the budgetary front, a number of decisions and
events led to an increase in the budget deficit since 1985. The anti-
alcohol campaign decreased revenues sharply, the fall in oil prices
decreased oil export revenues by almost 50 percent in 1986, and the
rise in wages led to increasing subsidies to enterprises. In addition,
because wages per unit output, and therefore unit costs, were rising
for enterprises while prices were frozen, government subsidies
to enterprises rose sharply in recent years (primarily to food-
processing enterprises). Budget subsidies for food and nonfood re-
tail goods in 1990 totalled around 24 percent ofsales. On food alone,
government subsidies are more than three-quarters of the value of
food sales.
3. Declining output growth. The rapid rise in the budget deficit and
in incomes led to a sharp increase in aggregate demand. During this
period, there was, in addition, a continued deterioration in the
growth of real output. The exact growth rates of Soviet output are
controversial, and table 4.1 shows a recent comparison of growth
estimates from different sources. According to official and unoffi-
cial data, there has been a further slowdown in growth in the last five
Olivier Blanchard and Stanley Fischer, eds., NBER Macroeconomic Annual, 1990
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990).
4. Most studies omit consideration of income earned from private sources, either
domestic or foreign. Gregory Grossman ("Roots of Gorbachev's Problems: Private
Income and Outlays in the Late 1970s," in U.S. Congress,Joint Economic Committee,
Souiet Economy in the 19805: Problems and Prospects [Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 19871) reports on surveys suggesting that private incomes were per-
haps one-third of reported incomes, and moreover that private incomes grew rapidly
during the 1980s.
Stabilizing the Soviet Economy
Table 4.1
Growth in National Output in the Soviet Union
A. Historical Data (Average Annual Rates of Growth)
National 1ncome Gross National Product
Soviet Selyunin- Soviet
Period Official CIA Khanin Aganbegyan Official
1961-65 6.5 4.8 4.4
1966-70 7.8 5.0 4.1 5.6
1971-75 5.7 3.1 3.2 4.0
1976-80 4.3 2.2 1.0 2.1
1981-85 3.6 1.8 0.6 0.4 3.9
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CIA
4.8
5.0
3.1
2.2
1.9
Source: P. R. Gregory and R. C. Stuart, S(Jl}iet Economic Structure and Performance,
4th ed. (New York and London: Harper and Row, 1990),389.
B. Recent Data (Average Percentage per Year)
Growth in Net Material Product
1976-80
1981-85
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
4.3
3.2
2.3
1.6
4.4
2.5
-4.0
Source: The Economy of the USSR, Summary and Recommendations: A Study Undertaken
in Response to a Request by the Houston Summit (Washington, D.C.: International Mon-
etary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, 1990), 4.
years, and the government has projected a 4 percent decline in Gross
Material Product in 1990.5
Why did growth slow so dramatically in recent years? Numerous
causes are given for the slowdown in the period up to 1985: a de-
crease in the growth of inputs (depletion of low-cost resources such
as oil, aging of the capital stock, and deterioration of labor disci-
5. A recent survey of economic conditions with recommendations for reforms is
contained in The Economy of the USSR: Summary and Recommendations, a study under-
taken in response to a request by the Houston Summit (Washington, D.C.: Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, 1990), 4.
88 William D. Nordhaus
pline); lowered technological change and efficiency (because of bias
against innovation in the planning system, concentration of invest-
ment in agriculture, and diversion of research and development
activities to the military); exogenous shocks (poor weather and de-
clining prices ofoil and other raw materials); and greater complexity
ofeconomic activity (with a greater number of products and greater
technical complexity).6
The actual decline ofoutput in the last year probably has a differ-
ent origin than the longer-term decline in growth. It is likely to be
the result of bottlenecks, reduced labor and administrative disci-
pline, and shortages of materials in key industries.
4. Shortages. The conjunction of rapidly growing demand, fixed
retail prices, and stagnant potential output has led in the last year or
so to severe repressed inflation and increasing shortages. As in-
comes rise with fixed prices, aggregate demand in constant prices
outpaces potential output. In a free market, the result would be a rise
in prices-inflation-sufficient to ration out the increased demand.
Since most Soviet prices are fixed, there is, of course, minimal offi-
cial inflation. But as incomes increase more rapidly, the excess de-
mand compounds the shortages. The shelves get barer and barer,
lines get longer and longer, and the few goods left in the state stores
are rusty tins and rotten cabbage. The free-market or black-market
prices rise sharply, the street price of hard currency diverges even
more from the official rate, and the free prices in farmers' stalls rise
sharply.
Once shortages appear, the dynamics of speculative hoarding
gear up as people begin to worry about the value of their rubles and
begin to use goods as a store of value. In this framework, it is not
surprising that the Soviet economy is experiencing worsening short-
ages and the disappearance of goods from the stores, and is driven
to ration basic goods like soap, meat, cigarettes, and sugar. By an
extension of Gresham's Law, overvalued things (rubles) are driving
out undervalued things (goods). In other words, the ruble is less and
less convertible internally by Soviet residents into Soviet goods and
services.
6. See Herbert Levine, "Possible Causes of the Deterioration of Soviet Productivity
Growth in the Period 1976-1980," in u.s. Congress, Joint Economic Committee,
Saviet Economy in the 1980s: Problems and Prospects (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1982).
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The breakdown of both retail and inter-enterprise markets with
growing excess demand is described in chapter 3. At the retail level it
takes the form of multiple types of rationing, great waste in queuing,
and even barter. A recent survey found that the average Soviet adult
spends 1.4 hours a day waiting in line (which, if accurate, would
equal about one-third of total working time). Under the pressure of
shortages, alternative distribution channels are sprouting up. A re-
cent study found that only 40 percent of food is currently distributed
in state stores, with the balance distributed in enterprise stores,
farmers' markets, special stores serving veterans, invalids, and pen-
sioners, and so forth. At the wholesale level, a complicated set of
barter markets for wholesale goods had developed by late 1990, in
which trades between enterprises were conducted in free-market
barter terms of trade. Such a breakdown of the official distribution
channels is a clear sign of repressed inflation.
5. Effects of partial liberalization. Tentative and partial liberaliza-
tions have served to destabilize the economy rather than to contribute
to an effective market economy.7 Virtually every attempt to liberal-
ize has encountered the law of unintended consequences, whereby
solving one problem has created two more.
An example of a partial liberalization that proved particularly
pernicious was the freeing up of enterprise wages funds, which
created a major increase in the incomes of the population (see table
4.2). The impact of this increase on incomes and the budget deficit
was described above. The government recognized the peril from the
growth in wage income and instituted the "tax on the wages fund,"
which is an increasing tax based on the rate of increase of total wage
payments. This tax (which was imported from Hungary) was in part
an attempt to substitute marketlike mechanisms for administrative
controls in a philosophy reminiscent of recommendations for tax-
based incomes policies in the West.
The wages tax immediately created problems of its own. Its de-
sign was flawed because it taxed the wages fund (total wages) rather
than average wage rates, thus introducing penalties for enterprises
that were expanding output and thus employment, as further de-
scribed in chapter 6. The wages-fund tax was largely ineffective in
7. A useful early account of the economic philosophy underlying perestroika is con-
tained in A. Aganbegyan, The Challenge: Economics of Perestroika (London: Second
World, Hutchison, 1988).
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Table 4.2
USSR: Incomes and Prices (Annual Percentage Increase)
1986 1987 1988
Retail price index 2.0 1.3 0.6
Average monthly wage 2.9 3.7 8.3
Household money incomes 3.6 3.9 9.2
Household purchases of 2.8 3.1 7.2
goods and services
Saving rate (percent of 6.9 7.6 9.2
disposable income)
Source: Economy of the USSR, 49.
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1990
1989 (estimates)
2.0 4.8
9.4 10.0
13.1 14.5
9.5 13.7
12.0 12.9
reducing wage growth because of successful pressure by enterprises
to be exempted and from the enterprises' ability to absorb the tax
through higher subsidies.
Economic Perspectives with regard to Changes in Output
This narrative leads to the following diagnosis of the mac-
roeconomic problems that face the Soviet Union as it attempts to
make the transition to a market economy. Overall, the current situa-
tion is best described as one of severe repressed inflation. Analytically,
three separate issues must be addressed in stabilizing the economy.
I. Stock problem. The "stock problem" denotes the fact that, be-
cause of past budget deficits and accumulations of liquid assets by
households, household assets today exceed the amount, relative to
incomes and prices, that households would desire to hold if goods
were freely available. This is often called the "ruble overhang."B To
eliminate the ruble overhang would require either a reduction of
household and enterprise liquid assets or a rise in the aggregate
price level. (See table 4.3 for data on the volume of money and
credit.)
8. It is technically incorrect to say that there is a monetary overhang in the sense of
involuntary holdings of money and other liquid assets. There are goods available at
high prices in farmers' markets and in the black market, so consumers can in fact
convert their money into some goods. It would be accurate to say that monetary assets
are in excess of what would be needed to buy today's output at official prices. Put
differently, the velocity of money may seem high when calculated at official incomes
(in fact, by this technique, velocity has fallen by about 35 percent through 1989). If, on
the other hand, we calculate velocity by using black-market prices, velocity may actu-
ally have risen over the last decade.
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Table 4.3
USSR: Money and Credit (Average Annual Percentage Increase)
1990
1981-85 1986 1987 1988 1989 (estimate)
Currency 6.0 6.1 7.8 13.6 19.5 21.5
M1 6.8 7.6 15.7 15.4 14.3 13.4
M2 7.5 8.5 14.7 14.1 14.8 15.3
of which:
Households 7.2 9.4 9.8 11.3 15.0 13.5
Enterprises 8.7 5.5 32.6 22.5 14.5 20.0
M2 (percent of Gnp) 51.2 56.9 61.2 65.5 72.5
Total credit 8.7 4.2 6.6 11.3 11.2 10.9
of which:
to firms 8.7 -13.3 -5.0 -6.8 -3.8 -1.3
to government 8.7 18.8 40.3 46.0 30.0 17.2
Source: Economy of the USSR, 49.
In a free-market economy, prices would tend to explode upward
under the pressure of large monetary assets. The equilibrium price
level with liberalized prices would be considerably higher than to-
day's level. There are a number of different ways to estimate the
extent of the disequilibrium. An illustrative calculation is the follow-
ing: The ratio of household liquid assets to income in 1989 was
around 0.95, whereas the same ratio was 0.70 in the 1976-82 period
(which we might consider a "normal" period). Assuming no budge-
tary impact of a price liberalization, this would suggest that a rise of
prices and incomes of 35 percent would be necessary to bring liquid
assets down to "normal levels." Other estimates, which include in-
dexation and wage response, suggest a rise of up to 150 percent as a
result of price decontrol. A third set ofestimates of the price disequi-
librium comes from black-market prices, which are often two to
three times official prices. Although no definitive answer to the
extent ofoverhang is possible, there is little doubt that a price explo-
sion of serious proportions will occur when prices are freed.
2. Fl(J1JJ problem. In addition to the stock problem, the Soviet econ-
omy currently has a serious "flow disequilibrium," which is seen in a
large budget deficit that is effectively automatically monetized.
Semiofficial data indicate that the on-budget deficit (expenditures
less receipts) is approximately 10 percent of gross national product
(GNP).
In addition, current pressures for expanded social programs
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seem likely to increase the deficit. Estimates are that the cost of
enacted or proposed social legislation (pensions, new pay scales,
social security, and indexation, for example) would total approxi-
matelyanother 10 percent of GNP. In addition, there are significant
"off-budget" expenditures (such as unrepaid credit advances to the
farm sector) which add substantially to the budget deficit. Because
of the structure of the Soviet banking system, these deficits are mon-
etized immediately in the sense that all net payments to households
are turned into cash or savings accounts.
At first glance, a budget deficit of around 10 percent of GNP
would not appear extraordinarily large. The danger lies not only in
the size of the deficit but in the fact that there are no significant
nonmonetary assets (that is, financial assets aside from M2) in which
the rapidly accumulating government debt can be marketed. In
effect, the ruble overhang is accumulating at a rate of about 10
percent of GNP per year.
3. Speculation and shortages. Recently, there has been a significant
outbreak of speculative hoarding and flight from the ruble. Follow-
ing the government's ill-designed announcement of future price
increases in May 1990, the shelves in state stores were cleaned out of
goods. The unofficial exchange rate for the ruble appears to have
fallen in 1990 (from 10 or 15 rubles to US$1 in early 1990 to 20 to 30
rubles to US$1 in summer 1990), another indication of price dis-
equilibrium and speculative panic.
According to Soviet experts reporting in mid-1990, relatively lit-
tle dollarization has occurred, with unofficial estimates of the dollar
balances held by the Soviet population being around US$O.4 billion
(as compared with estimates of US$10 billion for Poland in recent
times). On the other hand, estimates in the Skatalin Report indicated
that US$2 billion in hard currency is in circulation.9
James Noren presents other evidence of shortages that indicates
that shortages have worsened considerably in the late 1980s through
the mechanism described above. 10 Noren shows that the increasing
problems that occurred in Soviet consumer markets through the
middle of 1990 were due to increased demand and not decreased
9. Shatalin Report, 61.
10. James H. Noren, "The Soviet Economic Crisis: Another Perspective," SllViet Econ-
omy 5, no. I (January-March): 3-55.
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production. In fact, production of consumer goods rose steadily
through the middle of 1990.
Other data confirm the worsening shortages in consumer mar-
kets. One index is compiled from a survey of emigrants from the
USSR during the period 1981-89 concerning the extent to which
twenty-two goods were available in state stores and collective farm
markets. The percentage of respondents reporting regular avail-
ability of the twenty-two foods declined from around 50 percent in
1983-84 to 27 percent in 1989. Availability declined in all regions
covered by the survey. Another index of shortage was the extent of
rationing. A survey indicated that during the period 1987-89 the
extent of sugar rationing rose from 5 percent to 95 percent of re-
spondents, while the percentage of respondents reporting rationing
of butter increased from 40 to 60 percent. A third indicator ofexcess
demand is the black-market price of the ruble, which also rose
sharply in the period from 1985 to late 1990. In all these cases, it is
likely that the shortages were a combination of excess flow demand
and some speculative hoarding in anticipation of either price
changes or asset confiscations. I I
Conclusions
These conditions lead to the following two tentative conclusions:
First, the time is short. A sense of urgency pervades our policy
memorandum (chapter 2) and all the chapters in this volume. There
is a significant risk that the Soviet economy is on the verge of a
breakdown or of hyperinflation. There is no time for half-measures
or for carefully planned stages, sequences, and steps. Decisive ac-
tions must be taken quickly or the distribution system may become
paralyzed.
Second, given the complete irrationality of the current pricing
structure and given the opportunities for arbitrage, the best course
may be not to try to reform prices, introduce new plans, unify ex-
change rates, or undertake some partial move toward the market in
the short run. Rather, the only effective approach is to have a com-
plete and simultaneous systemic change to the market. That is why we
stress the interdependence of the reforms we propose. They must
be taken simultaneously and quickly.
II. The figures cited in this paragraph are largely from Noren, "Soviet Economic
Crisis."
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GENERAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
William D. Nordhaus
In designing our recommendations for economic stabilization,
we had the following considerations in mind. The goal is to replace
the centrally managed, administrative system with a decentralized
market in a way that minimizes the social cost, pain, and disruption.
This means that unemployment should be kept to relatively low
levels (those normally found in market economies); that prices
should be free to adjust to supply and demand; that the growth of
the economy and particularly living standards should be enhanced;
and that prices should be stabilized.
The major threat to economic stability will be the threat of a
severe inflation when prices are liberalized. In addition, there is
likely to be a period, hopefully short but perhaps extended, of irre-
ducible frictional unemployment as people are redeployed from
their currentjobs to ones that are consistent with an efficient market
economy.
The program presented here has been designed to reduce the
chances of hyperinflation while insisting upon the primary goals of
promoting markets and enhancing long-run economic growth. 12
Any program to stabilize the economy will be extremely difficult;
indeed, at many points our Soviet colleagues tell us that the program
is impossible (nevozmozhno). But the lessons of stabilization policies
around the world are that, when governments have had their backs
to the walls, when hyperinflation or economic ruin has threatened
governments, then everything we recommend has been possible by
the test that some countries have actually taken the recommended
steps.13
A final point is that the program must be simple. It must be easily
12. For a recent study of the dynamics of hyperinflation, with many lessons for the
Soviet Union and other socialist countries, see Rudiger Dornbusch, Federico
Sturzenegger, and Helger Wolf, "Extreme Inflation: Dynamics and Stabilization,"
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution,
1990), 1-64.
13. Many of the lessons of earlier stabilization programs apply to administrative
economies on the road to a liberalized system. An exhaustive review of the history of
liberalization and stabilization programs is contained in Demetries Papageorgiou,
Armeane M. Chokai, and Michael Micacly, "Liberalizing Foreign Trade in Develop-
ing Countries: The Lessons of Forty Years Experience" (World Bank, Washington,
D.C., 1990, mimeographed).
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understood by policymakers and easily communicated to the popu-
lation through the media. It must not involve complicated multi-
stage strategies like the chess game of a Grandmaster or intricate
rationales understood only by economists. It must be robust enough
to withstand unexpected twists and turns of politics, economics, the
weather, and oil prices. (This last sentence was written on the day
that Iraq invaded Kuwait and drove oil prices up by over 50 percent,
but that fact changed very little in this chapter.)
BACKGROUND ASSUMPTIONS
Any plan to stabilize the economy must begin with some back-
ground assumptions about the political situation and about the goals
of the effort.
Political Assumptions
The political situation in the Soviet Union changes virtually daily,
but before we can begin to describe the economic climate, we need to
clarify our assumptions about the political structure in which the
economy is operating. The Soviet Union is assumed to consist of a
union of republics and to be more or less the same size as it is today.
In fact, however, our conclusions would not be affected if the eco-
nomic unit were to consist of only half or two-thirds of the present
population and resources.
We assume there is a common currency in all areas, managed by a
single central bank, which is responsible for monetary policy. The
country is assumed to consist of a free-trade region, with no internal
tariffs or border controls. There would be free migration of goods,
labor, capital, and finances within the country. There would be a
common external policy, with common tariffs, quantitative restric-
tions, administration, and regulations. Exchange rate policy would
be determined by the central government.
This basic framework allows for considerable variation in the
relationships between different levels of government. The structure
suggested by the Shatalin Report would generally fit into the frame-
work put forth here. There is a great deal of room for alternative
structures, such as different tax systems, ownership patterns, gov-
ernment expenditures, and social safety nets among regions. Varia-
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tions of these issues will affect other parts of a transition to the
market but are incidental to the stabilization issues addressed here.
Economic Assumptions
Our recommendations contain certain presumptions about the
evolution of the economy. We believe that it is likely that the eco-
nomic crisis will continue and may even worsen. Through early 1991
the fundamental factors that are contributing to increasing budget
deficits, repressed and open inflation, and shortages are getting
worse, not better. The lessons of hyperinflation and economic col-
lapse from other countries suggest that when the population loses
confidence in the currency and in economic policy, prices can begin
to spin out of control very rapidly. Once the genie of hyperinflation
is out of the bottle, particularly in countries with weak political struc-
tures, it may take years and a period of great hardship and austerity
to get the genie back into the bottle. It is not possible to predict how
fast the current economy may deteriorate. Perhaps the system can-
not survive for a year; perhaps it can creak along for some time given
the inertia and residual goodwill of the population or political re-
pression or both.
In addition, the effectiveness of a stabilization policy will interact
with policies in other areas. In order to implement the recommenda-
tions on stabilization, we make the following assumptions about pol-
icies regarding prices, external policies, and other areas:
• It is assumed that an effort will be made to establish the precon-
ditions for the market in terms of the necessary laws to operate a
civilized market economy. These preconditions will be discussed
in a later section.
• The most important assumption, recommended vigorously in
chapter 3 and strongly supported here, is that virtually all prices
should be decontrolled simultaneously and virtually completely.
The particular importance of this step for stabilization is dis-
cussed below. We have called the day on which prices are de-
14. A word on terminology: We chose the term D-Day to represent "Deregulation
Day..' In the West, D-Day designates the Allied landing in Normandy inJune 1944; in
the Soviet Union that day is known as "the day of the opening of the Western front."
So perhaps the modern D-Day will be known as the day of the opening of the Eastern
market.
Stabilizing the Soviet Economy 97
controlled "D-Day." 14 Complete demonopolization and privatiza-
tion are clearly highly desirable, but D-Day should definitely not
wait for these transitions to be completed .
• With respect to opening the economy, the approach in chapter 5
supports and strengthens our stabilization measures. As ex-
plained below, we recommend that the program for opening the
economy be implemented exactly on D-Day.
• Once again we stress that it is essential that enterprises must face
hard budget constraints on D-Day. Unless they face hard-budget
constraints, it will be difficult to ensure fiscal discipline and to
contain inflation.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS:
POLICIES BEFORE D-DAY
Our policy recommendations fall logically into two stages. A first
set of proposals applies before D-Day, that is, before prices are liber-
alized and before the economy is opened. A second set ofsteps apply
to the period following D-Day. We discuss each of these two stages in
turn.
In the period between now and D-Day, two objectives exist: to
create the essential preconditions for D-Day and to keep the ship
afloat.
Preconditions for the Market
What preconditions must be established before freeing prices
and opening the economy? These topics are discussed in other chap-
ters, but our concern with stabilization makes us view these needs
somewhat differently, and we therefore address this issue briefly
here.
The absolute preconditions for the market are, in fact, relatively
few. It would be a mistake to wait until every law was perfected and
every program finely honed. Moreover, it is unrealistic to try to
establish a finely tuned commercial code, a full set of stock and
futures markets, a carefully crafted social insurance system, and the
like. What is needed instead is the most rudimentary framework for
the evolution of a market economy. This framework can be achieved
relatively quickly.
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Among the absolute preconditions are:
• Enterprises must have directors who have the authority to set
prices, output, and wages as well as to hire and fire workers and to
buy, sell, or borrow financial or tangible capital. It is desirable to
have these decisions made by autonomous, financially responsible
corporations; these would first be publicly held; privatization
would come later. This step would ensure the dejure (and, at least
partially, de facto) separation of the enterprises from the state.
But whatever the legal structure, somebody (or some body) must
have the authority to make decisions.
• The government must enact and enforce laws of property.
There must be clear rules regarding who owns what, and how
ownership can be transferred, and a system of contract enforce-
ment to encourage longer-term agreements and the development
of private capital markets must also be in place. Creditors must
have the right to seize quickly the assets of bankrupt debtors.
• There must be banks who perform rudimentary banking func-
tions and refuse to honor drafts, obligations, or checks written by
enterprises or people who have no money.
• There must be rules of bankruptcy and liquidation to govern
what happens when the claims on an enterprise exceed its liquida-
tion value.
• Above all, there must be hard-budget constraints. This means
that there must be a generally accepted system of accounts, a unit
of account, and a limit on credit. Enterprises must know that
unprofitability ultimately means bankruptcy for the firm and
economic ruin for the managers.
These five conditions are what we would call the preconditions
for a primitive market economy. In addition, a civilized market
would benefit from such measures as unemployment insurance, a
social safety net, a stabilized budget system, a full menu of financial
assets, and so forth. But markets have operated without these mod-
ern features and they are not, in fact, absolute preconditions for the
emergence of the market. Moreover, the Soviet Union may not be
able to afford either the time or the financial resources to establish
these loftier objectives.
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Stabilization Policy before D-Day
In the period before D-Day, the major goal of economic policy
should be to correct the flow problem, or reduce aggregate demand.
The primary tool for accomplishing this involves reducing the bud-
get deficit. In addition there exists a subsidiary role for monetary
policy and incomes policies.
1. The first priority during the transition to D-Day is to reduce the
budget deficit. Of course, no group would like to see its taxes raised
or its subsidies cut. As a result, reducing the deficit faces substantial
political obstacles-indeed, the difficulty faced in reducing budget
deficits is a problem common to the Soviet and to many Western
economies. But one way or another, it is necessary to curb excessive
deficits if a stable market economy is to be achieved.
We are not in a position to analyze specific suggestions in detail,
and political factors must obviously be taken into account. Yet, cer-
tain deficit-reducing measures stand out. One of the early targets
should be to reduce or remove subsidies. Subsidies undermine mar-
ket discipline, distort prices, and lead to wasteful use of resources.
We will return later to the point that there are generally more effi-
cient ways of achieving the objectives of the subsidies.
Another target for budget cuts is central spending on investment.
Because of the way investment is allocated, the outcome is often
highly inefficient. For example, a substantial number of investment
projects are simply abandoned. Estimates today are that unfinished
construction projects today are equal to almost one year's investment
expenditure. 15
According to most estimates, a substantial amount of spending
(and an even larger fraction of effective resources) continues to be
channeled into defense, particularly military research and develop-
ment and defense procurement. Most estimates indicate that de-
fense spending has not decreased at all. Indeed, such reductions
might produce a double "peace dividend," for they would strengthen
the arguments of those in the United States who wish to reduce
defense spending but are blocked by proponents who point to con-
tinued high levels ofSoviet procurement. Finally, in both the United
States and the Soviet Union, the defense establishment siphons offa
15. See Shatalin Report, 113-18, for a discussion of the problems of unfinished con-
struction in the Soviet Union.
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substantial fraction of the prime scientific and engineering talent, a
resource that is increasingly vital to economic health in a technologi-
cally sophisticated world. Reducing military research and develop-
ment and devoting these resources to civilian activities would pro-
vide double and triple benefits to both countries.
The allocation of hard currency might be immediately reformed,
say by hard-currency auctions; some believe this would reduce the
budget deficit by between one-third and two-fifths. Central expen-
ditures in housing and agriculture might be cut sharply (the poten-
tial for reduction here being almost one-half of the budget deficit).
2. Credit policy has traditionally been passive in the Soviet Union,
based on the historical premise of the "real-bills doctrine," wherein
credit is given only on evidence of invoices or warehouse receipts of
goods. In principle, credit policies of Gosbank could be reoriented in
the period before D-Day in order to tighten the screws on enterprise
spending. This could be done, for example, by segregating wage
and nonwage accounts and freezing wage accounts, or by severely
tightening overall enterprise liquidity by freezing a certain fraction
of enterprise balances. An alternative approach would be to apply
overall credit limitations to the enterprise sector, although this ap-
proach would have the difficulty of requiring some kind of nonprice
rationing system.
It is not sensible to try to attempt a complete reform of an admin-
istrative banking system in the short time before D-Day. Rather, we
recommend using the existing system in the most effective way
along with promoting the growth of a private banking sector. This
recommendation is based first on the view that an attempt to over-
haul the banking system to improve the command economy is prob-
ably a futile exercise as it is likely to lead to unintended consequences
and will waste the time of financial reformers. Moreover, such steps
are unlikely to reduce markedly the ruble overhang. A better use of
time and energy would be to prepare for a transition to the market
by training bankers and preparing to privatize the commercial bank-
ing functions.
3. Incomes policies are important in the initial transition period in
order to slow the growth of wages and incomes. It is clear that the
liberalization ofenterprise rules (particularly, the effective abolition
of targets for the wages fund) along with passive credit conditions
allowed wages to outstrip production by a wide margin since 1985.
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In addition, the tax on the wages fund has not yet been effective in
slowing wage growth.
The continued hemorrhaging of funds into wages is a serious
threat to economic stabilization in the near term. The government
should consider tightening controls over wages-either through a
sharp tightening of the taxes on the wages fund or tighter credit
constraints on enterprises. Unless wages are kept under control dur-
ing the period of soft budget constraints, the possibility of keeping
the ship afloat until D-Day is in peril and the dangers of hyperinfla-
tion after D-Day increase.
Another issue during the transition to D-Day concerns the desire
for guarantees or indexation during what will inevitably be a period
of declining confidence and increasing open and repressed infla-
tion. We recommend avoiding any kind of indexation, compensa-
tion, or other real-income guarantees during this period. They serve
no economic function, are likely to be abrogated later, and generally
will tend to destabilize the economy during the period after D-Day.
4. A major issue of economic reform in the period until D-Day
concerns whether there should be attempts to undertake price re-
forms to bring the system closer to equilibrium. Chapter 3 discussed
in some detail why administrative or partial price reform is unwork-
able. We recommend that policymakers minimize their attempts to
reform the administrative system in the period before D-Day. This is
not an absolute prohibition, but rather a warning that attempts to
rationalize or liberalize are as likely to be counterproductive as they
are useful.
The reasons for this recommendation are three: First, there is
plenty to do in the near termjust to prepare for D-Day. In particular,
the program to establish the preconditions for the market essentially
attempts to build an entire house in a day. It is better to concentrate
all efforts on making the systemic transition than to waste time cor-
recting an imperfect system. Reforming officially controlled prices
is like painting a house that is going to be demolished tomorrow.
Second, it is clear that there are almost always unintended conse-
quences of reforms and liberalizations (such as the wage boom that
followed enterprise liberalization). In a situation that is so full of
irrational prices and arbitrage opportunities, changes in the rules
are likely to create all kinds of new problems. Third, many of the
recommendations will hurt people by raising prices, thereby giving a
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bad name to economic reform and (further) damaging the political
prospects for actually making a successful transition to the market.
For example, a 20 percent increase in prices will not put goods on the
shelves; it involves all pain and no gain.
All these recommendations are somewhat complicated, so the
major point to remember is the following: Before D-Day, economic
policy should focus on establishing the infrastructure for the mar-
ket, stabilizing the budget, and minimizing attempts to improve the
present administrative economic mechanism.
STABILIZATION POLICY ON AND AFTER D-DAY
The next issue concerns the stabilization policy on D-Day. At this
time, it is possible only to layout the general recommendations.
Given the vast political and economic uncertainties, specific recom-
mendations are not possible. Nonetheless, the general shape of rec-
ommendations are clear.
Timing and General Conditions
On or near D-Day, a number of measures will be introduced
simultaneously to liberalize prices, open the economy, and introduce
hard-budget constraints into economic decisions. The following are
the important concomitants of the stabilization package:
1. When should D-Day come? The answer is, soon. Not on Janu-
ary I, however, for there may be turmoil and confusion, and it would
be better not to have confusion at minus 40 degrees Centigrade.
(Indeed, a grim joke circulating today is that, after four warm win-
ters, the next cold winter will be the last winter of socialism.) Many
believe that D-Day must be implemented quickly if the Soviet Union
is to avoid hyperinflation or a breakdown in the distribution system.
2. The key steps taken on D-Day are the deregulation of prices in
a substantial part of the economy and a hardening of budget con-
straints everywhere in the economy. The exact strategy for this was
discussed briefly above and is described in chapter 3. The strategic
reason to have complete rather than staged liberalization is that, by
allowing prices to rise sufficiently to clear markets, consumers will
quickly see goods on the shelves. Thus, although D-Day will neces-
sarily be accompanied by certain painful steps, such as inflation and
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a fall in real wages, one important benefit will be that at the inflated
price level the devalued ruble will be convertible into domestic goods
and services.
The proposition that freeing prices will produce goods on the
shelves is not merely a theoretical economic proposition. Historical
evidence from Germany in 1948 and Poland in 1990 indicates that a
rapid liberalization of prices did in fact produce goods in the stores
almost instantaneously. 16 By contrast, half measures, such as staged
decontrol, run the risk of dispensing pain to consumers in the form
of lower real wages without making goods available.
3. Some observers believe that it is at this point that Western
economic aid is likely to be most valuable. Given the current short-
ages and bottlenecks, along with the decline in production, price
deregulation might lead to extremely high prices for certain goods
in great shortage (for example, last year cigarettes were selling on
the black market for 5 percent of weekly income per pack). To help
smooth the transition, some believe that a modest amount of foreign
aid might be used to help put goods on the shelves and to ensure that
the prices of consumer goods are not exorbitant on D-Day.
Such aid, however, is not essential for our proposals. Indeed some
analysts question the wisdom of devoting any foreign economic aid
to consumer goods. Such a measure threatens to encourage unre-
alistic expectations at a time when the population must be encour-
aged to make the psychological transition to a market mentality.
Moreover, they argue that whatever economic assistance is available
might be better and more productively employed in training pro-
grams, technological transfer, and assisting foreign direct invest-
ment.
4. Credit for enterprises should be available only on a short-term
basis and at positive (and initially probably high) real interest rates.
Clearly, it is absolutely essential that any automatic credit link,
whereby firms get whatever they need from Gosbank, be severed.
5. We believe that D-Day is the proper time to have an opening of
the economy. In an open economy, the exchange rate would float or
be determined by the market; the ruble would be freely convertible
16. A full account of the German recovery after World War n, along with details on
the German monetary reform, is contained in Henry Wallich, Mainsprings of the
German Revival (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955).
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for current transactions; and all trade restrictions would be replaced
with tariffs at a low and uniform rate.
In addition, stabilization measures will benefit from the under-
valued exchange rate recommended in the chapter 5. By undervalu-
ing the exchange rate, business in the Soviet Union will look like a
bargain to foreign investors, and Soviet goods will find an eager
world market. The world market is enormous relative to current So-
viet foreign trade. The world market in tradable goods and services
is almost 200 times Soviet hard-currency exports. By ensuring that
Soviet labor, resources, and goods are a bargain relative to world
prices, foreign trade, and therefore integration into the world econ-
omy, will be hastened.
6. D-Day would also be the point at which the economy would be
open to free entry in all lines of business (except operating missile
systems and printing money). The combination ofopening the econ-
omy to foreign trade and opening the markets to domestic entry and
competition would be a major contributor to competition. In addi-
tion, the freedom to engage in different activities and start up small
firms would provide a shock absorber for unemployment, real wage
reductions, or other events that are sure to accompany D-Day.
Stabilization Policies
Given the concomitants of stabilization listed above, we now turn
to the measures proposed to stabilize the economy. Before listing the
steps, it is important to note that moving to a market does not mean
abandoning overall economic policy or "leaving everything to the
market." It is possible to leave many of the individual decisions about
prices, wages, and production to financially responsible firms. But
prices and wages are still indirectly controlled by aggregative policies
that exercise their influence through markets.
Putting this differently, in moving to the market it is necessary to
effect a sharp change in the instruments of economic control, to
move from microeconomic controls to macroeconomic controls. In
an administrative economy, the approach to stabilization involves
the micro control of individual magnitudes (individual prices, wages,
credit lines, and enterprise budgets). In a market economy, these
controls must be replaced by policies that macro control fiscal, mone-
tary, and other variables. Thus, instead of restricting the credit to
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particular firms, in a market economy the control is through the
aggregate su pply of money and credit available to the economy. This
shift from micro control to macro control requires simultaneously
relaxing controls on the micro variables and imposing strict and
disciplined control on the macro variables.
Fiscal Policies
I. The single most important condition for stabilization on D-Day
is that government budgets be both tight and under control. The
stabilization must be clear, adequate, and complete on D-Day. For
simplicity, the target should be a balanced budgetP Obviously, the
closer the country comes to a balanced budget, the better, for if the
deficit is too large, then the deficit itself can lead to excessive growth
in incomes and to the unstable dynamics leading to a hyperinflation.
2. We discussed above potential approaches to balancing the bud-
get, and that discussion applies to the period after D-Day as well as
before D-Day. A few other remarks apply to the longer-term fiscal
structure.
The current structure of taxation is generally economically via-
ble, although it would be useful to make taxation of all enterprises
uniform (state, private, and foreign). Moving to a value-added tax
such as that used in the European Community would be useful in the
medium run, but is certainly not necessary on D-Day.
However, the overall tax rates in the Soviet Union are high rela-
tive to levels seen in most market economies. The ratio of total taxes
to GNP is approximately one-half, and further amounts are im-
plicitly taxed and transferred through price and allocation policies.
It is unlikely that a market economy in the Soviet Union could oper-
ate efficiently with as high a level of taxation as today. For example,
taxes are about one-quarter of GNP in Japan and about one-third of
GNP in the United States. Therefore, in cutting the budget deficit,
17. The concept of the budget differs among different countries. For simplicity, when
we speak of the budget, we have in mind the most straightforward system, which is a
"cash" concept. In this approach, which provides the basis of the U.S. federal budge-
tary decisions, the deficit is simply the difference between all outlays (on goods,
services, and transfers) less receipts (from taxation and sales of government enter-
prises). The receipts definitely exclude monetary creation, borrowing from either
financial or nonfinancial sectors, and borrowing from the central bank.
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preference should be given to expenditure reduction as opposed to
tax increases.
3. For expenditure cuts, the discussion under "General Policy
Considerations" in this chapter will serve as a useful point of depar-
ture for detailed analysis. Again, we emphasize that, in a market
economy, subsidies for individual goods and services should be kept
to a minimum. Some exceptions to the general rule to abolish sub-
sidies may be desirable, particularly with respect to necessities like
food for low-income households; a civilized society should protect
the worst-off, such as pensioners, from the ravages of inflation or
relative price changes. Measures to protect these groups are dis-
cussed in chapter 3 and in chapter 6.
4. In addition to the need to balance the budget, the structure of
the budget also requires reform. More precisely, the structure of the
budget must be such that inflation decreases rather than increases
the real budget deficit. This condition, which we call "dynamic defi-
cit stability," is a somewhat technical but critical point and will be
elaborated upon here.
Prices liberalization will affect both the real revenues and real
expenditures (by "real," we mean those nominal or ruble values
divided by an appropriate price index). Expenditure programs that
are indexed tend to maintain their real spending levels as prices rise,
whereas the real spending on nonindexed programs erodes as
prices rise unless they are boosted by discretionary actions. In addi-
tion, the real value of taxes tends to erode in periods of rising infla-
tion, both because many taxes are in specific terms (that is, rubles per
kilo) and because they are paid with a lag (of say a month, quarter, or
year).
The danger ofdynamic deficit instability arises if the real value of
taxes falls more sharply than the real value of spending when prices
rise. This would imply that the real budget deficit would rise, which
would tend to produce more spending, more inflation, and increase
yet again the real budget deficit. Thus, to avoid spiraling inflation,
the structure of the budget must be such that the erosion of real
revenues with inflation is less than the decline in real government
expenditures.
We did not have the occasion to examine the fiscal structure in
detail, but three concrete recommendations will help to ensure dy-
namic deficit stability. The most important recommendation is to
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avoid the temptation to use "real" budgeting instead of "nominal"
budgets. Real budgeting allows an automatic adjustment of pay-
ments when the price level rises. This is commonly used for transfer
programs (such as pensions) and is also sometimes used for other
government programs. We suggest that budgeting remain in nomi-
nal (ruble) terms and that beneficiaries must return for further
discretionary increases to compensate for any price increases.
Two other technical recommendations will also help promote d y-
namic deficit stability. First, all "specific" turnover or other taxes
should be replaced with percentage or ad valorem taxes. (A specific
tax is one denominated in nominal (ruble) terms per unit, whereas
an ad valorem tax is set as a percent of the product price.) This
replacement will help prevent the erosion of real taxes when prices
rise. Second, we suggest that the tax-payment lag be shortened.
Taxes should be paid contemporaneously with wages (say within a
week or at most a month), and quickly on other items as well, rather
than with the current three-month lag.
5. There is an important interaction between stabilization policy
and price deregulation. This arises because administered prices lag
behind rising costs, thus leading to greater and greater subsidies. To
understand this dilemma today, recall the state of price reforms.
The Soviet Union has already freed many prices. As of November
15, 1990, retail prices were in principle freed from central control
on many consumer durables and luxury items. On January 1, 1991,
all wholesale prices were in principle freed from central control,
along with prices at which enterprises sell to one another.
Retail prices, however, remain controlled for items comprising
about three-quarters of retail sales, although a retail price reform is
planned. With retail prices fixed below market-clearing levels, the
government must provide subsidies for the difference between
wholesale and retail prices. Such subsidies are estimated to add 200
billion rubles in 1991 to the already swollen government deficit (this
being about 20 percent of GNP).
Price deregulation will by itself therefore remove one of the ma-
jor elements contributing to macroeconomic instability. Only by
freeing prices will it be possible to eliminate the need for subsidies
for enterprises whose rising costs exceed their revenues based on
frozen prices.
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Monetary Policies
6. In the longer run, the burden ofstabilization policies will neces-
sarily fall on fiscal policies. Monetary policies can, however, play an
important role in the short run.
With respect to credit policies, a substantial tightening of credit
will be possible and desirable when firms operate with hard-budget
constraints. Once individual enterprises are subject to hard-budget
constraints, Gosbank should make credit available only to firms that
can repay credits; this implies curbing credits to unprofitable enter-
prises. It is probably unrealistic to completely cut off credits to un-
profitable enterprises, but they should be forced to restructure their
operations with a view to attaining profitability in a short time.
We emphasized above that stabilization requires replacing con-
trols on individual enterprises with controls on economic aggre-
gates. In monetary policy, this means that the banking system must
place overall credit limits on enterprises, much as Western central
banks do today. In the beginning, before prices and wages have been
stabilized, banks will probably charge high interest rates to enter-
prises under a regime of tight credit. In the period surrounding
liberalization, real interest rates (equal to money interest rates less
the rate of inflation) must be positive. Based on the experience in
other countries, this implies that money interest rates must be well
above today's level, perhaps 20 or 40 percent per year or even
higher. After inflation has stabilized and the government budget is
safely under control, interest rates can be reduced to levels seen in
market economies.
In the transition period, there is likely to be a mixture of enter-
prises, some operating with hard and soft budget constraints. It will
be necessary to cordon off the two sectors so that the lack of disci-
pline in the one sector does not infect the other. For example, it may
be useful to allow private firms and deregulated, financially respon-
sible firms to develop an interfirm loan market for funds. But there
should definitely be strict limitations on transactions between the
financially responsible sector and the less constrained sectors.
Our proposals envision that monetary and credit policies will be
administered by the existing banking system. It is not necessary to
privatize the banking system in order to have tough credit policies.
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Rather, the state banking system must be subject to overall guide-
lines on credit aggregates, interest rates, and lending guidelines.
In the longer run, it is clearly desirable to develop a private bank-
ing system to replace the state-run retail banks. Foreign banks may
be able to lend their expertise to this task. But banking is a most
complicated industry, and establishment ofa private banking system
will require careful thought and private banks are unlikely to as-
sume credit allocation in the short run.
7. The steps outlined above will in principle solve the flow prob-
lem of the budget deficit. In addition, price deregulation will, at
high prices, put goods on the shelves. There remains, however, the
difficult issue of the ruble overhang. On D-Day, household assets are
likely to exceed the value of assets that households would desire to
hold at the current average price level. In order to reduce the real
value of household assets-that is, to eliminate the ruble
overhang-either prices must rise so that the real value of house-
hold liquid assets declines to the desired level, or the assets them-
selves must be reduced through sterilization or monetary reform.
Some advocate a monetary reform to solve the ruble overhang. IS
An idealized monetary reform proposal might operate as follows:
on or around D-Day, the government might convert all existing
assets and liabilities into "market rubles" or "convertible rubles"-
call them M-rubles. The M-rubles would be converted from existing
rubles at a rate of, say, one M-ruble to two old, nonconvertible
rubles. (The figure of two-to-one is used for illustrative purposes
and is unlikely to be exactly the right figure.) Then households
would convert all cash, savings accounts, and other financial assets
into M-rubles at the exchange rate of two to one. The size of house-
hold debts appears to be small enough to ignore, but in principle
these would also be reduced by 50 percent. Wages rates would not be
adjusted; wage rates in old rubles would continue to apply in
M-rubles. Other contractual questions, such as those involving en-
terprise and commodity contracts, will be ignored in this discussion,
although these may pose technical issues.
On the basis of the calculations made to date about the extent of
repressed inflation (see "Existing Economic Conditions" in this
18. A useful review of the history and theory of monetary reforms is contained in
Rudiger Dornbusch "Monetary Reform" (Economics Department, Massachusetts In-
stitute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass., 1990, mimeographed).
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chapter), it is plausible that a two-to-one conversion would be suffi-
cient to extinguish much of the monetary overhang. Then, and this
assumption is critically important, taken in conjunction with steps to
reduce the budget deficit and tighten credit, the monetary reform
should prevent a major price explosion on D-Day.
An important part of the deregulation process is that the ruble
will become internationally convertible on D-Day. One major advan-
tage of the monetary reform would be that the new M-ruble would
be immediately able to buy Western goods. This is where the deci-
sion about the exchange rate becomes crucial. Estimates of the ap-
propriate exchange rate on D-Day are treacherous, and some re-
search indicates that a rate of 10 rubles to US$1 might be an
appropriate rate if prices were to double, suggesting an exchange-
rate target at current prices ofabout 5 rubles to the dollar. Accepting
this estimate for purposes of discussion, the new M-ruble would
therefore be completely convertible into dollars for current transac-
tions at a rate of 5 M-rubles to the dollar. For those households
desiring Western goods and exposed to current black-market prices,
which were in the range of 15 to 30 rubles to the dollar during 1990,
the new M-ruble would actually look like a bargain rather than a
confiscation. After the currency reform, the new M-ruble might be
at a floating rate, but that depends on whether a floating or fixed
rate should prevail at the outset of the reforms. This question is
discussed in chapter 5.
Proponents of the monetary reform argue that it is the only prac-
tical alternative to inflation; even more important, once a price-level
increase of a factor of 2 or 3 takes place, the chances of triggering
budget expenditures, wage increases, and a runaway inflation are
significant and intolerable. They argue that an across-the-board
ruble conversion would be more equitable than either inflation or
partial conversion or freezing savings accounts. In the ideal mone-
tary reform, all rubles are treated equally, whereas inflation, partial
reforms, or asset freezes will end up mainly hurting the poor, el-
derly, and innumerate who are not sophisticated enough to under-
stand them and are therefore unable to take steps to minimize the
costs ofadjustment. Finally, in terms of popUlar support, experience
from Latin America suggests that although people generally oppose
monetary reform in advance, once a successful reform is behind
them, people are relieved and satisfied that it has been done.
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Opponents of monetary reform are skeptical of the ability to
produce anything like the ideal neutral ruble conversion analyzed
above. There will be pressures to exempt or to attach certain assets;
antispeculative sentiment may tend to make the conversion progres-
sive (as occurred, for example, in East Germany); it is likely to be
poorly timed; there are many examples of monetary reforms that
were introduced as substitutes for, instead of complements to, the
necessary fundamental reforms; they tend to undermine confi-
dence in the domestic currency and accelerate dollarization; and
they may provoke hostile public reactions. Most important, they can
only solve the stock problem (by reducing the monetary overhang)
and contribute nothing to solving the flow problem.
In addition, Soviet analysts argued that it would be impossible to
keep the plan secret given the necessity of gaining the agreement of
the republics, so the task is to devise an effective anticipated monetary
reform. Opponents point out that an anticipated partial monetary
reform (say one converting only large notes or savings accounts, or a
temporary freezing ofaccounts) could be easily defeated by convert-
ing assets to exempted assets or goods, or by "leveling" accounts in
the case of a progressive reform. 19
On the whole, it is certainly better to avoid monetary reform if the
resulting one-shot price increase would be modest (say 20 or 30
percent), while a neutral monetary reform would be preferable if the
price rise was extreme (a factor of 5 or more, which threatens to
trigger hyperinflation). In between these extremes, the decision will
depend upon the estimates of inflation and the extent to which the
actual reform plan resembles the ideal neutral plan sketched above.
But whatever the view about the wisdom of well-designed mone-
tary reforms, it is essential that these be part of a strict stabilization
19. The monetary reform ofJanuary 1991 reveals the difficulties ofa poorly designed
reform. This reform attempted to confiscate unlawfully obtained 50- and 100-ruble
notes and aimed to reduce the money supply owned by households (M2) by at most 10
percent. Some newspaper accounts indicate that knowledgeable people had wind of
the confiscation and moved into other assets.
The reform is almost certain to be ineffective for large-ruble holders will transfer
their holdings to cousins, grandmothers, and people who simply do not have any
rubles of their own to convert. The limit on personal conversions is approximately
equal to the average monthly wage. Assuming that the average citizen can convert 300
rubles in large notes, this allows for 300 times 280 million in legal conversions, which
is 84 billion rubles, as opposed to around 40 billion of notes outstanding.
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policy and not be used as a substitute for the necessary measures to
reduce the budget deficit and control money and credit.
8. The extent of inflation or the stringency of the monetary re-
form can be reduced ifthe ruble overhang can be reduced. With this
in mind, two specific steps might be considered to reduce inflation-
ary potential:
The government might attempt to convert some fraction of
household liquid assets into equity claims. These claims might be
shares of the stocks of privatized corporations or of the housing
stock (although the latter appears to suffer from serious technical
issues). In addition, liquid assets could be converted into illiquid
financial assets. These might include long-term bonds, or special
accounts that can only be used for capital transactions (such as pur-
chases of housing or equity claims on corporations).
In undertaking the conversion to illiquid assets, however, care
should be taken not to exacerbate the flow problem by incurring
large future government interest payments. For example, if the sav-
ings accounts were converted into indexed savings accounts or long-
term bonds bearing market interest rates, this would sharply
increase the government's future interest payments and would
therefore threaten to destabilize the economy.
Caution should be exercised in privatizing enterprises so that
further government financial obligations are not created. One pro-
posal for privatization would leave enterprises with any positive bal-
ances and would reduce any debts to zero. Clearly this would in-
crease the government debt and is to be avoided. From the point of
view of stabilization, the best policy is probably to cancel all financial
debts and credits of state enterprises and leave them with only their
physical assets. A particularly dangerous policy would be to cancel
debts, leave credits, and then to transfer shares for free to mutual
funds or individuals. This would overnight add another 100 to 200
billion rubles to the ruble overhang because the enterprises have
balances of that magnitude.
The point to emphasize is that the enterprises belong to the state.
Their assets and liabilities can be auctioned off in a way that is most
sensible to the public interest. There is little reason to give windfall
gains (or impose windfall losses) on those firms who happen to have
positive (or negative) financial balances because of the past whims of
the administrative economy.
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9. A major set of issues for the period after D-Day concerns how to
compensate or index various sectors for the possibility of price in-
creases. In general, we would emphasize the importance of minimiz-
ing the amount of automati~indexation ofbudget claims or ofwages
or taxes. As we noted in the discussion above, greater indexation
leads to a greater threat of dynamic deficit instability.
There is no way to index the entire economy; indexation is best
seen as a redistributive measure. The more the system is indexed,
the greater is the threat of hyperinflation. Many countries who have
indexed their economies have lived to regret it. Moreover, it must be
kept in mind that when prices are freed, queues will be reduced,
black-market prices will fall, and thus the true cost of living will rise
less than will the official retail price index.
With these general considerations in mind, we would allow for
one exception in the case of transfer payments to such low-income
households as pensioners, for example, who must be protected
against the hardships of a severe inflation. For such groups, a high
(but not 100 percent) indexation rate would be acceptable. With
respect to other groups, the recommendation would be to minimize
the amount of indexation. Avoiding indexation will improve the
overall stability of the economy.
It is worth noting that the country with the greatest inflation
stability, the Federal Republic of Germany, is one in which wage
indexation is illegal!
10. A final issue concerns the recommendations on incomes pol-
icies. Incomes policy is a term used to designate policies that work
directly upon the wage and price decisions of individual firms. It
could include limits on price or wage increases, penalties or taxes on
excessive wages (as in the current "tax on the wages fund"), informal
or formal guidelines, and other mechanisms.
Our view is that tight fiscal and credit policies are a necessary and
sufficient condition for the ultimate containment of inflation. In
ideal circumstances, we would recommend that conventional stabil-
ization policies be augmented by policies to restrain wages. 20 On the
whole, however, we recommend avoiding such measures.
20. The case for incomes policies, with suitable cautions, is laid out in Richard Layard,
"Income Policies in the Soviet Union" (1990, mimeographed).
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The major argument against incomes policies (such as wage
guidelines) concerns the danger they pose if policymakers view
them as substitutes for the more fundamental requirement of anti-
inflation policy-tight aggregate demand and elimination of the
ruble overhang. Putting this point differently, the only sure and
certain way to ensure that inflation will be contained is the threat of
unemployment and bankruptcy that prevents firms from raising
prices and wages in an atmosphere of tight budget and credit
policies.
Other dangers exist in an economy that is trying to move to the
market. Historically, most incomes policies end up with the govern-
ment putting pressure on individual firms (and sometimes unions)
to restrain wages and prices. Such pressure interferes with the prin-
ciple of free prices and wages. Although the damage may be toler-
able in a society with long and deep market traditions, it seems more
perilous in a society that is trying to nurture financial responsibility,
autonomy, and freedom from central interference with price and
wage decisions. Particularly in a mixed system where the govern-
ment retains some residual powers and can use economic threats to
enforce incomes policies, it would seem better to abjure their use.
Given all these limitations, we see at best a limited role for incomes
policies. Chapter 6 suggests that incomes policies should be applied
only to large enterprises that are likely to be monopolies in their
product markets and have strong unions. In contrast, we would
forego entirely incomes policies because of the risk that when a
government has residual powers and can use economic threats to
enforce incomes policies, such policies can weaken enterprise inde-
pendence and bring back into the political process decisions about
relative incomes of different groups.
11. We must be clear on two points about prices. To begin with, the
fundamental choice for stabilization policy is between monetary re-
form (of either the ideal neutral or a messier partial version) and
inflation (of uncertain size and duration). To the extent that no
monetary reform occurs, the presence of excessive household liquid
assets will require a significant price rise to reduce the real value of
monetary assets.
At the same time, whether a monetary reform is instituted or not,
there is no way of avoiding a major economic upheaval because of
the necessary change in relative prices. No stabilization policy can
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prevent the relative free-market prices of highly subsidized items
like food from increasing, although in the process many important
consumer goods, such as televisions, automobiles, and jeans, will
experience a sharp fall in relative prices.
FINAL THOUGHTS
Many Western observers of the Soviet economy are today pessi-
mistic about the prospects for achieving economic reform. The road
is long, political will is meager, and the time is short. The most recent
period seems to be a case of"one step forward, two steps backwards."
The chasm between the administrative-command economy and the
full market economy is wide and deep. Nonetheless, we hope that
the chasm will be crossed and that these recommendations will make
the crossing less perilous.
Chapter Five
Opening the Soviet Economy
Richard N. Cooper
This chapter addresses the extent and the timing of the opening of
the Soviet economy to interaction with the world economy. This
involves examining the international convertibility of the ruble, the
exchange rate, and commercial policy.
This analysis assumes that the Soviet Union will continue as a
free-trade area and as a currency area within roughly its present
boundaries. This chapter does not address the pressing political
question of the sovereignty of the republics within the Soviet Union,
some of which have raised the possibility of instituting separate cur-
rencies and establishing restrictions on intraunion trade.Yet if the
reforms recommended here and in other chapters are carried out, it
would be economically disadvantageous to break up the Soviet
Union into diverse regions with separate currencies and border
restrictions.
OPEN THE ECONOMY EARLY
The opening of the Soviet economy should be an integral part of
the domestic economic reforms from the outset and not delayed
until many of the other reforms have become effective. By the open-
ing of the economy, we mean allowing the sale of foreign goods and
services within the Soviet Union, promoting Soviet exports to the
rest of the world, and encouraging foreign firms and individuals to
invest in the Soviet Union, Opening the economy requires establish-
Note: This chapter draws upon the discussion ofa study group on the opening of the
Soviet economy that met in Sopron, Hungary, in July-August 1990, and was subse-
quently revised in response to comments made by the participants and by chairmen of
other study groups. The chapter is the sole responsibility of the author.
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ing early convertibility of the ruble, necessarily at a realistic ex-
change rate, combined with a trade policy that encourages imports
and exports. We return to both these issues below.
There are several reasons for preferring that the opening of the
economy occur early rather than late. First, the key to a modern,
flexible, and innovative economy is competitive markets, wherein
information on new patterns of demand or new technological devel-
opments are transmitted to the entire economy through price sig-
nals, to which both households and enterprises can respond by
adapting their behavior. The Soviet Union has intentionally concen-
trated production of most manufactured goods in one or relatively
few enterprises (see table 3.3). Monopolies do not respond to market
signals in the same way that other enterprises do, and their re-
sponses are not socially optimal. Some method must be found for
introducing competitive pressures on Soviet enterprises at an early
stage of restructuring so that enterprises feel these pressures in
making their decisions. One way to do this, and for some sectors the
only effective way, is to introduce foreign competition, so that Soviet
enterprises have a price and a quality standard that they must match
in order to sell at home or abroad. This action will strongly reinforce
the actions recommended in chapter 3 concerning the establishment
of effective competition within the Soviet economy.
A second reason for introducing currency convertibility early is to
encourage from the beginning an alignment of Soviet prices with
world prices of traded goods and services, subject to such deviations
as the economic authorities wish explicitly and consciously to make.
If, as we assume, this alignment with world prices is the final objec-
tive, then starting the process early would be more advantageous
than going through a domestic price deregulation and then having a
second major price realignment when the economy is opened. The
alternative of administrative price adjustment to approximate world
prices is inadvisable, both because it perpetuates the principle of
administrative control of prices (as opposed to market-determined
prices) and because such control cannot be fully effective in a world
with millions of products of diverse qualities. l
A third reason for favoring early convertibility of the ruble is to
provide goods to Soviet workers whose incentive to work is now
I. The argument against administrative price reform is made in chapter 3.
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adversely affected by extensive shortages and to increase the quality
and quantity of inputs available to Soviet enterprises. Opening the
economy would offer a wide array of new consumer and producer
goods, albeit for purchase at high prices. It would not only provide
effective goods for households and improved inputs for firms but
would also help reduce the ruble overhang, since firms and house-
holds would be more willing to hold financial assets, which are not
high by Western standards. It would also provide the government
with badly needed revenue from taxes levied on imports, as we
propose below. Opening the economy early, then, reinforces the
proposals made in the previous two chapters.
Fourth, convertibility would provide a strong stimulus to develop
export markets. At the exchange rate required to make the ruble
convertible, exports would be extremely profitable for newly inde-
pendent enterprises. Autonomous enterprises would have a strong
financial incentive to develop export markets, and that would push
them from the beginning to take into account not only the price but
also the quality of products that are sold in the world market.
A final reason for current account convertibility is that Council
for Mutual Economic Assistance trade is moving to a convertible
currency basis and such trade accounts for about 55 percent of both
the Soviet Union's imports and exports. To maintain trade in conver-
tible currency when the ruble itself is not freely convertible for cur-
rent account transactions would require complex administrative
controls.
CONVERTIBILITY OF THE RUBLE
For all these reasons, a convertible ruble should be established at
an early stage of the reforms. By convertible we mean that all Soviet
enterprises and households would have free access to foreign ex-
change for the purchase of foreign goods or services, but not for the
purpose of buying assets abroad or holding foreign currency. For-
eign firms operating within the Soviet Union could repatriate their
after-tax profits. Obviously a system of monitoring would be re-
quired to assure that foreign currency is used for the permitted
purposes. In practice, this is likely to require a limit on the amount of
foreign exchange that Soviet citizens can acquire for foreign travel.
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It also implies a need for Soviet residents to be authorized to open
limited foreign currency deposits. It will be necessary, however, to
have some procedure for Soviet enterprises to invest abroad in dis-
tribution and servicing channels for the sake of promoting exports.
In today's world, some foreign investment is often required for
effective marketing of national products.
Fixed versus Flexible Exchange Rates
With ready access to foreign exchange, what will prevent an out-
flow of foreign exchange in excess of what is available? The answer
lies in making foreign exchange sufficiently expensive so that, over
time, the supply will balance the demand. This condition will require
a substantial depreciation of the ruble from the current official ex-
change rate. We favor devaluing to a specific exchange rate that
would then be fixed for at least a year or two in order to provide
some stability to the new set of arrangements. Such a strategy, how-
ever, has some prerequisites and necessitates careful selection of a
specific exchange rate.
With respect to the prerequisites, the most important one is de-
scribed in chapter 4. There it is argued that the rate ofincrease in the
money supply must be substantially reduced from what it has been
in the recent period. No currency can long remain convertible at a
fixed exchange rate if the supply of money is growing more rapidly
than the domestic demand for it, taking into account both overall
economic growth and trends toward a more monetized economy.
Reduction in the growth of the money supply requires a sharp re-
duction of the budget deficit. This will require a sharp turnaround
in Soviet fiscal and monetary policy, particularly since events in the
last half of 1990 exacerbated rather than ameliorated the budget
deficit.
An implication of this overall stabilization of monetary growth is
that individual enterprises will cease to have unlimited access to
credit when they get into financial difficulty. In other words, enter-
prises have to operate under hard budget constraints, as discussed in
the other chapters. The best way to accomplish this, and to advance
the other objecti"es of economic reform, is to convert most enter-
prises into joint-stock corporations and to allow the managers con-
siderable freedom in decision making, with the guideline of max-
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imizing financial profits. The experience of Hungary suggests the
need for at least some private ownership to assure autonomy from
government ministries. Ifa firm becomes insolvent, such that cumu-
lative operating losses exceed its net value, the management should
be replaced and, if the new management cannot improve the firm's
financial condition, the firm should be dissolved unless there are
special and explicit social reasons for introducing subsidies to pre-
serve it. This system will work well only ifenterprises can spend their
ruble earnings anywhere in the economy, and if market prices re-
flect the forces of supply and demand-again with exceptions that
are determined explicitly and are maintained by conscious govern-
mental action.
Our preference for a fixed exchange rate depends on the as-
sumption that the macroeconomic balance of the economy has been
established. However, a move to convertibility should not be ruled
out even if macroeconomic stability has not been established ahead
of time. Of course, under these circumstances a new exchange rate
could not be fixed, because convertibility could not be maintained
indefinitely if it were. But a fixed exchange rate is not required for
convertibility, and convertibility could be introduced with a flexible
exchange rate (subject to official intervention, but without commit-
ment to a fixed rate), with the expectation that the ruble would
continue to depreciate over time. Although this arrangement is not
ideal, it would have some pronounced advantages over the current
situation of a strongly overvalued ruble accompanied by shortages,
rationing, and extensive distortions in resource allocation. The fact
of continuing currency depreciation would itself create some pres-
sure for introducing monetary stability. A number of countries
around the world that have been moderately successful in their eco-
nomic growth, such as Brazil and Colombia, have opened their econ-
omy to some degree without overall macroeconomic stability and
have managed to function even with steadily depreciating curren-
cies. Again, though, we stress that this is very much a second-best
solution.
Current account convertibility is achieved by permitting any party
that needs foreign currency to import foreign goods or services or to
repatriate earnings in the USSR, to buy that currency in the foreign
exchange market. Such a market would have to be established (and
would quickly be established in London and other international
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financial centers if not developed in the Soviet Union) and the for-
eign exchange rate would be determined continuously by supply
and demand. Soviet residents who earned foreign exchange abroad
would be required to sell that foreign exchange in the market, ex-
cept insofar as they received permission to retain it for investment
abroad. Although the exchange rate would be determined by supply
and demand, official intervention in the market (presumably by the
central bank) would still be possible for the purpose of reducing
sharp fluctuations in the exchange rate. The central bank's source of
foreign exchange would be official conversions (for example, from
oil royalties) or borrowing abroad.
To repeat, currency convertibility is more difficult if mac-
roeconomic stability has not been established at the same time, but
moving to convertibility would be preferable to continuing the cur-
rent arrangements even if macroeconomic stability cannot be estab-
lished early during the restructuring period.
Selecting an Initial Exchange Rate
On the other hand, if the political will is found to balance the
Soviet budget, a fixed exchange rate would be preferable. A fixed
exchange rate helps the government stand by its commitment not to
monetize a future budget deficit. Any attempt to cover the fiscal
shortfall by printing money will be readily observable by the loss of
foreign exchange reserves, followed ultimately by the need for an
official devaluation. Thus the monetization has consequences that
are very visible. Once the public becomes accustomed to it, the daily
market revaluation of the ruble under a floating exchange rate re-
gime would be less dramatic, and hence more conducive to monetiz-
ing large budget deficits and maintaining upward pressure on prices
in the Soviet Union.
With respect to the choice of an exchange rate, there is no for-
mula to determine the correct rate. The usual modes of analysis
involving purchasing power parity comparisons or comparisons
based on macroeconomic models that reflect some history of supply
and demand responses to price changes are likely to offer little
guidance, particularly because the Soviet Union is facing extensive
price adjustments. In the end, a decision must simply be made,
informed by judgments about how Soviet citizens and enterprises
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are likely to respond to currency convertibility in the medium run.
We believe the choice ofexchange rate should allow the Soviet Union
to run a slight surplus in the current account of the balance of
payments. The objective here is not actually to run a surplus-for we
believe the arrangements we propose would in fact encourage a net
inflow of foreign capital for some years, thus permitting a current
account deficit-but rather to give some encouragement to exports,
which would be useful in the early period. If a surplus in fact
emerges, consideration can then be given to appreciating the cur-
rency at a later time.
On the basis of general considerations, we would guess that the
appropriate exchange rate at the outset might lie somewhere in the
range of three to six rubles per U.S. dollar for the price level prevail-
ing in the summer of 1990. After allowing for a likely doubling of
the price level following price deregulation the rate would be five to
ten rubles per U.S. dollar.2 We emphasize that this choice requires a
more informed judgment about the likely functioning of Soviet en-
terprises under currency convertibility than we are able to give. A
number ofcalculations based on newly deregulated prices and some
estimate of production efficiency in some of the key industries
should be undertaken as a check on any proposed exchange rate.
In any case, in operational terms the ruble should probably not be
fixed against the U.S. dollar alone, but rather against some combina-
2. The rates proposed here reflect the price level that would have prevailed had the
price deregulation occurred in the early fall of 1990. Since then, there has been
continual inflation and an increase in the money supply, which would make the
appropriate rate higher, although we lack current data to pick a precise rate. In
November 1990 a commercial rate ofabout 1.8 rubles per V.S. dollar was introduced,
alongside the official rate of 0.6 and a tourist rate of 6 rubles to the V.S. dollar. (The
tourist rate has since been devalued to about 27 rubles to the V.S. dollar). The foreign
exchange reform of November I, 1990, was accomplished by a Presidential Decree
dated October 26, 1990; it introduced a number of changes in addition to the new
commercial exchange rate. They abolished the differentiated foreign exchange
coefficient system-effectively a set of multiple exchange rates that varied from
commodity to commodity and even from enterprise to enterprise. Further, the de-
cree raised the amounts of foreign currency that enterprises could retain from their
export earnings, reduced some import taxes, and imposed export taxes on some raw
materials. Although some of these measures are ones we agree with, we doubt they go
far enough to enhance significantly the international competitiveness of Soviet indus-
try. See A Study ofthe Saviet Economy (Paris: International Monetary Fund, World Bank,
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, 1991), 1:422. (Footnote added by the editors.)
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tion of the dollar and the European currency unit (Ecu), or even a
basket of currencies that includes the Japanese yen. Most primary
product markets in the world operate in dollars, and the Soviet
Union will be selling heavily into those markets; on the other hand,
most of the USSR's trade in manufactured goods will probably be
with Europe, Japan, and the developing countries. One possibility
would be to fix the ruble to the SDR, a synthetic unit of account
comprising a weighted average of the U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen,
the German mark, the British pound, and the French franc. An
exchange rate in the range of five to ten rubles to one U.S. dollar
translates roughly into an exchange rate of seven to fourteen rubles
per SDR.
COMMERCIAL POLICY
An exchange rate aimed at a slight current account surplus can-
not be determined without specifying what trade policy will be fol-
lowed. As part of the move to markets and the restructuring of the
Soviet economy-and parallel moves in a number of the Soviet
Union's trading partners-the Soviet Union will shift in its trading
relations from centralized bilateral bargaining over the exchange of
goods to purchase and sale arrangements by enterprises. Under
these circumstances, it is necessary to decide whether any prefer-
ence is to be given to domestic over foreign goods within the Soviet
economy.
We can draw upon an extensive analysis of the diverse experi-
ences of economic development in many other countries.3 The re-
sults are not decisive and they lend themselves to diverse interpreta-
tions, but an emerging consensus is that, particularly for a country
with as developed an industrial structure as the Soviet Union, the
best trade policy would involve a uniform tariff duty covering all
imports. We recommend replacing all quantitative restrictions on
imports with a uniform tariff on all imports in the neighborhood of
10 to 15 percent.4 Tariffs are more evenhanded than quotas as a way
3. See, e.g., M. Michaely, D. Papageorgiou, and A. M. Choksi, LiberalizingForeign Trade
in the Developing World (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991).
4. Note, however, that the The Economy of the USSR recommends an average 30
percent rate with a minimal degree of dispersion. The Economy of the USSR: Summary
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of protecting domestic industry, and they avoid the administrative
system that currently dominates and distorts Soviet foreign trade. In
addition, tariffs can provide a source of valuable government
revenue.
We can envisage the possibility that a few items might bear higher
tariffs for the sake ofadditional revenue, or to discourage consump-
tion, but introducing these exceptionally high tariffs should be
strictly limited. In particular, when the aim is to discourage the
consumption of luxury goods, excise taxes that apply to all luxury
items, whether imported or domestically produced, should be ap-
plied rather than tariffs. The excise taxes would penalize both do-
mestic production and importation of the goods whose consump-
tion is to be discouraged and single out goods that can be taxed to
raise substantial revenue.
An initial exchange rate of, say, ten rubles per SDR would provide
substantial protection to most Soviet enterprises, since at that ex-
change rate imports would be expensive. We can envision, however,
transitional tariffs higher than the uniform rate to avoid a sudden
shock of competition to enterprises that are not initially competitive
at the chosen exchange rate but have a prospect of becoming com-
petitive in the long run. These transitional tariffs on products
should be fixed at 20, 40, and 60 percent, depending on the calcula-
tions of initial competitiveness of Soviet enterprises by product and
should decline over a period of five to seven years to the long-run
uniform tariff mentioned earlier.
This schedule of tariff reduction should be fixed in advance and
be nonnegotiable by the enterprises, although the pace of tariff
reduction across all sectors might be accelerated or retarded for
macroeconomic reasons. It is necessary to resist the inevitable pres-
sures from enterprises to postpone tariff reductions. Of course,
many products will not require any transitional tariffs, since the
enterprises will be adequately competitive at the new exchange rate.
Transitional tariffs should be used sparingly because they tend to
perpetuate the principle of administrative control of prices.
and Recommendations, a study undertaken in response to a request by the Houston
Summit (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment, and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1990),29.
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The adoption of this commercial policy, along with the associated
other changes we have recommended, would hasten the accession of
the USSR to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
Moreover, the USSR could make the limited purpose and duration
of the transitional tariffs more credible to enterprises by committing
itself to eliminate them as a condition for full accession to GATT.
Since most international trade takes place in intermediate prod-
ucts, raising the price of imports through tariffs also raises costs to
domestic enterprises that purchase them. To avoid blunting the in-
centive to export at the new exchange rate, a system of import duty
drawbacks should be introduced, whereby the tariff is rebated when
a product containing an imported input is exported.
A large devaluation combined with transitional tariffs and cur-
rency convertibility raises the possible danger of large price in-
creases within the Soviet Union. We believe this danger will be mini-
mal in practice. In the Soviet Union, the problem at present is
extensive shortages and a general absence of imported goods, espe-
cially consumer goods. The main impact of the introduction of con-
vertibility and devaluation, therefore, will be to widen the purchas-
ing opportunities of both households and enterprises, albeit at high
prices. The real wage will actually rise on this account, not fall, as
might be the case in an economy that was already extensively open to
the world economy.5
There are two areas, however, where special attention should be
paid to the impact of the currency devaluation on domestic prices.
The first concerns oil and gas, the second grain and vegetable oils.
The Soviet Union is a large exporter of the former and a large
importer of the latter.
With domestic markets linked through trade to foreign markets
and domestic prices determined by supply and demand, the domes-
tic price ofenergy would rise to the world price, converted at the new
exchange rate (see table 5.1). No doubt some increase in energy
prices is desirable to encourage greater efficiency in the use of en-
ergy. The magnitude of the increase implied in our proposal, how-
ever, would be a major shock to many energy-consuming enter-
prises. In order to spread this shock over time, it would be desirable
5. For a simple model where this can happen, see D. Lipton and J. Sachs, "Creating a
Market Economy in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland," Brookings Papers on Eco-
nomic Activity, no. I (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990), 90-98.
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Table 5.1
USSR: Domestic and World Energy Prices (Wholesale Prices to Industrial
Consumers)
1990 1991'
(ruble 0.58 per US$I) (ruble 1.80 per US$I)
Oil
in rubles per m.t. 30.0 70.0
in US$I per m.t. 52.6 38.9
in percent of world market priceb 26.3 27.7
Coal
in rubles per m.t. 27.0 50.0
in US$I per m.t. 46.6 27.8
in percent of world market price< 93.1 55.6
Gas
in rubles per th.cm. 25.0 50.0
in US$ per th.cm. 43.1 27.8
in percent of world market priced 33.7 21.4
Source: The Economy of the USSR: Summary and Recommendations: A Study Undertaken
in Response to a Request by the Houston Summit (Washington, D.C.: International Mon-
etary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, 1990),42, and author's calculations.
'The ruble prices reflect officially announced new domestic energy prices for oil,
coal, and gas, effective January I, 1991.
bWorid market prices are assumed to be US$200 per metric ton (m.t.) in 1990 and
US$140 per m.t. in 1991.
cWorid market prices are assumed to be US$50 per metric ton (m.t.) in 1990 and
1991.
dWorid market prices are assumed to be US$130 per thousand cubic meter
(th.cm.) in 1990 and 1991.
to introduce a duty on exports of crude oil, gas, and petroleum
products. The level of export duty should allow domestic energy
prices to rise more than the general price level, but still shield the
Soviet domestic economy somewhat from an immediate energy
shock. The duty should be designed to decline over a five- to seven-
year period. The export duty would raise revenue for the govern-
ment, again facilitating stabilization.
Whether the duty should decline to zero, or remain positive over a
longer term, would depend on technical judgments concerning the
long-run supply of oil and gas in the Soviet Union. If this elasticity of
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supply is low, a permanent duty would be advisable to capture some
of the rents on these extractive products. If by secondary recovery
and other technical developments, however, the supply elasticity is
high, then the duty should eventually disappear to avoid discourag-
ing production of oil and gas.
It should be noted that this discussion could in principle apply to
other mineral products, but oil and gas are clearly the most impor-
tant and widely used and so the price shock might best be spread
over time. This case is not nearly so compelling for other mineral
inputs.
The second area of price concern is grain and vegetable oils, both
highly visible consumption goods. To avoid a strong political reac-
tion to price increases, it would be desirable to subsidize the import
of these products for a transitional period, permitting lower domes-
tic than world prices at the new exchange rate. These subsidies,
which should also be phased out over time to encourage domestic
production of grain and vegetable oils, would place a claim on the
budget and would thus offset a part of the export taxes and the
import tariff revenue. Furthermore, with domestic prices for grain
and vegetable oils lower than those prevailing in the world market,
some mechanism would be necessary to prevent the export of these
products at domestic prices, for example, through the imposition of
an export tax. Sugar might also be a candidate for this special treat-
ment, but sugar is currently subject to special trading arrangements
with Cuba, and we did not consider the future of those arrange-
ments.
A convertible ruble at a realistic exchange rate will open up many
new opportunities for profitable and socially productive exports. A
key issue affecting the long-run benefits of convertibility for the
economy is the response of enterprises to these potentially profita-
ble export opportunities that will be opened up under the proposed
arrangements. To what extent, and how soon, will enterprises de-
velop new export markets? We feel that at any realistic exchange rate
the current structure of wages paid to the Soviet Union's highly
educated work force will make many manufacturing enterprises, for
whom wages form the lion's share of costs, quite competitive (see
table 5.2).
In some cases, especially with respect to primary products, enter-
prises will be able to sell into well-organized foreign markets. In
128
Table 5.2
Hourly Compensation in
Manufacturing (1990 Wage in US$,
index US$ = 100)
Germany
United States
France
Japan
Spain
Korea
Taiwan
Portugal
Singapore
Mexico
Poland
USSR
138
100
98
82
72
24
24
20
19
12
6
3
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Source: Olivier Blanchard, Rudiger Dornbusch, Paul Krugman, Richard Layard,
and Lawrence Summers, "Reform in Eastern Europe," Report of the WIDER World
Economy Group (Cambridge, Mass., 1990, mimeographed),lll-14. The figure for
the USSR is calculated as follows. The average monthly wage of R257/mo. (See
PlanEcon Report, vol. 6, no. 46-47, November 23, 1990, p. 8.) yields an average
hourly wage of R 1.48. At the tourist exchange rate (within the range recom-
mended by this report) of R5.56/US$1 (Ibid., 29), this is 26.69 US¢/hour, and that
is 1.76% of the U.S. average of US$15.20. The USSR rate is rounded up to 3 to al-
low for some wage adjustment after price deregulation. Calculations of the USSR
wage rates is by the authors of this report.
The above numbers reflect the hourly compensation paid by enterprises and not
the real income of workers. In Poland and the USSR, housing, medical care, and
pensions are subsidized by the state, and income taxes are modest compared to
many of the other countries in the table. Hence real income in these two countries
is closer to the others than the above numbers suggest. For international com-
petitiveness, however, it is the wages paid by enterprises that are significant.
other cases, enterprises will have to develop new marketing chan-
nels, which typically requires making expenditures abroad (except
insofar as foreigners take the initiative and seek out Soviet products).
In many cases, they will have to make domestic investments in qual-
ity control and in packaging. In all these cases, the response of
potential exporters will be faster if they have access to credit, ad-
vanced on the basis of potential export orders. To this end, it is
desirable that the new commercial banking system be sufficiently
developed to evaluate and make selective credits for the purpose of
developing quality export products and export markets. It is also
essential, ofcourse, to eliminate the requirement for firms to obtain
an export license once price deregulation occurs. (In the absence of
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price deregulation, some restraint on exporting is necessary to pre-
vent the export of goods that are priced below true costs; but once
price deregulation occurs, it is desirable to encourage any firm that
believes it can export profitably to make the attempt, except for
products such as weapons and nuclear materials, where national
security and foreign policy require export controls.)
Another factor that will influence the transition is the response of
transportation and telecommunications. In many countries, these
services are provided by state enterprises (the United States and
Japan are major exceptions), and it is important that adequate ser-
vices be made available to support the growth of exports.
FOREIGN CAPITAL
The flow of capital from abroad can be very important for the
Soviet Union, especially in the form of foreign direct investment.
The value of such inflows lies less in the foreign exchange they
provide than in the technical, managerial, and marketing skills they
can bring to the Soviet Union. The arrangements proposed here, a
ruble convertible for current account transactions, including the
remittance of profits, combined with a stable and modest import
duty schedule, will be conducive to direct foreign investment. On the
whole, foreign investment within this framework should be treated
neither better nor worse than investment by domestic enterprises.
Until such time as this convertibility is established, however, it is
highly desirable to allow joint ventures to engage in ruble transac-
tions that have recently been permitted in the Soviet Union. Prevent-
ing the regular use of rubles represents a strong impediment to the
exercise of business judgment and business flexibility and thus in-
hibits foreign joint ventures in the Soviet Union.
Other forms of capital inflow are suppliers' credits, bank loans,
and official loans of various kinds. The Soviet Union damaged its
international reputation in early 1990 by allowing delays in meeting
payments due on its obligations. It will take some time to reestablish
its earlier reputation as a financially sound and reliable country. On
the other hand, foreign sellers will have to learn to evaluate the
credit standing of individual Soviet enterprises when they engage in
transactions with them. Enterprise transactions will no longer be
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Table 5.3
USSR: External Debt and Reserves (In Billions of U.S. Dollars)
1990
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 (estimates)
External debta 28.9 3 \.4 39.2 43.0 54.0 52.2b
Short-term external debt 6.9 7.4 8.6 I\.2 17.7 1O.0b
External debt service< 7.8 8.8 8.2 9.4 13.4
(As a percentage of (-) (27.7) (26.5) (23.1) (24.2) (33.0)
goods and services)d
Foreign exchange reservese 12.9 14.7 14.1 15.3 14.7 5.1
Source: Economy oflhe USSR, 50.
aExternal debt contracted or guaranteed by the Vneshekonombank.
bAs ofJune 1990.
<Total debt service on debt contracted or guaranteed by the Vneshekonombank,
excluding repayments of short-term debt.
dIn convertible currencies.
eBank of International Settlements data excluding end-1990, which are staff
projections.
supported by the credit standing of the government, either in their
corporatized or ultimately in their privatized forms.
By objective standards, however, the existing external debt of the
Soviet Union, amounting to around 50 billion dollars, or 40 billion
dollars net of reserves other than gold, is not high given the size and
potential of the Soviet economy (see table 5.3). With the right re-
structuring measures, the Soviet Union has substantial capacity to
borrow abroad on commercial terms. At present, the external hard
currency debt modestly exceeds hard currency exports, a burden
that is not high by international standards, and one that will be
lowered by an expansion of exports.
In addition, the USSR will have access to officially guaranteed
export credits from other countries. (In January 1991, the Bush
administration was working to remove a statutory obstacle to such
export credits from the United States.) It may also have access to
long-term lending from the World Bank after it is able to join that
institution (this is conditional on membership in the International
Monetary Fund). Whether the Soviet Union actually has access to
World Bank loans will depend on a calculation of per capita income
in the Soviet Union after the price and exchange rate adjustments
have taken place. (World Bank lending is permitted only to countries
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with a per capita income on World Bank calculations below around
US$4100, a standard the USSR is likely to meet.)
Concessional financial aid to the Soviet Union is unlikely, except
possibly from Germany, because there are many low-income coun-
tries around the world that have claims to the limited amount ofsuch
aid that is available. But, of course, concessional aid is influenced by
political factors within each donor country.
In a setting that involves the proposals we make here, however, it
is possible that the Soviet Union could raise a stabilization loan in
support of the move to convertibility, to lend confidence that the
early days of convertibility can be sustained. This loan could come
from the International Monetary Fund if the Soviet Union were a
member, or it could come from the central banks or governments of
the major industrial countries. It is the nature of such a loan that it
will not be used if all goes well.
CONCLUSION
The proposals outlined here, while bold, make the most sense for
the USSR in the context of the goal of a major restructuring of the
economy to bring it closer to world standards. A number of pro-
posals for more limited action have been made. We have not exam-
ined all of them, but we find two classes of limited action markedly
inferior to our recommendations. The first is a move toward dollar-
ization of the Soviet economy. This involves enlarging the scope for
Soviet citizens to engage in transactions in dollars or other hard
currency within the Soviet Union and having access to special shops
with imported goods. Such an action will hasten internal flight from
the ruble, and it is costly to the nation to have to earn through
exports the hard currency used in domestic transactions. Introduc-
tion of general convertibility for the ruble, at a depreciated ex-
change rate, would be superior on both counts.
The second class of proposals concerns creation of a parallel
ruble, a so-called hard ruble, convertible into foreign currency or
gold, that would circulate alongside the existing ruble. If such a
development were successful, it would partially avoid the need to
earn foreign currency for use in circulation within the Soviet Union.
But it, too, would hasten the collapse of the usefulness of the ordi-
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nary ruble. Its introduction would also create political resentment
toward those relatively few who had access to the hard ruble. Again,
a bold movement to convertibility of the ordinary ruble would be
preferable.
Much of the economic reform plan outlined in this book and
summarized in the policy memorandum (chapter 2) will be painful
and politically difficult. Opening the economy is no exception. In-
deed, even in market economies more developed than the USSR,
trade liberalization demands great political will, as the current
round of GATT negotiations and the debates over trade liberaliza-
tion in some of the newly industrialized countries demonstrate.
Still, we feel that postponing this part of the reform to a later,
more tranquil period would be a mistake. It is better for the Soviet
economy to undergo a painful adjustment to a new set of relative
prices only once. Furthermore, domestic monopolies will be sub-
jected to foreign competition, limiting their ability to raise prices,
and, more importantly, setting a standard they will eventually have
to meet to stay in business. Finally, Soviet workers will at last be able
to buy quantities of high-quality foreign goods that are not admin-
istratively limited, albeit at high prices. This should yield, we sug-
gest, an incentive effect that could be a significant stimulus to their
productivity.
Chapter Six
Moderating the Social Costs
of Unemployment
Wil Albeda
Our policy memorandum (chapter 2) proposes that the social costs
of unemployment that will accompany the transition to a market
economy be moderated by unemployment benefits. The first part of
this chapter elaborates on the unemployment problem. The second
part goes beyond chapter 2 to consider longer-term measures that
deal with persistent unemployment. The final section examines the
difficult questions of wages and collective bargaining.
UNEMPLOYMENT
The Soviet Labor Force
The labor force of the Soviet Union in 1990 was about 140 million
people according to official statistics-about 133 million in the
civilian sector and 7 to 9 million in the defense sector. I The labor
force is defined here in the Western sense as including all those
employed and all those seeking work. In 1990, open unemployment
was minimal, although there was said to be significant disguised
unemployment, that is, workers making at best minor contributions
to output.
Note: This chapter is based on discussions of the sludy group on Labor Markets and
Employment and has benefited from lhe collaboration of Aleksandr Shokhin of the
Foreign Ministry of the USSR.
I. Estimates based on information provided by the USSR Stale Committee for Sta-
tistics supplied to the IlASA Conference on Economic Reform and Integration,
Sopron, Hungary, July-August 1990.
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Table 6.1
Estimates of Unemployment with Varying Transitions to a Market Economy
(in millions of workers)
Transition
Condition
Long-Term
Unemployment
Short-Term
Unemployment
Total
Unemployment
Rate
(in percentages)
Modest measures 0.4
Shatalin plan 6.0
Shock version
3.3
6.0
3.70 2.8
12.00 9.0
35.00 26.3
Sources: The first and third entries come from Soviet government studies, and the
data were supplied by our Soviet colleagues at the Sopron meetings. The second
row is from Transition to the Market (Report of a Working Group formed by ajoint
decision of M. S. Gorbachev and B. N. Yeltsin, Moscow, Cultural Initiative Founda-
tion, 1990), chart following p. 75.
Estimates vary widely concerning future patterns of unemploy-
ment and depend on assumptions about the extent and speed of the
transition to the market economy. The range is recorded in table 6.1.
Unemployment in a Transition to a Market Economy
The highest estimate ofunemployment in table 6.1 is an unrealis-
tic overestimate. This estimate assumes that most of the disguised
unemployment would be converted to open unemployment; that is,
it presumes that workers making a contribution to production less
than their wage would be immediately fired when enterprises re-
ceive the right to do so and are under market pressures and hard
budget constraints. But this estimate ignores the fact that with price
deregulation the revenue of enterprises will rise and hence so will
workers' marginal revenue productivity. With higher revenues en-
terprises will find that it pays to keep some of the presently disguised
unemployed on their payrolls. More significantly, this estimate ig-
nores job creation by new enterprises, particularly those in the small
business service sector. The importanee of this factor is borne out by
the fact that cooperatives, which had only a negligible share of non-
agricultural employment in May 1987, reached 5.2 million employ-
ees in 1990, once the laws restricting their activities were liberalized.2
2. The Economy of the USSR: Summary and Recommendations, a study undertaken in
response to a request by the Houston Summit (Washington, D.C.: International
Monetary Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development, and European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development, 1990), 26.
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Among the three estimates in table 6.1, we consider that of the
Shatalin Report to be the best estimate for the reforms proposed in
our policy memorandum. We note, however, that the unemploy-
ment rate of 9 percent is almost twice the 5 percent unemployment
rate experienced in Poland during the first year of the transition to a
market economy.3 A 9 percent unemployment rate is high but not
far beyond that experienced by market economies. Even after sev-
eral years of economic growth, the unemployment rate in much of
Europe is about 9 percent. Nevertheless, we warn the reader that
there is considerable uncertainty in this estimate. Unemployment
could easily be 6 or 12 percent instead of the 9 percent shown in table
6.1.
Frictional and Long-Term Unemployment
Table 6.1 identifies two quite different kinds of unem ployment-
frictional (or what is called short-term structural unemployment in
chapter 4) and long-term unemployment. These two types have
quite different social consequences and policy solutions.
Frictional unemployment is a necessary feature of a market econ-
omy. Enterprises must be free to fire workers as the demand for
their products changes and as productivity gains allow them to pro-
duce with fewer workers. At the same time, other enterprises whose
demand is increasing will be hiring workers. Frictional unemploy-
ment is the necessary bridge between enterprises that are contract-
ing and those that are expanding their employment. (Frictional un-
employment also serves as a check on wage demands.) The necessary
amount of frictional unemployment will vary with the way in which
labor markets are organized. In the United States at present a 4
percent unemployment rate is considered a necessary frictional
amount; in Japan, 2 percent seems to suffice. The estimate in table
6.1 from the Shatalin Report that half of the unemployment will be
frictional seems reasonable.
The social consequences of frictional employment are tolerable
and the policy measures required relatively simple. Almost all mar-
ket economies have a system of unemployment benefits similar to
3. Olivier Blanchard, Rudiger Dornbusch, Paul Krugman, Richard Layard, and Law-
rence Summers, "Reform in Eastern Europe," Report of the WIDER World Economy
Group (Cambridge, Mass., \990, mimeographed), IIl-23.
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that proposed in the policy memorandum. The level of benefits
should be less than the previous wage, decline with the duration of
unemployment, and be paid for a limited period to give recipients
an incentive to seek newjobs. In most industrial economies up to 85
percent ofjob seekers find employment without relying on the pub-
lic employment service. Information about openings comes from
newspaper advertisements, networks of friends, and private em-
ployment agencies.
Unemployment Benefits
The Shatalin Report proposes a benefit level of 70 percent of the
average month's wage during the first three months of unemploy-
ment, 60 percent during the next three months, and 50 percent
during the last six months.4 The benefit period is limited to twelve
months.
Although such a proposal conforms to the criteria listed in our
policy memorandum (chapter 2), it may be that the Soviet Union
cannot afford earnings-related benefits in the immediate future.
The alternative is a flat-rate benefit that provides a minimum level of
support for all unemployed irrespective of their previous earnings.
Flat benefits are simpler to administer, an important consideration
when the detail and accuracy of records of earnings are low and the
number of unemployed may be high.
Limitations on the duration of benefits is important. In the
United States, the duration of unemployment compensation is lim-
ited to six months. The dangers of unlimited unemployment bene-
fits are illustrated by the Spanish provinces of Andalusia and Es-
tremadura where indefinite part-time unemployment benefits
support unemployment rates of over 25 percent.
Market economies often finance unemployment benefits by a
special payrOll tax on employers with the proceeds segregated in a
separate fund from which benefits are paid. Such financing seems
desirable, yet as The Economy of the USSR observes, high levels of
unemployment may require additional financing from general gov-
4. Transition to the Market: A Report of a Working Group Formed by M. S. Gorbachevand
B. N. Yeltsin, Part I: The Concept and Program (Moscow: Cultural Initiative Foundation,
1990) (Shatalin Report), 79.
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ernment revenues.5 Given the geographic diversity of the Soviet
Union, unemployment benefits might be best administered by local
governments.
We understand that the employment law passed in January 1991
by the Supreme Soviet provides for unemployment benefits, to-
gether with retraining and public works employment. It appears to
implement the main outlines of our proposa1.6
LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND
LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT
Definition and Incidence of Long-Term Employment
Long-term unemployment is defined as that which leaves workers
jobless for more than a year. Such unemployment is devastating for
both the individual and society. Table 6.1 indicates that six million
workers might suffer long-term unemployment in the transition to a
market economy.
The experience of market economies with long-term unemploy-
ment varies considerably. The increase in unemployment in Europe
in the eighties was due partly to the duration of unemployment
rather than to an increase in the number of workers who lost their
jobs. In the United States, 2 percent of workers lose their jobs each
month but remain unemployed on average for two to three months.
In France and Germany, only 0.3 percent of the workers lose their
jobs each month but half of those remain unemployed for over a
year. In Italy, Belgium, and Ireland over two-thirds of the unem-
ployed have been out ofwork for more than a year. Sweden, Canada,
and the United States are at the other extreme where only about 7
percent of the unemployed have been so for over twelve months.
The extent of frictional as opposed to long-term unemployment
depends in part on macroeconomic policies and in part on the be-
havior of workers and enterprises. We cannot fully explain why
5. Economy of the USSR, 33.
6. See V. Shirokov, "Protection against Unemployment," Pravda,January 25, 1991, I,
translated in FBIS Daily Report: Soviet Union, January 29, 1991, FBIS-SOV-91-019,
38-39.
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some market economies have greater long-term unemployment
than others, but there appear to be two contributing factors:
1. The level of unemployment benefits relative to average wages
and the duration of such benefits, an issue which has already been
discussed.
2. The extent and efficiency of such labor market institutions as
employment services, which match up unemployed with em-
ployers, and retraining programs, which provide workers with
skills that are in demand. The goal should be to have labor market
institutions that minimize long-term unemployment at a reason-
able cost to governmental budgets.
Employment and Retraining Services
To be efficient, employment services need information about the
current conditions in the labor market. (Such information is also
valuable for decisions on other aspects of economic policy.)The
usual way to measure unemployment is through household surveys
that record as unemployed all those seeking work. We think that this
is the right way despite the difficulties of measuring the willingness
to work.
In the USSR, employment legislation defines the unemployed as
those "able-bodied citizens of working age who do not have any
earnings for reasons beyond their control, who are actually looking
for work, will undergo retraining, and who are registered at an
employment agency."7
Such a definition may be appropriate for determining eligibility
for unemployment benefits, but it is a misleading way to measure
unemployment. Individuals who are not entitled to unemployment
benefits will not register, and others may forego registration to avoid
being entangled in the bureaucracy.
A market economy also needs detailed information from enter-
prises concerning their past trends of employment by skill and wage
levels and their future hiring plans. Since labor markets are lo-
calized, data must be collected by cities or regions on a current basis.
The sample survey method, this time covering enterprises, seems
the best way to collect such information.
7. Quotation supplied by the Soviet experts at the I1ASA Conference in Sopran,
Hungary, July-August 1990.
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Labor market statistics are needed for the efficient operation of
the central institution of an active labor market policy-a govern-
mental employment service. Yet, although this employment service
needs access to labor market statistics, it need not collect the data
itself. A governmental employment service has three functions: (l)
administering the unemployment compensation system, (2) match-
ing the unemployed with job openings, and (3) operating retraining
programs.
In matching the unemployed with job openings, the employment
service will need the cooperation of employers. It should have close
links with employers and trade unions and should not focus only on
problem workers, otherwise employers shun it as a source of only
low-quality workers. As part of the employment function, it should
provide counseling to those who register with it.
A public employment service can be supplemented by private
employment agencies that match up workers and employers for fees
paid by either the worker or the employer. Such private agencies
have proved their worth in many market economies. According to
the International Labour Organisation Convention employment
agencies should be public and free ofcharge for both employers and
workers. This provision, originally designed to eliminate abuses by
private agencies at the turn of the century, is now commonly seen as
outdated. Several countries have a system of licenses for private
agencies that provide an adequate check on abuses.
An employment service can also serve as a major weapon against
long-term unemployment by providing retraining. The unem-
ployed in retraining programs would receive allowances, thus pro-
viding for their needs after their employment benefits have expired.
Although in some cases the service might establish its own schools or
contract with existing ones, creating a large system of retraining
centers seems inadvisable for several reasons. Such a system is not
likely to coordinate well with the demands of enterprises for particu-
lar skills or offer the quality of training needed. Vocational educa-
tion in the USSR already suffers from these difficulties. A system of
training centers would be expensive and inflexible. Finally, bringing
the unemployed together in centers adds to their feeling of exclu-
sion from society's mainstream.
It seems preferable to emphasize retraining by enterprises that
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would use classroom and on-the-job training. Such retrammg is
more responsive to current employer demands for personnel, is
cheaper and more flexible, and brings the unemployed into the
world ofwork. Ofcourse, enterprises would need grants to cover the
allowances for trainees and the costs of training itself. Experience in
the United States shows that such programs must be carefully moni-
tored to prevent enterprises from substituting lower-cost trainees
for regular employees in their operations.
Public Employment
Retraining is likely to be inappropriate for some of the long-term
unemployed. Thus, consideration might also be given to using em-
ployment in local government to support the long-term unem-
ployed. Again safeguards must be developed to prevent such em-
ployment from degenerating into disheartening busywork and
from undermining the quality of public service activities, destroying
the morale of regular employees, or raising significantly the cost of
local government services. Thus road building is a poor candidate
for using the long-term unemployed for it requires advance plan-
ning, a high level of skills, and capital-intensive equipment. Keeping
public parks tidy or cleaning streets may be more appropriate work
for unemployed unskilled workers. Such employment should be
considered a last resort in providing for the long-term unemployed.
Retraining and public employment, however, are preferable to
supporting the long-term unemployed by welfare. The experience
in Europe is that long-term idleness fosters a culture of permanent
unemployment, complete dependence on welfare benefits, and (if
benefits are low) poverty. The best policy, of course, is to operate the
economy in such a way that only a few become the long-term
unemployed.
In contrast to an unemployment benefit system, job matching
services, retraining programs, and public employment policies need
not be in place when price deregulation and the other reforms oc-
cur. Long-term unemployment will take time to develop. Still, plan-
ning should begin before the problem of long-term unemployment
becomes acute. Such systems might be best operated by local govern-
ments since the extent of the problem and the suitable measures will
vary by locality. Localities will need financial help from the republics
Moderating the Social Costs of Unemployment 141
or the union since some may be particularly hard hit if they special-
ize in industries with weak demand in a market economy.
A market system also needs to provide for individuals who are
outside of the labor force-the aged, the disabled, and the single
parents with small children. The Soviet Union has in place a com-
prehensive pension system. With price deregulation, frequent ad-
justments in pensions and related transfers to those outside the labor
market will be needed to insure the continuation of a minimum
standard of living for these individuals.
Labor Mobility
Labor mobility is important to the equity and efficiency of the
labor market. One of the inherent protections for workers in a mar-
ket economy is the ability to change jobs if another employer offers
better wages and working conditions. Labor mobility is also impor-
tant for economic efficiency, for the movement oflabor allows enter-
prises to expand or contract their production. Conditions favoring
mobility also reduce unemployment by making it easier for those
discharged to find new jobs.
Several features of the Soviet economy reduce labor mobility.
First, official permission is still required to live in many cities, al-
though residence regulation has recently become more flexible. Un-
til freedom to move from city to city to seek employment is well
established, there cannot be a Western style labor market.
Second, enterprises compensate their workers partially in kind
through assigning housing and access to special stores, medical
clinics, and vacation travel. Such privileges vary widely among enter-
prises and are lost by switchingjobs, particularly by accepting jobs in
the small business sector. The labor market would function better if
such compensation in kind were gradually converted to cash
payments.
Third, housing is scarce everywhere and often assigned by enter-
prises or the local government. Waiting lists for apartments are long.
Workers are loathe to move, given the uncertainties of finding hous-
ing. We touched briefly on the creation of a housing market in
chapter 3, but we would emphasize that a competitive housing mar-
ket is important for an efficient labor market.
Finally, enterprises have recently taken upon themselves the task
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of distributing food and other consumer goods. The current break-
down in retail distribution has made this function a key one for many
employees. We hope that price deregulation will allow enterprises to
stop serving as retailers to their workers.
WAGES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Wages with Price Deregulation
Nominally, the USSR still retains a system of wage rates that sets
the monthly salary of each occupation with variations by industry
and region. Yet enterprises have increasingly bypassed this system as
they have been given more freedom to set wages and give bonuses.
Gradually the USSR is attaining a labor market, although a much
distorted and restricted one. Workers are technically free to change
their place of employment, but geographic mobility is restricted by
the need for residence permits and by the frequent unavailability of
housing. Labor shortages in some enterprises and localities have
tended to push wages up, reflecting the limitations on worker
mobility.
Our proposals for price deregulation and corporatization could
increase the current wage inflation. Corporatization is the call for
enterprise independence that would include managerial determina-
tion ofwages. Free collective bargaining also follows from enterprise
independence. In the current inflationary climate, such freedom
could lead to significant wage increases that would fuel an inflation-
ary fire. Price deregulation will add to the problem, for there is no
avoiding a one-time jump in prices. If wages rise to match price
increases, hyperinflation could result, with prices and wages chasing
one another at an increasing rate. Hyperinflation would convert an
economic crisis into a disaster.
Incomes Policies
During the transition, government control ofwages-an incomes
policy-may be necessary. This is particularly so because eliminating
repressed inflation requires a reduction in real wages. That has been
the experience in Poland, for example, where real wages declined
sharply in the first three months after price deregulation. One must
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be cautious, however, about overestimating the effect of a decline in
real wages. Suppose the price of meat doubles. At the previous low
price, it could seldom be found in state shops and was freely available
only in the second economy markets at prices two to ten times the
official ones. Once the official prices increase, prices in these second
economy markets are also likely to fall. The changes in the official
price index, which is used to calculate real wages, will then overstate
the decline in real wages. This problem of the price index is de-
scribed in greater detail in chapter 4.
Macroeconomic Reforms
The first line ofdefense against inflationary wage increases lies in
two general economic reform measures. Placing enterprises under
hard budget constraints by eliminating subsidies and tightening
credit will force enterprises to limit their wage increases to remain
financially viable. These constraints should not be weakened by ac-
cepting pleas for subsidies and easy credit because wages have
increased. Establishing a market system will restrict the ability of
individual enterprises to raise wages. Thus the market system has a
built-in mechanism to control wages and hence hyperinflation.
Macroeconomic stability is the other essential defense against
wage inflation. If the state runs a significant deficit or provides easy
credit, it will increase the money supply, adding to demand and
permitting enterprises to raise prices and thus wages. The wage
increases will raise costs, providing a further need for price in-
creases. The process will continue as long as a significant budget
deficit and easy credit continue to add to the money supply. This
process is the essence of hyperinflation.
The Dangers of Indexation
We think our proposals, that enterprises be self-financing and
that macroeconomic stability be achieved, will reduce the risk of
hyperinflation. But these safeguards can be destroyed by a govern-
mental requirement of wage indexation-that is, a mandate that
enterprises increase the wages they pay employees by the amount of
the increase in the official price index. Full indexation would mean
that if the price index doubles with deregulation, enterprises would
have to double their wages.
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The only way wages can be doubled is if prices are increased
sharply. Higher prices, in turn, mean that either the economy
plunges into a recession, since at higher prices the goods cannot be
sold, or the government adds to demand by running a deficit and
providing easy credit. Thus full indexation has a tendency to result
in recession or hyperinflation. Gorbachev's Presidential Guidelines
recognize the danger of full indexation and call for 50 to 70 percent
indexation of wages (with the higher degree of indexation intended
for pensions and family allowances tied to the price of a minimum
consumer basket).8 As noted earlier, even such partial indexation
could overcompensate for real income changes, because changes in
the official price index do not reflect changes in second economy
prices or the availability of goods.
Thus, partial mandatory indexation, even if measured correctly,
will add to inflation. We strongly recommend against it. In an infla-
tionary situation, the indexed increases become the starting point or
floor in determining wage increases, particularly in collective bar-
gaining. The danger of mandatory indexation is apparent from the
history of the many countries that have tried it.
We would not change the present tariff system of wages, but we
would not index them either.9 Thus the tariff wages would in effect
become a minimum wage system. It does not seem prudent to en-
dure the controversy that altering the tariff system would provoke.
With inflation, tariff wages would no longer be very meaningful.
A policy of price increases without mandatory indexation will be
politically unpopular; so much so that it could preclude price de-
regulation. People fear price deregulation; they wonder how they
will ever get even enough food at market prices. We are in no posi-
tion to evaluate the gain in support for price deregulation that par-
tial indexation might provide relative to the problems it poses. From
8. Economy of the USSR, 24.
9. The tariff system is a schedule of wage rates set by the State Committee on Labor
(Goskomtnul) for each occupation, differentiated by branch of industry and by geo-
graphic region. It is applied to state employees only (and therefore not to kolkhoz
workers) and is supplemented by a system of bonus payments. See S. Oxenstierna,
From Labour Shortage to Unempluyment? The Soviet Labour Market in the 19805, Swedish
Institute for Social Research, no. 12 (Stockholm: Swedish Institute for Social Re-
search, 1990), 125-34.
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the viewpoint of economic policy, indexation is dangerous. The less
of it the better.
Incomes Policy and Large Enterprises
As chapter 3 indicates, the monopoly of a large number of prod-
ucts will be a significant problem with price deregulation and cor-
poratization. Such enterprises will not face hard budget constraints
and so will escape one of the constraints against excessive wage
increases. Experience in market economies has shown that when a
monopoly is combined with powerful and aggressive unions, infla-
tionary wage increases can occur,creating two significant problems.
Large wage increases in the monopolized sector can lead to pres-
sures to make comparable increases elsewhere in the economy, thus
fueling the inflation. Converting monopoly profits into wages also
can slow down the process by which high profits attract entry and
thus competition, which we rely upon to eliminate the monopoly.
For large enterprises, then, wage controls may be necessary, par-
ticularly if the one plant/one enterprise rule set forth in chapter 3
leaves a substantial number of monopolies. Since identifying mo-
nopolies is extremely difficult, wage controls should be applied to all
large enterprises-all those with over 10,000 employees, for exam-
ple. We emphasize, however, that an antimonopoly policy is of cru-
cial importance as a supplement to such wage controls, and it will
eventually eliminate the need for them.
What form might these wage controls take? Experience has
shown that wage regulation is best formulated as a control on the
average rate of increase in wages for the enterprise as a whole. This
is preferable to controlling the average rate of increase of total wage
payment-the wages fund. Controlling the increase in total wages, a
form of control already tried in the Soviet Union, penalizes enter-
prises whose output is expanding and thus need more workers,
while it favors those whose output is contracting and thus are laying
off workers.
Controlling the increase in average wages allows the enterprise
flexibility in distributing wage increases among workers. Such con-
trol is better than regulating increases for each grade of labor, a
method that reduces the freedom of the enterprise to adjust wages.
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Control by labor grade is more difficult to administer and can easily
be evaded by promoting workers to higher grades. 10
The controls should not constitute an absolute prohibition on
above-average wages, but rather should provide for a tax on above-
average increases in order to penalize the enterprises that provide
inflationary increases. Such a tax would recognize that above-
average wage increases impose costs on the economy.
We lack sufficient information even to guess at the correct level of
the tax. Similarly, we lack information concerning the proper rate of
increase for average wages, but the rate of increase in the unregu-
lated competitive sector should be one guide; another would be the
economy-wide average rate of increase in productivity.
We do caution against allowing enterprises with a high rate of
growth in labor productivity to give higher wage increases. Produc-
tivity growth varies widely among industries, mainly for technologi-
cal reasons unrelated to the efforts ofworkers. In market economies
there is a weak correlation across industries between the rate of
growth of wages and the rate of growth of productivity. This is
because competition in the product market forces productivity gains
to be passed on to the consumers as lower prices and competition in
the labor market forces enterprises to pay similar wages to attract
and hold workers.
We are mindful that incomes policies have seldom been successful
in the United States and Western Europe. Only when trade unions
were willing to cooperate with employers and the government to
limit wages and thus inflation did incomes policies enjoy some suc-
cess. These conditions for cooperation are now lacking in the Soviet
Union. As a result, establishing even the limited incomes policies
suggested here may use up too much of the government's limited
stock ofgoodwill. That is why we advance the notion ofwage regula-
10. The above statements are based on the experience of market economies with
income policies. We note, however, that in the context of centrally planned econo-
mies, control of average wage increases has not proved to be an effective instrument
for wage control. Managers, with the tacit agreement of trade unions, have recruited
low-paid employees from such groups as students and pensioners to depress the
average wage of their firm and thus permit wage increases for their regular employ-
ees above the target amount. Such low-paid fake employees were, in effect, hidden
unemployed. This is clearly the experience in Hungary.
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tion for large enterprises in a tentative fashion and give incomes
policy less emphasis in the policy memorandum (chapter 2).
The other danger of an incomes policy is that it may justify doing
less to achieve macroeconomic stability and enforce hard budget
constraints for enterprises. It is essential to recognize that an in-
comes policy is a complement to and not a substitute for enterprise
self-financing and tough macroeconomic measures.
Collective Bargaining
Soviet workers have been accustomed to state-controlled trade
unions. With the relaxation of controls, it is understandable that
workers now prefer unions that are aggressive, independent, and
close to them. New unions have developed, often in the form of
strike committees.
The difficulty with the rapid rise of collective bargaining is that it
takes longer to develop independent employers than independent
unions. Our proposals for corporatization are intended to create
such employers and a market-oriented system of collective bargain-
ing that is both independent and responsible, with workers and
employers both pursuing their conflicting interests.
Strikes are a normal and necessary phenomenon with free collec-
tive bargaining. It does happen, however, that a strike can shut down
an entire industry that is essential to the functioning of society. No
economy can allow itself be held hostage in this way. For such cases it
may be necessary to have compulsory arbitration, perhaps through a
labor court.
Existing market economies have a wide range of collective bar-
gaining institutions, demonstrating that a market economy is consis-
tent with a variety of forms of union organization. Some collective
bargaining is highly centralized (Sweden and Austria); others are
not (the United States and the United Kingdom). Furthermore, the
extent of unionization varies from 20 percent of the labor force
(United States) to 80 percent (Sweden and Austria).
One system of labor relations for the entire Soviet Union seems
unlikely and is neither desirable nor necessary. Different republics
may pursue different policies and develop different institutions.
The European Common Market has shown that a variety of collec-
tive bargaining institutions are consistent with a single integrated
market economy.
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As long as the Soviet Union lacks some form of political pluralism,
trade unions will feel tempted to play the role ofa surrogate political
party. This will compound the difficulties of collective bargaining
since union demands will extend to political questions that enter-
prises cannot resolve. Unions, like enterprises, are likely to look to
the government for solutions to problems. As long as the transition
to an effective market economy has not been initiated, every eco-
nomic question will retain its political character. This factor alone
makes the development of responsible collective bargaining diffi-
cult. We hope the measures proposed here will reduce the politiciza-
tion of economic decisions, including those affecting wages.
Chapter Seven
Privatization and the Creation of a
Commercial Banking System
Kimio Uno
Privatization and the establishment of a commercial banking system
are the most difficult phases in the transition to a market economy.
In other economies the institutions of private property have evolved
over centuries; the problem in the Soviet Union is to condense that
history into a few years. To compound the problem, some of the
issues have no commonly accepted solutions among Western econo-
mists. Furthermore, existing market economies offer a variety of
models from which to choose, particularly for the ownership of
large, capital-intensive corporations.
Corporatization-making the large, state enterprises man-
agerially independent and self-financing yet allowing the state to
continue to own corporate shares-was described in chapter 3 as a
relatively quick way of creating firms consistent with a market sys-
tem. The ultimate goal, however, is privatization. The first part of
this chapter examines how privatization of corporations might be
accomplished.
The banking system is also to be left in state hands temporarily,
but the banks are to begin making loans on a commercial basis and to
follow a tight credit policy. The ultimate goal is a privatized banking
system with a clear separation between central and commercial
banks. The second part of the report examines how this might be
done.
Note: This chapter is based on the discussions of the study group on Capital Markets
and Privatization that met in Sopron, Hungary, in July-August 1990. It was subse-
quently revised in response to comments by the participants and by chairmen of the
other study groups. The author is grateful forthe comments Benjamin M. Friedman,
Leonid M. Grigoriev, Robert E. Litan, and Merton J. Peck made on an earlier draft.
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In each instance-with the large, state enterprises and the bank-
ing system-the use of the state as an owner is designed as an interim
measure, chosen simply because that appears the only way to achieve
quickly the market-oriented institutions that the D-day deregulation
requires. It is not a completely satisfactory solution but preferable to
delaying reforms until the longer process of privatization can be
achieved.
Privatization is necessary, however, because only private owners
can establish an enduring basis for self-financing and managerial
independence. Private owners have a vested interest in the long-run
financial success of the firm. Their vested interest, in turn, makes
private owners guardians of the managerial and financial indepen-
dence of their firms in a way that the state as an owner cannot match,
as history has demonstrated. Private ownership creates a wall be-
tween the enterprise and the state, thereby making the enterprise
responsive to the market.
Of course, in market economies around the world some state
enterprises have functioned well. These are the exceptions and they
occur in largely privatized market economies with strong business
traditions, hardly the situation in the Soviet Union. The more com-
mon history of state enterprises is that they become subject to politi-
cal pressures that divert them from responding to profit incentives,
which is what the market system requires. The 1980s have been
characterized by major actions to convert state enterprises into pri-
vate corporations. The most notable examples are Margaret
Thatcher's privatization of a large number of nationalized British
enterprises and the very similar process in Japan.
Privatization as a goal of Soviet economic reform was universally
accepted by the economists, from both East and West, who partici-
pated in the deliberations leading to this book. Discussions of the
ways to achieve privatization efficiently and equitably generated
more controversy.
PRIVATIZATION OF LARGE STATE ENTERPRISES
We focus on the largest four hundred nonmilitary industrial en-
terprises that are currently under the jurisdiction of the all-union
ministries. These each have assets of more than 200 million rubles
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(see table 7.1 ).1 In addition there are two hundred similarly large
enterprises engaged in military production. They present special
problems because their customers are primarily the state. We set
them aside in order to focus on those that are potentially more
market oriented.
We focus on these very large enterprises because they present the
most difficult questions of privatization. At the other extreme are
the small enterprises engaged in light manufacturing, trade, and
services. There are thousands of such enterprises. (Table 7.2 pre-
sents the size of retail shops; some are very large, but most are small.)
These small-scale enterprises can be privatized by public auctions or
leased to workers with eventual right of sale, as discussed in chapter
3. That chapter also discusses agriculture and the natural monopo-
lies in such sectors as transportation and communication. Since nat-
ural monopolies would be regulated even with privatization, their
turn should come late in the privatization process. Agriculture lends
itself to privatization in ways similar to small businesses and the
service sector.
Of course, there are many medium-sized enterprises, as table 7.1
indicates. Our comments regarding the largest four hundred apply
to the largest ones in this middle range, while our comments on the
small enterprises apply to the smallest ones in the middle group.
Experience will determine where the line should be drawn between
the two categories.
Preconditions
Privatization of large enterprises requires several preconditions.
l. Ownership. The ownership of each enterprise must be clearly
assigned to a level of government-the union, the republic, or the
locality. There could be, however, a division of the stock of a particu-
lar corporation among levels, but there must be one level of govern-
ment that controls the privatization process to avoid disputes be-
tween levels that will slow down the process. The decision
I. Sergei Aleksashenko and Leonid Grigoriev, "Privatization and Capital Markets"
(Paper presented at the IIASA Conference on Economic Reform and Integration,
Sopron, Hungary, July-August 1990).
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Table 7.1
Size Distribution of Industrial Enterprises in the Soviet Union
Kimio Uno
Assets of Enterprises
(in millions of rubles)
Over 200
50-200
10-50
Less than 10
Approximate
Number of
Enterprises
600
1,600
6,230
38,400
Total Assets in the
Size Class
(in billions of rubles)
360
165
147
95
Level of
Governmental
Supervision
USSR
USSR
Repub.lUSSR
Repub.lLocal
Source: Aleksashenko and Grigoriev, "Privatization and Capital Markets."
Note: The net value of fixed capital is used to determine assets.
concerning which level of government should be the initial owner of
a particular enterprise is a political one. The important point is that
the decision regarding ownership of a corporation be made clearly
and permanently in order for privatization to proceed.
2. Demonopolization. Many branches of the Soviet economy are
highly concentrated, so the problem of monopoly power will be
pervasive upon deregulation. Demonopolization should precede
privatization, since otherwise shareholders in firms with undue mar-
ket power will attempt to block procompetitive policies. Moreover,
the privatization process itself will be hampered by uncertainty over
an anticipated antimonopoly program.
3. Ownership assurance and transferability ofassets. Citizens who hold
shares in the newly privatized enterprises must believe that these
assets will not be reappropriated or otherwise rendered worthless.
They must have free and clear title to any assets they own, and they
must have the unrestricted right to resell these assets to anyone who
places a higher value on them.
4. Bankruptcy law. A bankruptcy law must accompany the privatiz-
ation process. With the establishment of the principle that enter-
prises must cover their costs by the revenue from their operations,
there is no reason to allow enterprises that are losing money to
survive. It is worth pointing out that in the Soviet Union today, not
only is there no private equity, but there is no genuine private debt
either. What appear to be debts on the books are simply accumulated
transfers from one state entity to another. Provisions for enforcing
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Table 7.2
Size of State Retail Shops
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Floor Space
(square meters)
Up to 30
31-50
51-100
101-400
401-1,000
1,001-3,500
Over 3,500
Total
Percentage of Shops
17.4
20.5
27.3
28.1
5.9
0.7
0.1
100.0
Source: Aleksashenko and Grigoriev,
"Privatization and Capital Markets."
contracts and providing damages in the event of nonperformance
must also accompany privatization.
5. Accounting pn.u:tice. In view of the fact that the countries of the
world are becoming increasingly open and that business is fre-
quently conducted across national boundaries, adjusting accounting
practice in the Soviet Union to accord with international standards
would allow potential owners, both foreign and domestic, to be in-
formed about the financial condition of particular companies. Such
information is required for shareholders to fulfill their ownership
role of monitoring the management.
6. Corporate profit taxation. Such taxes must be uniform across
industries and enterprises and provide an incentive for profit mak-
ing. A rate of about 50 percent on corporate profits seems appropri-
ate. In the Soviet Union there are now so-called windfall profit taxes
with rates as high as 90 percent. Although currently justified by a
highly regulated and distorted price system that makes profits a
poor indicator of efficiency, the advent of price deregulation will
remove this rationale.
Corporatization and the Distribution of Shares
Corporatization sets the stage for privatization by orgamzmg
large state enterprises asjoint stock companies. It establishes them as
managerially independent and self-financing entities. The advan-
tage of a joint stock company is that it makes ownership divisible.
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This is the common form of ownership for large corporations in
market economies simply because it permits widespread ownership
and easy transferability of ownership. Both of these elements are
essential if corporations are to be able to raise the large amounts of
capital that they will need for restructuring. Moreover, joint stock
companies not only allow the ownership of shares to be widespread
but permit diverse groups to be easily represented among the
owners-management, workers, financial institutions, individuals,
and foreign investors-and each may hold varying percentages of
the shares.
State property management agencies (PMAs) would be the initial
owners of the stock. The PMAs are to distribute the stock of the
enterprises once the preconditions enumerated earlier are met.
This poses an obvious danger, for the PMAs are to engineer their
own demise, something which goes against the natural tendencies of
any organization. There seems to be no easy way of creating incen-
tives for the PMAs to push forward on privatization, other than the
pressures that come from a state committed to privatization. The
drive for privatization of state enterprises in Western industrialized
economies came from the political process, not from the state enter-
prises themselves. One could establish bonuses (perhaps in the form
of stock) for PMA managers that would reward them for privatiza-
tion, but such devices can only supplement the commitment of the
political process to privatization.
Another problem is the treatment of the financial assets of enter-
prises at the time ofcorporatization. Some firms will have substantial
liabilities; others substantial assets, largely in the form of bank de-
posits. The amounts involved are substantial, enterprise debts were
about 370 billion rubles and enterprise bank balances about 235
billion rubles at the end of 1990 (see table 7.3). The current distribu-
tion among enterprises of such debts and assets largely reflects the
distribution of subsidies and the operation of price controls. Prices
have been set by the central planners, basically on the principle of
average industry costs. Enterprises with costs above the average have
been given subsidies and special credit to continue to operate,
whereas those with below average costs have had their profits confis-
cated. There is little correlation between the present financial health
of an enterprise and its viability in a market system. Leaving the
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Table 7.3
Consolidated Balance Sheet of the Present Soviet Banking System, December 1990
(1n Billions of Rubles)
Assets
Credit to governments
Credit to enterprises
Credit to households
524.9
367.4
10.6
902.9
Liabilities
Deposits of households
Deposits of enterprises
Currency in circulation
Other Items
(Interenterprise and interbank
settlement accounts, budgetary
transit accounts, and misc.)
380.2
235.8
133.0
153.9
Source: A Study of the Suuiet Economy (Paris: International Monetary Fund, World
Bank, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1991),1:132.
enterprise debts intact would hobble or even threaten bankruptcy
for many enterprises. Thus it is necessary to cancel past enterprise
debts to allow such enterprises to start with a clean slate.
At the other extreme, some enterprises have substantial bank
balances that would in effect allow them to operate with a soft budget
constraint by drawing down their balances. As chapter 4 indicates,
we propose canceling both the debts and the deposits of enterprises
upon corporatization, leaving enterprises with only their physical
assets and inventories. (This arrangement still leaves some room for
soft budget constraints among enterprises that have accumulated
excess inventories which can be sold off. It is infeasible, however, to
deal with excess inventories, given the difficulties of distinguishing
between excess inventories and those needed for current
operations.)
Giving Away versus Selling Stock
One major question is whether the PMAs should privatize the
corporations they own by giving shares away to the general public or
by selling them. This is a crucial decision central to any privatization
program. There is no clear consensus among economists concern-
ing which is preferable. Poland, the Czech and Slovak Federal Re-
public, and Bulgaria are moving towards the free distribution of
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shares to the general public, whereas Hungary and the former Ger-
man Democratic Republic favor selling shares.
Several arguments support free distribution:
1. The objective is not merely to effect privatization, but to build
popular allegiance for the reform measures. Citizens who are
shareholders have greater allegiance than those who are not. Sale
of stocks will make only a small fraction of the population
shareholders.
2. There is great concern within the Soviet Union about the cur-
rent inequality of wealth. Sale of stock would lead to a highly
unequal distribution of shares, an outcome that could be espe-
cially unpopular in view of the fact that many of those who have
accumulated large holdings of wealth are perceived to have done
so illegally.
3. A free-distribution scheme sidesteps the need for asset valua-
tion. No one knows what the assets of these enterprises are worth,
and any price put upon them would be highly arbitrary. Under a
free-distribution scheme, stock prices will emerge as the prof-
itability of a firm becomes apparent under price deregulation.
The mechanics of distributing shares in many enterprises to the
public requires the use of financial intermediaries. Privatization via
distribution might then involve equity intermediaries in lieu of the
PMAs who would be given shares in enterprises, and their shares, in
turn, would be distributed to the public. To promote competition,
there should be a considerable number of such investment funds-
between ten and fifty, for example. The investment funds would
derive their income from the dividends on the enterprise shares
they own and use such income to pay dividends to the public, who
hold shares in the investment funds. The public would be free to
shift their assets among investment funds, as these will in time have
different rates of return and risk. At some point when capital mar-
kets are well established, the funds could sell off their enterprise
shares, distributing the proceeds to the holders of their shares.
Many of the participants in the study group on Capital Markets
and Privatization at the conference in Sopron supported a free dis-
tribution plan; others did not. This reflects the lack of a clear con-
sensus on this point among Western scholars. Despite its attractions,
we are dubious of the merits of free distribution on several grounds.
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1. Many people, unfamiliar with such investment instruments
and nervous about the unstable Soviet business climate, would be
likely to sell their shares in the investment funds quickly and at
very low prices. Hence the stage where every citizen is a share-
holder would be a transitory one, and the stock would end up in
the hands of those with the larger ruble balances anyway. The
final distribution of shares would thus not be too different from
their allocation if they were sold.
2. The Soviet Union is a vast country, with about 300 million
people. The sheer logistical aspects of disseminating information
and distributing shares are overwhelming, particularly as many
villages have no regular means of communication.
3. The stock certificate seems a remote and abstract way of pro-
moting the concept of private property. A piece of paper repre-
senting a small ownership share of a large enterprise in a distant
city would not be meaningful to many. The concept of private
property seems likely to be better promoted by encouraging
citizens to invest in small local enterprises and in their own hous-
ing, particularly since half the population has less than ten years
ofschooling and the Soviet Union has no tradition ofstock owner-
ship. Further, extremely widespread share ownership may give
the managers effective control of the firm as we discuss later.
4. Giving stock away might add to the ruble overhang by increas-
ing the public's financial assets. If they regarded stock as equiv-
alent to cash, they might increase their spending from their ruble
deposits, thus adding to the inflationary pressures. To dampen
this impact, and to guard against fraud spawned by ignorance at
the start, one proposal suggests that the shares given to the public
should not be transferable for the first three years. But such a
restriction could be easily evaded, and it undermines the idea that
the public is being given something of value.
5. Giving the stock away immediately would create future political
problems for policymakers. First, it would be much easier to
break up monopolies owned by the interim PMAs than by private
shareholders. The latter are likely to fight the break up in the
political arena, given their strong incentive to maintain monopoly
profits for their firms. Second, and for similar reasons, foreign
trade liberalization, as discussed in chapter 5, will be easier to
achieve while domestic producers are owned by PMAs. Finally,
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and again for essentially the same political reasons, any desired
environmental regulations would be easier to introduce during a
period of interim state ownership under the PMAs.
In selling the stock, the primary device would be the public auc-
tion. Stock would go to the highest bidder. Anyone could buy-
individuals, foreign investors, other Soviet enterprises, managers
and workers in the enterprise, and banks and financial institutions.
Auctions must be widely publicized in advance, and the publicity
must provide the necessary financial information. Otherwise the
shares will be bought by those with inside information, thus casting
doubt on the fairness of the process.
The problem with auctioning shares is that corporate assets are
likely to be bought at very low prices. The Skatalin Report estimates
the depreciated value of industrial assets to be 469 billion rubles.
The public is unlikely to have more than 50 or 60 billion rubles to
invest annually, and these funds are more likely to go for purchases
of small enterprises and housing than for corporate shares.2 Only a
small amount of funds will probably be available annually for pur-
chasing shares, even with allowance for foreign and enterprise in-
vestment. Thus the vast Soviet industrial establishment could be
transferred to relatively few individuals for nominal sums.
We propose that the sale of the stock of large enterprises be
spread over several years. It is less ofa problem if 10 or 20 percent of
the stock is sold at bargain prices than ifall the industrial assets are so
distributed. As experience accumulates and corporations establish
earning records, the auction prices for shares would come closer to
reflecting the long-run value of the enterprise. One important
source of demand for shares should be other enterprises who would
regard shares as good investments for surplus earnings. Suppliers,
subcontractors, and large customers of a firm may want to own
shares, reflecting their long-term interest in a particular firm. Such
ownership is common in some market economies, particularly in
Japan.
The difficulty with this way of proceeding is that it spreads the
process of privatization over time. But recall that the focus of the
2. Transition to the Market: A Report ofa Working Group Formed by M. S. Gorb(J£hev and B.
N. Yeltsin, Part 1: The Concept and Program (Moscow: Cultural Initiative Foundation,
1990) (Skatalin Report), 53.
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process is on the very largest existing state enterprises; we anticipate
that the small business sector could be quickly privatized and in this
way create a society familiar with private property.
Worker and management ownership is an alternative to auctions
or free distribution. Partial ownership ofenterprises by either group
can be valuable in promoting an identification with the long-run
success of the firm. Workers could be given, or sold at highly favor-
able terms, perhaps 10 percent of the shares in any enterprise. 3
Management could be given even more priority in distributing
shares in order to give them some of the incentives of owners. This
might be done by making shares available to managers only after the
enterprise has proved successful, after three years, as an addition to
their salaries. The knowledge that these shares will be available
could strongly encourage managers to make the economically prof-
itable decisions that shareholders would have made; in other words,
the interests of managers and shareholders would be somewhat the
same. As a continuing practice, a substantial fraction of manage-
ment bonuses could be given in shares.
Although there is much to be said for the partial ownership by
workers or managers, there is a strong case against either group
being the dominant owner. Workers have their greater interest in
wages, and thus prefer immediate wage increases over the long-term
commitment of funds to capital formation and research and devel-
opment. Thus worker control has proved largely a failure as the
dominant form of ownership in such countries as Yugoslavia. Man-
agement likewise has a greater interest in their immediate salaries
and bonuses than in the long-term success of the firm.
We stress that the entrepreneurial role is indispensable in carry-
ing out productive activities combining capital and labor and in tak-
ing advantage of new technologies and market opportunities. It is a
distinctive role not well performed by those with other and conflict-
ing interests in the firm. The entrepreneurial role is essential in
making the firm self-financing, independent, and disciplined by the
market. In market economies, however, the entrepreneurial role is
3. One argument against the slower form of privatization proposed here is that the
workers may simply seize the assets of the firm as their own, given the current
confused state of political and legal affairs in the USSR. For reasons discussed below,
we view this as inequitable, and we oppose it. As a result, however, the state must be
very forceful in asserting its interim ownership claims through the PMAs.
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increasingly performed by institutions, such as banks, investment
trusts, and other institutional investors rather than individual
persons.
Fairness also argues against management and workers becoming
the dominant owners. The present capital stock of an enterprise
represents the past sacrifices of Soviet society, generally in the form
of foregone consumption. To assign property rights over all such
past investment to those who happen to be the present managers or
workers ignores the investment Soviet citizens as a whole have made
in their industry. It would particularly favor those who happened to
be employed in the profitable sectors at the time of privatization. A
related problem has arisen in Poland and Hungary, where the man-
agers of state firms have contrived to sell their enterprises either to
foreigners or to themselves as private owners. This spontaneous
privatization has proven to be extremely unpopular and has been
referred to as nomenklatura capitalism, reflecting the relatively priv-
ileged political status of these managers under the old socialist sys-
tem. To permit this sort of asset transfer would mean effectively
assigning initial ownership rights to the old management, and for
reasons of equity and efficiency we strongly oppose it.
We favor the sale of shares over other methods of privatization,
slow as this method is likely to be. The Shatalin Report envisages that
40 percent of assets would still be state owned five years after the
start of privatization, and that may be optimistic.4 This may seem too
long, but a hasty and ill-conceived privatization process may be even
worse.
We think our proposal is consistent with these words written by
Academician Shatalin: "Fundamentally important is that the state
cannot and should not give away its property without compensation.
Property must be earned, because people do not believe in free
property and do not value it sufficiently."5
Corporate Governance and the Role of Shareholders
The large corporation has the problem of how the shareholders
will monitor and control the managers who run the corporation on a
4. Shalalin Report, figure following p. 52.
5. Ibid., iii.
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daily basis. The shareholders are numerous, with each share repre-
senting only a small fraction of the ownership. No one shareholder
has the incentive or the power to supervise or control the corpora-
tion's managers. Shareholders do elect the directors who in turn
appoint the full-time managers, but with a widely dispersed elector-
ate, managers can easily dominate the election of directors.
Managers can have objectives and interests that conflict with
those of the shareholders. The most obvious conflict concerns man-
agerial compensation: managers prefer high compensation whereas
shareholders will accept it only to the extent that it improves the
corporation's long-run profits. Another common conflict arises
when shareholders wish to replace current managers with ones who
seem more likely to improve the corporation's performance. A more
subtle conflict can arise over corporate growth because managers
may prefer growth for the increased power and prestige it provides
them as managers, whereas the shareholders are interested in
growth only if it increases the firm's long-run value.
This problem of shareholder control over managers is formu-
lated by economists as the principal-agent problem. The share-
holders are considered to be the principal employing an agent-the
manager-to run the corporation for their benefit. The question
then is how the principal-the shareholder-can insure that the
agent-the manager-actually does so. This is not purely a private
matter of protecting shareholders, for a society based on a market
system requires that corporations respond to market signals and be
run efficiently in order to serve the social ends of growth and eco-
nomic efficiency. A central premise of market economies is that
corporations are profit-maximizing institutions, and shareholders
serve to insure that this occurs. The problem is not merely a hypo-
thetical one dreamed up by economists but has been of central con-
cern to investors and legislators in market economies for many
decades.
Western economies have developed several ways of coping with
this problem. One of the most common is to relate a portion of
managerial compensation to the profit performance of the firm,
thus aligning the managers' objectives with those of the share-
holders. The use of this arrangement is urged at several places in this
volume. A similar solution is to make managers shareholders as well,
as just mentioned.
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Yet these devices are often thought to be insufficient, particularly
when the issue of replacing inefficient managers arises. Dispersed
shareholders do not have sufficient power or incentives to organize a
campaign to change the directors who will replace the managers.
One solution is to have a dominant shareholder who alone holds
enough shares to change the board of directors. That need not be a
majority of the shares; 20 to 30 percent is often thought to be suffi-
cient to give such power. In Western economies, dominant share-
holders are often individuals of great personal wealth (often inher-
ited) who can augment their own holdings by borrowing to buy more
shares and thus achieve control of a corporation. Such individuals
are unlikely to exist in the Soviet Union for some decades. And it
may not be desirable for them to emerge.
Another way to achieve shareholder control is through block-
holders, usually defined as those with 5 percent or more of the stock
of a corporation. Their holdings are large enough to encourage
them to take time to monitor carefully the performance ofmanagers
and to take actions to change them if necessary. They differ from the
dominant shareholder in that blockholders must organize other
shareholders to exercise control.
Again there is the question of where blockholders might arise in
the Soviet Union, since to be a blockholder of a major corporation
still requires significant capital, although less than would be re-
quired to be a dominant shareholder. One possibility is that the state
PMAs, formed at various levels of government, could act as compet-
ing blockholders. Multiple and competing PMAs as shareholders
would provide some check on one another. For example, an All-
Union PMA might hold 40 percent of the sharesofa firm, a republic
PMA could hold 20 percent, a local government PMA could hold 15
percent, and the balance could be held by, or promised to, the
workers and management.
Institutional investors (investment funds, banks, other corpora-
tions, pension funds, and insurance companies) can also provide
some of the control and monitoring functions of blockholders, even
when they themselves hold a smaller percentage of the stock. Com-
pared to individuals, institutional investors still have larger share
holdings and so have an incentive to develop professional managers
to monitor the corporations in which they have invested. Further-
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more, their major activity is investing and their own success turns on
how well they do it.
Institutional investors are important in most Western economies.
In the United States they hold 58 percent of corporate stock and in
Japan 73 percent.6 It will take years to develop a comparable set of
institutional investors in the Soviet Union. However, two kinds of
institutional investors could develop more quickly in the Soviet
Union-banks and investment funds. As discussed subsequently, a
banking system already exists in the Soviet Union, and these banks
could become institutional investors. We would allow banks to buy
stocks through auctions, but consideration might be given to placing
two limitations on their purchases: (1) no bank could hold more than
5 percent of the stock of a particular corporation, and (2) no bank
could have more than 10 percent of its total assets invested in stock.
The rationale for these limitations is that stocks are risky invest-
ments, and banks should have diversified assets and not be overcom-
mitted to risky assets. Diversification serves to minimize the risk of
bank failure. Some people also feel that banks should not become
too powerful in the economy. These limitations have developed in
Japan and similar ones are common in many market economies. In
Germany, however, banks are major stockholders, and this has not
created any particular problems.
The other type of institutional investor that could develop quickly
are the investment funds common in market economies. These
firms aggressively sell their shares to individuals and institutions and
in turn invest the money in a portfolio of corporate stocks. From
their stock dividends, the investment funds in turn pay dividends to
their individual investors. Such financial intermediaries are attrac-
tive to individuals because a small investment can be diversified
among many enterprises, and they provide individuals with profes-
sional management of their investments. They are useful to society
for they yield another group with an incentive to monitor large
corporations carefully. As the stocks of large corporations become
available for purchase, investment funds could develop without re-
quiring any particular policy action or incentives. It is important,
6. For the United States, F. M. Scherer, "Corporate Ownership and Control," 46 (data
for 1979). For japan, Merton]. Peck, "The Largejapanese Corporation," 23 (data for
1982). Both injohn R. Meyer and james M. Gustafson, eds., The U.S. BWiinessCorpora-
tion (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988).
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however, to have regulations in place that would allow investment
funds to be created.
Finally, the Soviet Union will need a stock exchange in which both
individuals and institutions can buy and sell their stock. Easy trans-
ferability and the resulting liquidity are important advantages of
share ownership.
The stock market also performs the function of monitoring cor-
porate performance. Those with increasing profits will see the price
of their shares rise; those with financial problems will see the price of
their shares decline. In market economies, the behavior of stock
prices is the most important corporate scorecard, and it creates pow-
erful pressures for managers to run their corporations well.
Despite shareholders' significant influence, it is important not to
exaggerate the importance of shareholder control over managers.
Most Western economies seem to function well with many large
corporations that are management controlled and lack a dominant
shareholder. For example, in 1963, 169 of the 200 largest U.S. cor-
porations were controlled by a self-perpetuating management. 7
These included such notable companies as International Business
Machines (IBM), General Motors, and American Telephone and
Telegraph (AT&T). Ifa firm encounters competition in its markets,
managers are forced to be profit-maximizers simply to insure the
firm's long-run survival. Thus it is not surprising that various studies
have found either no statistically significant difference or only a
modest one between the profitability of management and share-
holder controlled firms with otherwise similar characteristics.8
Throughout this study we have emphasized the importance of
competition. We think that this is of primary importance in eco-
nomic reform and that the problem of insuring that managers serve
their stockholders may be of secondary importance. The crucial
objective in privatization is to separate large corporations from the
direct control of the state and to make them responsive to competi-
7. Robert J. Lamer, "Ownership and Control in the 200 Largest Corporations,"
American Economic Review (September 1966): 777-87. Corporate takeovers and man-
agement buyouts in the 1980s have reduced the numberoflarge corporations that are
management controlled. There is no recent study of the proportion of large U.S.
corporations that are management controlled, but it remains a substantial number.
8. F. M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (Chicago: Rand
McNally, 1976), 34.
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tive markets. If privatization can achieve that, we would regard it as a
success.
CREATING A BANKING SYSTEM FOR
A MARKET ECONOMY
In a market economy, the banking system is the key institution for
providing credit to enterprises and achieving macroeconomic equi-
librium. These two roles are assigned to different entities in market
economies, creating what is termed a two-tier banking system. We
consider it essential that the Soviet economy establish a two-tier
organization-one tier being the central bank, and the other the
commercial banks. The central bank would set monetary policy
through its controls over the commercial banks; the commercial
banks would collect deposits from individuals and enterprises and
would make loans, primarily to enterprises. Until recently, the Soviet
banking system was, in effect, a one-tier organization consisting of
one mammoth institution, Gosbank.
The content of monetary policy was discussed in chapter 4. Here
we discuss the institutional reforms that are necessary to carry out
that monetary policy effectively. These are not insignificant or cos-
metic reforms, for money and the banking system had an essentially
passive role in the traditional Soviet system. Plan construction and
implementation were for the most part carried out in physical, as
opposed to financial, terms. Prices bore little, if any, relation to
scarcity and demand, and therefore financial flows merely served as
a means to check plan implementation. There were essentially two
circuits of money, beznalichnye (enterprise money) and nalichnye
(household money). These were effectively separated, meaning that
a large government budget deficit, expressed in soft credit to enter-
prises, did not necessarily have adverse macroeconomic conse-
quences. The reforms of 1987 and 1988 broke down the barrier
between the two circuits of money, and as a result excessive money
and credit creation began to yield longer lines and greater deficits of
goods, given largely fixed retail prices.
We take as the starting point the Soviet banking system as it was in
the summer of 1990, the time the preliminary report on this topic
was written. Taking that starting point serves to identify the key
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issues. Subsequently we examine the changes introduced by the
banking legislation approved in December 1990 and compare them
to our own recommendations. In recent years the Soviet system has
consisted of Gosbank, the major institution, and a set of specialized
banks serving with loans and deposits the specific sectors indicated
by their titles. These specialized banks are: the Industrial Construc-
tion Bank (Promstroibank), the Social Housing Bank (Zhilsotsbank), the
Agricultural Bank (Agrobank), the Bank for Foreign Economic Rela-
tions (Vneshekonombank), and the Savings Bank (Sberbank). Only the
Savings Bank collected deposits from individuals, and it was by far
the largest.
Creating a Central Bank
Gosbank, the existing State Bank, is the obvious candidate for the
role of the central bank. The specialized banks are the best candi-
dates to become commercial banks.
Gosbank, as the central bank, needs safeguards, either by legal
stipulation or by custom, to protect its independence from the gov-
ernment. Monetary policy is crucially important in a market econ-
omy and so Western economies in varying ways and degrees have
made their central banks independent from the government.9 The
management of the central bank must be free to set monetary policy
to avoid the twin evils of inflation and recession. It must not, as in the
Soviet Union, be a passive instrument to finance whatever deficit the
government chooses to create.
One recurring issue in the Soviet Union is whether each of the
fifteen republics should have its own central bank. The Federal Re-
serve System, the central bank for the United States, has twelve
separate banks. Monetary policy, however, is set largely by what is
called the Open Market Committee whose members are seven
Federal Reserve governors in Washington and five members chosen
from the heads of the twelve separate banks. The system operates as
a single central bank. It is a political decision whether there should
be one central bank, as in Japan and most Western countries, or
several nominal ones, as in the United States.
9. No Western central bank operates totally without government control, but all have
more independence than government departments. The level of independence
varies by country; the central banks of the United Kingdom and France, for example,
are less independent than those of Germany and the United States.
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In either case there can be only one monetary policy with a single
currency. Monetary policy can be set centrally or with the participa-
tion of the central banks in the republics, but there must be a single
policy. If there is easy credit and low interest rates in some republics
and not in others, borrowers will flock to the easy credit republics,
thus nullifying tight credit elsewhere. Individual countries can have
differing monetary policies, but that is possible only because they
have different currencies and changes in the exchange rates offset
differences in monetary policy.
To maintain a single currency, therefore, the Soviet Union must
have a single monetary policy and hence a single, coordinated
central banking system. As argued elsewhere in this volume, a single
currency and a unified common market for goods and services is
one significant economic advantage that the Soviet Union has
achieved. A large common market and the advantages in productiv-
ity and specialization that a large free trade area affords are said to
explain much of the economic success of the United States. The
European Economic Community has spent many difficult years try-
ing to create such a market.
Creating Commercial Banks
The best candidates for the role of the commercial banks are the
several specialized banks listed previously. We recommend that they
pass through a process ofcorporatization, analogous to that ofother
corporations. They should be organized as joint stock companies,
with the stock initially held by state PMAs. The former specialized
banks should also be divided into a number of smaller units to com-
pete with one another,just as many large industrial associations and
enterprises should be split up during the corporatization period.
They should be managerially independent and self-financing.
Their income would come from the interest on the loans they made
and they, in turn, would pay interest on their deposits. (As with other
corporations, the stock of these commercial banks would eventually
be sold to the public at auction.) Even with PMAs as interim owners,
the objective of commercial banks would be to maximize their
profits.
The new commercial banks will realize their income by making
loans to enterprises. In making loans it is essential that commercial
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banks allocate credit to insure that its use passes the market test of
profitability. Past practice in the Soviet Union, where financing was
made available to enterprises according to the credit plan, cannot
work in a market economy. The allocation ofcredit, ofcourse, deter-
mined the allocation of real resources of labor and capital among
enterprises.
Given the minor role of other financial institutions in the Soviet
Union for the foreseeable future, commercial banks will be the main
source of credit to enterprises, both for such financing of physical
investment as the expansion of manufacturing facilities and for
working capital to cover the time lag between production and sales.
Loans to enterprises must be made at market rates of interest, ad-
justed for the risk that the loan will not be repaid. There should be
no government credit subsidies, for once prices are deregulated
these lose their present rationale.
In the medium to long run, the Soviet capital stock will need to be
expanded and investments made to raise productivity. Given this
great need for investment, some observers favor a system of capital
rationing in which some loans are made at less than market rates of
interest according to governmental priorities. In the context of the
Soviet Union, such a method opens the door to a return to central
planning. It is better to rely on the market for the allocation ofcredit
and hence the selection of investment projects. Given the profit
objective of the new commercial banks, they will allocate credit ac-
cording to market criteria.
The other function of commercial banks is to collect deposits
from households and enterprises. Bank deposits are the efficient
way to carry out financial transactions, and they are the most com-
mon way in which current earnings can be saved for subsequent use.
Commercial banks attract deposits by the interest they pay depos-
itors. As discussed subsequently, the rate of interest on deposits must
be high enough to attract and retain deposits.
Central Bank Control of the Newly Established
Commercial Banks
The major characteristic of the old banking system is captured by
table 7.3, which consolidates the balance sheet of Gosbank with all
the specialized banks. Such a consolidation is appropriate since the
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Table 7.4
Balance Sheet of the Central Bank in the Two-Tier Banking System
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Assets
Government debt
Loans to commercial banks
Loans to PMAs for bank equity
Liabilities
Currency in circulation
Deposits from commercial banks to
meet reserve requirements
Bonds issued to commercial banks
banking system operated as one bank, dominated by Gosbank. The
balance sheet makes clear that over half the assets of the banking
system were credits to the government, reflecting the past role of the
banking system in financing the state deficit. This overhang of gov-
ernment debt creates a problem in the transition to a new banking
system. We will suggest a possible solution subsequently.
The system that we recommend is portrayed in table 7.4 for the
central bank and table 7.5 for the commercial banks. These show the
assets and liabilities of each level of the two-tier system, although
with no numerical magnitudes since these will depend on how indi-
viduals and enterprises react to the transition to a market economy.
The central bank would hold three types of assets (see table 7.4).
The first would be the old debt of the government, which would
carry a very low rate of interest to avoid a major increase in interest
payments and thus increases in the government deficit. The second
would be the loans the central bank would make to the commercial
banks. Changing the interest rate on these loans would be one way
the central bank could execute monetary policy. Raising the rate
would cause the commercial banks to raise the rates on their loans,
thus tightening credit. Lowering the central bank loan rate (called
the rediscount rate) would ease credit. The third kind of central
bank asset would be loans to PMAs to enable them to make equity
contributions to the commercial banks.
The central bank would have three kinds ofliabilities as well. The
first would be currency in circulation. The second would be deposits
from the commercial banks to meet their reserve requirements. By
changing the reserve requirements, the central bank could also
tighten or ease credit. The third asset would be the bonds-backed
by government credit-that the central bank would issue to the
commercial banks to give them assets and income. By selling or
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Table 7.5
Balance Sheet of Commercial Banks in the Two-Tier Banking System
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Assets
Deposits in central bank to meet reserve
requirements
New credits to enterprises
Bonds issued by central bank
Stock equity
Liabilities
Old deposits of individuals
(insured; former savings banks only)
New deposits of enterprises
New deposits of individuals
(not insured)
Loans from central bank
buying back these bonds from the commercial banks the central
bank could also tighten or ease credit. These are commonly called
open market operations. Such bonds would represent only a frac-
tion of the old government debt held by the central bank. Their
function would be to give the commercial banks assets and interest
income at the outset of corporatization.
Two of the assets of the newly established commercial banks
would correspond to the liabilities of the central bank: deposits to
meet reserve requirements, and the bonds issued by the central bank
(see table 7.5). New credits to enterprises would reflect the fact that
enterprises will need to borrow from the banks to obtain working
capital and to finance long-term investment. Much of these bor-
rowed funds would be used in turn to create enterprise deposits in
the banking system. Both loans and deposits are labeled "new" in
table 7.5 to reflect the proposal made above to cancel old enterprise
debts and deposits at the time of corporatization.
The stock equity, shown in table 7.5 as an asset, reflects the fact
that we recommend that the commercial banks meet the interna-
tional standard set by the Basel agreement specifying that commer-
cial banks must have an equity cushion of at least 8 percent of their
deposits. The initial owners would be PMAs and they, in turn, will
need to borrow the funds from the central banks to provide equity.
When the commercial banks are privatized through the sale of their
stock by the PMAs (to be discussed subsequently), the proceeds from
the sales can be used to retire this debt of PMAs to the central bank.
The difficult question concerns the treatment ofexisting deposits
by individuals. As prices are deregulated and goods become avail-
able, there would be withdrawals of deposits for purchases of goods
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and services. Anticipation of inflation would further accelerate the
process ofbank withdrawals. The new commercial banks would then
need to borrow from the central bank to meet their cash needs. The
central bank, in turn, would need to print currency to meet the
demand from the commercial banks for currency.
This is the monetary side of the one-timejump in prices discussed
elsewhere in this volume. Inflationary as it is, we recommend accept-
ing the consequences of this one-time price jump, including the
withdrawal of individual deposits.
Nevertheless, it is necessary to minimize the depletion of individ-
ual bank deposits. To serve this objective, we propose deregulating
interest rates for both loans and deposits for this will result in posi-
tive real rates of interest, that is, interest rates that exceed the rate of
inflation. Of course, the monetary policy of the central bank would
be the major determinant of interest rates through its rediscounting
activities, its setting of reserve requirements, and its open market
operations.
But how will the commercial banks obtain the income to pay high
rates of interest? This is a special problem for Sberbank, by far the
largest of the present specialized banks and the one now with indi-
vidual deposits. In the past the function of the Savings Bank was to
collect savings from the population and channel these funds into
covering the state deficit. The Sberbank is to be transformed and
divided into commercial banks; these will continue to collect de-
posits, but they will also make loans to enterprises and to local gov-
ernments at market rates of interest. The resulting interest income
will enable them to pay high rates of interest on deposits, but that
may not be enough. If it is not, then it will be necessary for the
central bank to pay high rates of interest on the government bonds
the central bank issues to these former savings banks. These interest
payments will need to be repaid by the government to the central
bank, thus adding to the state deficit. Recall, however, that chapter 4
stressed the importance of eliminating the state deficit.
The problem then is to seek a way to reduce the withdrawal of
individual deposits while minimizing the addition to the deficit. We
would propose achieving this objective in the following way.
Deposits in the Savings Bank are now de facto completely guaran-
teed by the state. The Savings Bank, once divided into several new
commercial banks, would distinguish between old and new deposits.
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Old deposits of individuals would retain the implicit deposit insur-
ance guarantee they now have and carry a low rate ofinterest relative
to those elsewhere in the economy.
New deposits by individuals and enterprise would carry higher
rates of interest in order to compete with the new commercial banks,
particularly those formed out of the other specialized banks. These
accounts, however, would carry no deposit insurance. The combina-
tion ofdeposit insurance and lower interest rates will appeal to some
of the population and thus reduce the flight of individuals out of
existing savings accounts at a lower level of interest rates than would
otherwise prevail. The lower interest rates would, in turn, reduce
the need to pay high interest rates on the government bonds that
finance interest rates on the old individual deposits and thus reduce
the additions to the government deficit.
Although the proposal for distinguishing between old and new
individual deposits has its problems, it is still better than the alterna-
tive of freezing individual bank deposits to prevent their withdrawal.
We are strongly against freezing individual bank accounts. In a so-
ciety where markets are only beginning to exist, freezing individual
bank accounts is obviously extremely detrimental to creating con-
sumer confidence in the system. lO Nor are we in favor of indexing
bank accounts, given our general concern with indexing as an instru-
ment for hyperinflation.
Privatization
We consider private ownership of the specialized banks (now the
newly established and restructured commercial banks) to be the
ultimate goal, just as it was for the nonfinancial corporations. And
we would achieve this goal by auctioning off the stock of banks, held
initially by state PMAs, to the general public. There are, however,
some special preconditions for privatization that apply particularly
to commercial banks. These preconditions need to be established as
quickly as possible during the corporatization stage.
1. DemonopoLization must be completed. Even when corporatized,
the former specialized state banks must be free to compete among
one another for both loans and depositors. Banks should be free
10. The partial freeze of deposits in January 1991 has certainly led to a decline in
consumer confidence.
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to make loans to and accept deposits from any sector of the econ-
omy. That alone would not be sufficient to create competition,
and so each of various specialized state banks should be divided
into several smaller units, creating twenty to fifty separate and
independent commercial banks.
Entry into banking should also be open. Foreign banks should
be free to establish branches in the Soviet Union and to make
loans and attract deposits. Organizations and individuals who
wish to establish new banks comparable to existing ones should be
free to do so. They must, however, conform to the capital require-
ments and regulations for existing banks.
2. Bank supervision by the central bank must be in place at the time
of privatization. Such supervision might be modeled on systems
in Western Europe and Japan. Such supervision, however, in-
volves a delicate balancing process. Supervision must be detailed
and strict enough to preclude loans that threaten banks with
bankruptcy, and yet it must allow the bank management to run
their institutions as profit-maximizing firms immune to political
pressures. It is particularly important to supervise the funds de-
rived from deposits in insured accounts. With the insured de-
posits, the managers of commercial banks are making loans with
funds that, in effect, are state guaranteed. Central bank supervi-
sion is then needed to limit the risk taking of those who have
access to state guaranteed funds.
3. Training of bank managers must be accomplished. Running a
commercial bank is a special art that requires instruction. We
recommend that bank officials be exposed to European, Japa-
nese, or American bank practices by on-the-job training abroad
and by instruction in the Soviet Union.
4. Physical infrastructure of the banking system must be improved.
Soviet banks lack the data collection facilities and computer net-
works that modern banking requires.
Private Banking
One recent development in the Soviet Union is the emergence of
new private commercial banks. These are typically based on the
credit centers of enterprises with cash on their hands, and they must
have a capitalization of 5 million rubles or more. At present there are
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about 400 such banks and their share ofdeposits in the total banking
system stands at 2.2 percent, although this data may already be
outdated. In addition, there are cooperative banks, for which the
minimum capitalization is 0.5 million rubles. The establishment of
companies engaged in insurance, wholesale trade, leasing, and au-
diting has also been reported.
The emergence of such institutions is a promising development
that provides competition to the existing state banks. We recom-
mend that they have minimal regulation, but in return the state
should not guarantee their deposits. The current depositors are not
drawn from the general public and should thus be in a position to
evaluate the risks the banks are taking. They should clearly under-
stand that their deposits are at risk.
These institutions are likely to evolve in varying ways into invest-
ment funds, commercial paper brokers, and investment bankers. A
market economy needs a variety of financial institutions, and the
entrepreneurial drive and diversity of these new institutions are
likely to help give the Soviet Union the variety of financial institu-
tions it needs. However, these institutions are unlikely to develop
rapidly into strong competitors for the restructured successors to
the state specialized banks.
Recent Bank Legislation
After the preceding sections were written, the provisions of the
banking legislation, approved in December 1990, became available
to us. 11 The legislation includes many of the proposals made in the
preceding pages. It creates a new, independent central bank. It es-
tablishes monetary control instruments to be used by the central
bank. It breaks up the large state-owned specialized banks into inde-
pendent joint stock companies. Gosbank is to guarantee fully the
individual deposits held at the Sberbank but not those of any other
bank. Table 7.6 compares in greater detail the proposals made here
and the provisions of the new law.
We welcome this legislation and note in particular how closely it
conforms to our own proposals. Nevertheless, although Gosbank
II. "USSR Law 'On the USSR State Bank,''' "USSR Law 'On Banks and Banking
Activity,''' "Decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the Implementation of [said
laws!." lzvestiia, December 19, 1990,3-4, translated in FBIS Daily Report: Sauiet Union,
December 31,1990, FB1S-S0V-90-25 I , 34-47.
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Table 7.6
Comparison of the Proposals Made in this Chapter with Those of the New Soviet
Banking Legislation
(Proposals made in this chapter come first; corresponding parts of the Soviet
legislation follow)
1. Two-Tiered Banking System
A. Make Gosbank an independent Central Bank, safeguarded from political
pressure.
Article 1 of the Law on Gosbank (LGB) makes Gosbank the central bank
of the USSR. Article 6 makes it accountable to the USSR Supreme Soviet,
which sets limits on the amount of credit it can grant to the ministries of
finance of the USSR and the republics (Article 21). The Supreme Soviet of
the USSR cannot remove members of the Gosbank governing body, its
central council, though the law does not prohibit the president from doing
so (Article 43).
B. This chapter does not recommend whether the republics should have their
own central banks, but notes that, if there is only one currency, then there
must be one, unified central banking system (as in the United States).
Article 2 of LBG creates "a unified system of central banks based on a
common monetary unit and performing the functions of a reserve
system." The central banks of the republics are thus subordinate to
Gosbank USSR.
Il. Commercial Banks
A. Corporatize the existing specialized banks, after breaking them up into a
larger number of competing units. Eventually they are to be privatized.
Foreign participation and competition is to be allowed.
New commercial banks are encouraged. The specialized banks are also
made into joint stock companies, and foreign participation is allowed.
[IMF/BRD/OECD/EBRD, A Study of the Saviet Economy (Paris:
International Monetary Fund, World Bank, Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development. European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development. 1991),2:370-71).
B. Regulate the commercial banks according to international standards; let
them set interest rates to clear the market. (See below on Savings Bank).
Interest rates are generally to be market-determined. though Article 16 of
LGB mentions indirect Gosbank USSR regulation, and Article 17 contains
provisions for emergency short-term credit controls.
Ill. The USSR Savings Bank (Sberbank)
Gosbank USSR guarantees old deposits 100 percent, and new ones. like those
in ordinary commercial banks, are not state guaranteed. This implies an
interest rate differential.
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Gosbank USSR guarantees 100 percent of household deposits in the Savings
Bank, but not in other banks, which must establish special reserve funds
(Article 38 of the Law on Banks and Banking Activity [LBBA)).
IV. Gosbank Control of Credit and Monetary Policy
A. Gosbank USSR is to manage credit and monetary policy through the use
of the usual instruments: rediscounting, reserve requirements, and open
market operations.
Article 14 of LGB says Gosbank USSR sets the volume and price of credit
provided by Gosbank USSR and the central banks of the republics to
commercial banks; it establishes reserve requirements; and it buys and
sells securities and foreign currency.
B. Gosbank USSR must not provide concessionary credit to the government
for purposes of financing budget deficits. The government must borrow at
market interest rates, like everyone else, from the public.
Article 21 of LGB governs credit provision of Gosbank USSR and the
central banks of the republics to the ministries of finance of the USSR and
the republics. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR limits this credit, but the
president can, "in exceptional cases," permit excess credit above those
limits.
V. Privatization of the Commercial Banks Held by PMAs
Eventually, these banks are to be auctioned off to the highest bidder. Effective
preconditions for this are: (I) demonopolization, (2) establishment of a bank
supervision system, (3) training of bank managers (probably abroad), and (4)
development of a modern physical banking infrastructure.
Although both the LGB and the LBBA say the commercial banks are to be
joint stock companies, they say nothing about who will own the stock, much
less about preconditions for its transfer.
Source: This table was compiled by the editors from the USSR banking legislation,
translated in FBIS Daily Report: Soviet Union, December 31, 1990, FBIS-
SOV-90-251,34-47.
USSR is nominally free from political pressure, its ability to maintain
this independence seems questionable. Under the new banking leg-
islation, the president has the effective ability to force Gosbank to
cover a fiscal deficit (Article 21). Further, in an environment marked
by rapidly changing laws and regulations, the formal independence
of the central bank might prove only too easy for a future govern-
ment to reverse.
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In market economies, policy credibility is essential to its effective-
ness, and this is true most of all for a nation's central bank. If the
public believes the central bank will not monetize a fiscal deficit,
inflation and a flight from the nation's currency are less likely to
occur. If the monetary authority is not credible, however, no amount
of on-paper independence will stop such flight. Soviet political
leaders should give serious consideration to the importance of
establishing-through deeds as much as through laws-such real
credibility for Gosbank.1 2
A CONCLUDING COMMENT
The policy memorandum presented in chapter 2 gave less em-
phasis to privatization and the creation of a commercial banking
system.I3 This is not because they are less important measures but
because they take time. Privatization is essential to achieve a com-
plete separation of the enterprises from the state, and this con-
stitutes the essence of a market economy. Through its commercial
banking system a market economy allocates the resources for invest-
ment and channels savings into the real economy. This chapter posi-
tion at the conclusion of this book does not indicate that the topics it
discusses are ofany lesser importance in creating a market economy.
Since this is the last chapter, it is useful to summarize the primary
thesis of this book. This thesis is a manifesto for economic reform,
although it is stated in the sober prose of economists. The sober,
straightforward prose does not lessen the urgency of the manifesto's
message.
In 1902, Lenin borrowed the title What Is To Be Done? from the
nineteenth-century novel by Chernyshevskii, and we have elected to
borrow it from him. 14 In his book, Lenin emphasized the impor-
tance of a vanguard party-his soon to be formed Bolshevik party-
in leading the masses to revolution. In some sense, Lenin's What Is To
\2. See Stwly of the Saviet Economy, \:373-74, for a further discussion of this point.
13. These last few paragraphs were added by the editors.
14. Nikolai G. Chernyshevskii, What Is ToBe Done? Stories aboui New People (Ann Arbor,
Mich.: Ardis, 1986; first Russian ed., 1862); Vladimir I. Lenin, What Is To Be Done:
Burning Questions of OUT Mavement (New York: International Publishers, 193\; first
Russian ed., \902).
178 Kimio Uno
Be Done? provided much of the organizational framework for the
events that followed. We claim no similar historical import for the
chapters of this small volume. Yet it is true that, without some logical
and consistent program, the Soviet transition to the market is impos-
sible. And for that we can see no alternative to some form of the
proposals put forward here.
The Soviet economy is suffering from acute shortages and threat-
ening inflation, with both policymakers and the people gravely con-
cerned about the future. It will take time to achieve tangible gains. As
a result, short-term policy measures such as price freezes, rationing,
forced delivery ofgoods, and increased government subsidies will be
tempting. Some such measures may be needed in order to keep the
economy afloat. Yet they must be temporary exceptions rather than
long-term policy, and they must be employed as sparingly as
possible.
Long-run resolution of the problems of the Soviet economy can
only be achieved through increased efficiency, which can only be
realized through increased individual responsibility. All the mea-
sures discussed throughout this book are directed at creating such
responsibility. Furthermore, as the experience of the European Eco-
nomic Community suggests, a market system may provide a way
sovereign nations can live together for their mutual advantage. The
Soviet Union needs the market system to permit the sovereignty of
its republics while retaining the economic advantages of a large
national economy.
Painful as it will be, it is illusory to believe that there exists an
alternative to a transition to a market economy. The status quo seems
certain to lead to deteriorating efficiency and economic disintegra-
tion. A market economy promises, not tomorrow but in decades
hence, a prosperity comparable to Western economies. For tomor-
row it promises hope.
Appendix A
Economic Policy and the Reforms
of Mikhail Gorbachev
A Short History
PetrO. Aven
The economic situation of the USSR is catastrophic. In 1990 peace-
time output declined for the first time, traditionally stable prices
began to rise sharply, and most goods were no longer reliably avail-
able in the state stores. Unemployment and strikes, hitherto un-
known, exacerbated social tensions.
This appendix is an evaluation of recent Soviet economic policy
organized chronologically and with an emphasis on the period be-
tween October 1989 and March 1991. A survey of Soviet public
opinion in January 199 I indicated that about 40 percent of the
population thought that perestroika was a mistake. These results are
not surprising. While the intelligentsia gained a free press, travel
abroad, and various political freedoms, most "ordinary" people re-
garded the level of consumption as the main criterion for judging
the success of perestroika, and that has declined since 1985.
THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE USSR
IN THE MID-1980s
Table Al shows official Soviet statistics on growth rates together
with the more believable "alternative" estimates of Grigorii Khanin.
Note: This appendix reflects many discussions with Soviet colleagues, in particular
with those who in the course of 1990 found themselves at the center of events. In
particular, I would like to single out E. Gaidar, S. Shatalin, A. Shokhin and E. Yasin. T.
Richardson is responsible for the translation from Russian into English. The views
expressed here are solely the responsibility of the author.
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Table Al
Soviet Annual Growth Rates
(Average Annual Percentage)
1961-65
Net material product 6.5
Official data
Alternative estimates' 4.4
Fixed assets 9.6
Number of employees 4.4
Domestic fuel 25-30c
productionb
PetrO. Aven
1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85
7.4 6.3 4.2 3.5
4.1 3.2 1.0 0.6
8.1 8.7 7.4 6.4
3.2 2.5 1.9 0.9
25-30c 28.6 20.6 9.6
Sources: Promyshlennost'SSSR (Industry of the USSR), 1988, p. 6; Material'no-
tekhnicheskoe obespechenie narodnogo khoziaistva SSSR (Material-technical provisioning
of the national economy of the USSR) (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1989), 65.
'Estimates of G. Khanin, "Ekonomicheskii rost: Al'ternativnaia otsenka" (Eco-
nomic growth: An alternative estimate) Kommunist, 1988, no. 17:85.
bGrowth during the five-year period (measured in tons of coal equivalent).
CEstimates of A. Aganbegyan, "Perestroyka: Recent Developments in Restructuring
the Soviet Economy" (Paper delivered at IlASA, Laxenburg, Austria, Dr. Bruno
Kreisky Lecture Series, no. 3, 1987), 2.
Even though Khanin's estimates differ markedly from the official
ones, both have the same pattern-a significant reduction in rates of
economic growth in the second half of the 1970s and the start of the
1980s. 1 Table A I also illustrates one of the causes of the fall in
growth rates-the partial exhaustion of Soviet reserves of fuel, raw
material, investment, and labor resources.
Exogenous factors also played a role, especially the acceleration of
the arms race and the fall in export prices for Soviet exports of
energy. Still, the main reason for the fall in growth rates was that the
economic mechanism created by Joseph Stalin was no longer effec-
tive after the seventies.
Soviet industrialization policy was designed to maximize the pro-
duction of goods deemed crucial to rapid development-the output
of heavy industry and raw materials. Such output has grown sharply
I. According to official statistics, the best postwar Five-Year Plan (FYP) was the eighth,
the first FYP under L. Brezhnev and A. Kosygin. According to Khanin, the best was
the seventh, the last FYP under N. Khrushchev. In comparison with the official
estimates, the alternative estimates of Khanin show a significantly sharper fall in the
rate of economic growth, practically to zero at the start of the 1980s.
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since the 1930s, but little attention was paid to their costs. The system
was well-suited to achieving simple, stable goals, such as maximizing
the growth rate of steel production, but it proved resistant to
changes in objectives. Once achieved, the level of production of a
given product was seldom reduced, even when the product was no
longer needed. 2
One explanation for the relatively successful economic develop-
ment of the USSR until the 1970s is that the goals of industrial policy
accurately reflected the rational priorities of early industrialization-
namely, the expansion of heavy industry and raw materials produc-
tion. Further, the economic system set up with these goals in mind
was effective in achieving them. Over time, however, these priorities
became outdated, but the command economy was not capable of
redirecting its efforts. In other words, the centrally planned econ-
omy was adequate for industrialization but ineffective for post-
industrial development. The reason was the growing complexity of
the economic system as economic growth continued and the result-
ing need to decentralize decision making.
Complexity here refers to the difficulty of coordinating produc-
tion given the dramatic increase in the number of products and
services as well as the number of technologies that can produce
them. This complexity also stems from an increase in the rate of
technical change in products and processes. Even in the 1950s and
1960s complexity was reducing the effectiveness of the "command"
system. The idea of command presupposes the observability of the
commanded," which became increasingly difficult in a complex
economy. In dealing with this massive coordination problem, the
Center-meaning economic planners in Moscow-was forced, first,
to limit its "field of view" by concentrating on important branches.
Key branches for industrialization not only were supplied with in-
puts and labor resources on a priority basis, but were also strictly
controlled. I t is no accident that the fall of discipline and the rise in
thievery and corruption were particularly noticeable outside these
key sectors (as in agriculture and services).
2. Tractors are one of the best examples. Their production continues to increase,
although less than 80 percent of the tractor parks have sufficient tractor drivers and
many brands cannot be sold for any price. In 1985 the USSR produced five times as
many tractors as the United States. SSSR i zarubezhnie strany v 1987 (Moscow: Finansy i
statistika, 1988), 137.
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Second, the Center, unable to manage the ever-growing volume
of information, became more and more inclined to make simple
decisions. For example, older technologies were preferred by plan-
ners over modern ones, simply to facilitate coordination ofeconomic
activity.
Third, the inability to use all the relevant information led to the
use of a small number of indicators for evaluating the performance
of the firm. However, orientation "to the indicator" significantly
changed the incentives for managers, provoking price increases,
falsification of reports, and so forth.
Indeed, for a command economy to work, even in theory, certain
assumptions need to hold: 3
• The Center must have a relatively accurate assessment of the
capabilities of its subordinates (both ministries and enterprises).
• The Center must formulate its commands or targets on the basis
of these accurate assessments.
• Subordinates must be held strictly responsible for carrying out
these commands.
Until the 1960s, the actual economic mechanism corresponded
roughly to this theoretical model. With the increase in complexity of
the economy, however, the assumption that the Center had "objec-
tive knowledge" about the capabilities of subordinates no longer
applied. Moreover, the Center's ability to collect and analyze large
masses of information did not keep pace with its information re-
quirements. To an ever-increasing extent, the economic planners
became dependent on information provided to them from below.
Informational dependence of the Center on enterprises led to a
weakening of the commandability of the system and eventually to
the replacement of a command economy by a "bargaining" econ-
omy, in which relations between higher and lower organizations
were characterized more by exchange than by subordination. The
higher units had, as chips in this bargaining process, material-
technical resources, money, and various ways of rewarding
managers-while the subordinates had as chips the fulfillment of
3. Note that these assumptions mirror those in much of the Western literature on
economic planning, namely those of honesty (no adverse selection) and obedience (no
moral hazard)-the Editors.
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production targets (or promises of their fulfillment).4 The impos-
sibility of objectively evaluating the actual situation of an enterprise
(which always had a thousand reasons for not fulfilling the plan and
justifications for increased resources) led, therefore, to the collapse
of the discipline a command economy requires.
The informational dependence of the Center and the develop-
ment of bargaining facilitated the development of branch lobbies.
Beginning in the 1930s, Mafia-like interest groups or lobbies devel-
oped in many branches of industry to press the Center to allocate
resources to their branches. Cadres for all-union functional depart-
ments, such as Gosplan or Gossnab, were recruited from these
branch lobbies, further enhancing their influence at the top. The
most important branch lobbies were the military industry and the
energy complexes.
The emergence of these branch interest groups was partly a cause
and partly the result of the growing uncommandability of the sys-
tem. They complicated the planning process by forcing the Center
to consider their interests, particularly since not all economic coor-
dination could be done explicitly at the top. Yet this very complexity
meant that bargaining and local interest groups were inevitable.
The multiplicity of issues subject to bargaining and the complex-
ity of achieving an agreement in any individual case also strength-
ened the importance of informal ties.5 The local Party orga'nization
became an important institution for informal coordination, serving
not only as a directive force but also as a middleman or arbitrator in
the many horizontal bargains that took place.6
Economic legislation itself became an object ofbargaining as well.
Exceptions to the rules became the rule. Corruption was promoted
by the nonenforcement of the laws, while bribes and personal ser-
vices became part of the resources used in bargaining. This process
led to a further softening of the budget constraints on enterprises.
Excess demand for investment resources was not effectively con-
trolled by the Center, and this led to a real waste (razpylenie) of
4. See P. Aven and V. Shironin, "The Reform of the Economic Mechanism: The
Realism of the Projected Transformations," Problems ofEconomics Uune 1988): 33-48.
5. See L. Csaba, "Some Lessons from Two Decades of Economic Reform in Hungary,"
Communist Economies I, no. I (1989): 17-30.
6. This was particularly true in agriculture, where the local Party organs put forward
the interests of the kolkhozy in relations with machine building or repair enterprises.
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resources. By the time Mikhail Gorbachev came to power, more than
350,000 construction projects were being carried out, with an aver-
age duration approaching ten years.
In general, the importance of decisions taken at the top steadily
fell, and the role of the Center gradually devolved simply to covering
up the losses incurred by inefficient management at the bottom.
Underfulfillment of plans, the share ofwhich increased from year to
year, became the norm.
Until 1985, the soft budget constraints for enterprises created by
a bargaining economy did not lead to a sharp growth of wages. The
claims of workers were held in check by administrative controls,
combined with a prohibition on strikes. As opposed to the industrial
branch lobbies, which united managers and the Party apparatus, the
workers were not effectively organized and were without a way to
exert pressure. As a consequence, inflation was channeled less into
the growth of personal incomes and more into unneeded produc-
tion and construction projects.
Despite effective wage controls, the slowdown in economic
growth began to affect the consumer market. The food supply be-
came a major source of social tension, with, for example, the growth
of per capita consumption of meat stagnant in the 1970s and 1980s.
Attempts to ration consumption and to distribute goods at work-
places only increased inequality. Higher income groups had access to
the restricted systems of supply, permitting them to purchase goods
at subsidized prices. Because of such access, in 1984 a family with a
monthly income per person of 150 rubles paid an average of 2.96
rubles for a kilogram of meat, while a family with an income of less
that 50 rubles paid 3.93 rubles. 7 In this system, most of the subsidies
went to the well-off groups.
The weakening of observance of the law and the growth of cor-
ruption, both of which started in the economic sphere, gradually
spread to all of society. The last years of the Brezhnev leadership
were the apotheosis of irresponsibility, lawlessness, bribery, and pro-
tection rackets, and they led to growing protests. Thus the Soviet
leadership that took power in 1985 was faced with a declining rate of
economic growth and increasing social tensions. Changes were in
order, but those that were introduced made the economic situation
7. Estimates of the USSR State Committee on Statistics.
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worse. These included an ill-conceived program of industrial re-
structuring known as "acceleration" (1985-1987), timid and poorly
thought-out institutional reforms (1987-1989), and the govern-
ment's responses to "populist" pressures (1988-1989).
THE ACCELERATION PROGRAM (1985-1987)
The need for a major restructuring of the economy was clear by
the late 1970s. It was to be achieved by increased capital investment
in the priority sectors of industry, with particular attempts to mod-
ernize the military industry and machine building. In this sense,
Gorbachev did nothing new; he only continued, with great fanfare,
what had begun under his predecessors.
As in the short period of Andropov, there was an emphasis on
strengthening discipline and action against corruption and protec-
tion rackets. Overall, no attempt was made radically to reform the
economy, but rather the focus was on using the old methods better.
The growth of household consumption was once again "tem-
porarily" put off.
According to the ideologists ofacceleration, the key to success was
the development of machine building.8 If from 1981 to 1985 capital
investment in this sphere grew by 24 percent, then the growth from
1986 to 1990 would have to be 80 percent to meet the objectives. At
the start these objectives were achieved; capital investment grew by
17 percent in 1986. However, already by 1987 the share of invest-
ment in machine building had returned to its 1985 level, and then it
continued to decline.9
Renovation and the renewal of capital stocks were the other key
recipients of capital investment. Depreciation and underinvestment
had combined to yield a highly skewed age structure for the capital
8. The machine-building sector is essentially the set of branches producing "all forms
of machinery and equipment, cable products, electronic products, machine tools,
precision instruments, transportation vehicles and equipment, agricultural and con-
struction equipment." See D. Bond and H. Levine, "The Soviet Machinery Balance
and Military Durables in SOVMOD," in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee,
Soviet Economy in the 1980s, vol. I (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1982), 300n.
9. A. Aganbegian, The Challenge: Economics ofPerestroika (London: Hutchinson, 1988),
5; Narodnoe khoziaistvo (Narkhoz) SSSR v 1989 (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1990),534.
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stock. Thus, by 1986,68 percent of the machinery and equipment in
industry and construction was at least six years old, and almost 15
percent was over twenty years old. 10
Between 1986 and 1990, according to the plans, 45 percent of
operating equipment was to be replaced. Achievement fell well short
of the plan. The renewal rate did accelerate briefly from 3.1 percent
of the value ofall investment in 1985 to 4 percent in 1986 for civilian
machine building. Abel Aganbegyan, at that time close to Gor-
bachev, was not satisfied and promised that in 1987, 7.5 percent of
the stocks in civilian machine building would be renewed, and in
1990 the rate of renewal was to reach 13 percent. I I These plans were
never fulfilled and the renewal rate remained at its 1985 level.
One source of the failure was poor interindustry coordination.
The accelerated development of machine building needed at least
some minimal investment in infrastructure, as well as investment in
the metallurgy and the energy sectors. The Center was not powerful
enough to secure the necessary interbranch (interindustry) coordi-
nation.
Another reason for the failure was that the consumers of
machine-building products were not prepared to use the new mod-
ern technology made available to them. Rather, the increase in the
output of the machine-building industry contributed to the further
growth of uninstalled equipment (see table A2).
Many economists doubted whether the choice of machine build-
ing as the key recipient for increased investment was the right one.
Although between 1960 and 1985 the capital-labor ratio almost dou-
bled, there was virtually no increase in labor productivity.12 Using
capital equipment more effectively would have been a better goal in
this view. More investment in metallurgy, rail transport, light indus-
try, and the oil industry, and less in machine building, might have
made a greater contribution to economic growth.
The inflationary consequences of increased investment in ma-
chine building reflected the failure to make offsetting reductions in
investments in nonpriority branches. The pressure of branch inter-
10. Nauchno-tekhnicheskii prolfress v SSSR (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1988), 60.
11. Aganbegyan, Challenge, 5.
12. G. Khanin, "Ekonomicheskii rost: Al'temativnaia otsenka" (Economic growth: an
alternative estimate) Kommunist 17 (1988): 89.
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Table A2
Excess Equipment in Inventories at Beginning of Year (Current Prices in Millions
of Rubles)
Metal-cut lathes
Foundry equipment
Electronic equipment
Agricultural machinery
1981
98.3
12.7
52.4
15.7
1986
163.6
15.7
99.7
23.2
1988
173.9
22.0
107.7
34.6
Source: Material'no-tekhnicheskoe obespechenie, 197.
est groups hindered any such redistribution of investment. Simply
put, to give more to one branch was easy, but to take it from another
was usually impossible. Thus, officials in agriculture not only pre-
vented any reduction in their investment levels but were even able to
achieve increases. 13 In this way, the redistribution of capital invest-
ments turned into their uncontrolled growth with inflationary
consequences.
By 1987 the failure of acceleration had become obvious, and the
growth of investment was sharply curtailed. Yet the measures to
reform the economy that were taken in response to the failure of
acceleration themselves increased the inflationary forces and made
any return to the past impossible.
INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS (1987-1989)
The word reform first appeared in the lexicon of the political
leadership somewhere in the middle of 1987, when it became clear
that the acceleration campaign had failed. Prior to this, the leader-
ship only spoke about the "perfection" of the economic mechanism.
That year saw passage of the Law on State Enterprise, which intro-
duced the state order (goszakaz) system. Such state orders were even-
tually to be accepted "voluntarily" by the firm and were to cover only
a portion of the enterprise's output; they were to sell the rest at free
prices. In other words, the diktat of the Center was to be replaced by
13. Capital stocks in agriculture grew by 15 percent from 1985 to 1989, although the
volume of production was 8 percent less. Narkhoz, 418, 481.
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decentralized planning. In practice, the goszakazy simply repre-
sented a new name for the old obligatory plan targets.
The enterprises were to be given considerable freedom in the use
of their financial resources. The 1987 legislation also emphasized
careful definition of the mutual obligations of the state and the
enterprise. Many of the concepts had been tested in an earlier
"large-scale experiment" that applied to a limited number of
enterprises.
The incentive mechanism embedded in the Law on State Enter-
prise is often called a system of "indicative" or indirect planning.
The government remained responsible for the production of a spe-
cific list ofgoods and for the formation ofcentral plans. Control over
enterprises was to be accomplished by means of economic levers
such as tax rates, price controls, economic "normatives" (governing
the use of retained earnings), and interest rates on credit, as well as
some direct limits on the use of various types of resources. Soviet
proponents of"the new course" asserted that this indirect regulation
would be more effective than the old planning directives. 14 In fact,
actual practice did not confirm their assertions.
The normatives, which also regulated payments to the state bud-
get, were to remain stable for the duration of a Five Year Plan. This
was to provide greater incentive to enterprises, who could thus earn
higher profits without fear that these would be confiscated in the
future. The problem was that the promise of stability of normatives
strengthened the enterprise in its bargaining with the state. It be-
came significantly more complicated to extract financial resources
from a disobedient or wealthy enterprise, because such extraction
now directly violated the official policy. At the same time it was very
difficult to avoid softening constraints for firms experiencing finan-
cial difficulties. If the firm adopted a plan sent down from above,
then the state had to take responsibility for its financial status. As a
14. See, for instance, N. Petrakov and E. Yasin, "Ekonomicheskie metody tsentralizo-
vannogo planogo rukovodstva narodnym khoziaistvom" (Paper presented at the all-
union conference Problems of the Scientific Management of the Economy, Moscow,
November 1986). The economic mechanism that was introduced in the USSR began
more and more to look like the 1968 Hungarian system on paper. 1n fact, the propo-
nents of the reform admitted they borrowed liberally from the Hungarian experi-
ence. Most ofall this dealt with the regulation ofincomes. Unfortunately, they paid no
attention to the negative experience of Hungary with this sort of mechanism.
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TableA3
Distribution of Profits of State Enterprises (In Percentages)
1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Total profit 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Transferred to the 59 56 51 50 48 46 45
state budget or branch
ministry
Left at the disposal of 38 40 46 47 50 52 51
enterprises
Used on other goals 3 4 3 3 2 2 4
Source: Narkhoz, 620; Statistical Press-Bulletin, no. 22 (1990): 10. For 1990, estimates
are from the USSR State Committee on Statistics.
result of this asymmetric situation, payments to the state budget out
of enterprise profits fell (see table A3). Exceptions were frequently
granted that reduced the financial obligations of the firm. Thus, in
1989, only 28 percent of state enterprises paid into the state budget
the 3 percent of the value of their capital stock required by regula-
tions. The rest paid little or nothing.
Other factors strengthened the bargaining power of enterprises.
Thus, the Law on State Enterprise for the first time permitted enter-
prises to sell and exchange capital stock as well as products that were
produced above state orders. The importance of the control of ma-
terials supplied by Gossnab (which had traditionally played a major
role in the management ofenterprises) fell significantly. The Center
had practically only financial incentives to control enterprises.
Table A4 demonstrates the decentralization of capital investment
after 1986. This, however, did not lead to the better use of invest-
ment spending. In the absence of a capital market, the intersectoral
mobility of capital investment was limited, and firms made invest-
ments mostly in "known" production processes.
Corresponding to the political campaign for democratization, the
Law on State Enterprise transferred many powers from enterprise
management to labor collectives, which in 1988 began electing the
enterprise directors. 15 This change also weakened further the posi-
tion of the Center in bargaining, as the managers found in the
workers a powerful source of support for extracting resources from
IS. In 1990 this practice was abolished.
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Table A4
Decentralization of Capital Investment in the State Sector (In Billions of Rubles)
Total capital investment
(constant prices)
Capital investment from
enterprises' production
development funds (constant
prices)
Ratio between 2 and I (%)
Source: Narkhoz, 529.
1986
172.0
5.3
3.1
1987
189.6
33.2
18.2
1988
192.9
77.2
40.0
1989
200.8
102.4
51.0
the government. The new possibility of strikes became another bar-
gaining tool of the enterprises. The transfer of enterprises to
leaseholding-a system in which management and workers lease
plant and equipment from the state and thus become financially
independent-further strengthened their position vis-a-vis the
ministries. Though it had become difficult to extract resources from
a purely state enterprise, it was now practically impossible to do so
with a leaseholding enterprise.
To sum up, a number of changes led to reduced power of the
Center relative to that of the enterprises. Much in the way of re-
sources, which had been pumped into the economy as a result of the
incompetent investment policy, simply sat in the accounts of pro-
ducers. The growth of these funds was greater than had been
thought. The aggregate size of the production development fund of
enterprises from 1985 to 1988 grew almost eightfold; in 1989 the
growth comprised 28 percent. The material incentive fund grew
fourfold from 1986 to 1989, and in 1989 it grew by 36 percent. 16
From 1987 to 1989, payments out of enterprise profits to the state
fell by 11 percent, and this was one factor in the growth of the budget
deficit.
The multiplicity of types of money had served as an important
control instrument for many years, enabling the government to sup-
port a relative balance between the real and the monetary sides of
the economy, even under conditions of budgetary expansion and
fixed prices. Resources from the production deVelopment fund, for
16. Statistical Press-Bulletin, 1990, no. 22: II.
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example, could not be used for wages. The wall between the mone-
tary and the real economies markedly eased the problem of moni-
toring and control. However, decentralization under the Law on
State Enterprise significantly weakened the partition between the
two spheres. The growth of financial assets that could be used as the
enterprise saw fit increased the inflationary pressure on prices.
The influence of the new incentive mechanism on the growth of
prices was observable as early as 1986. Consumers, however, were
protected against a rise in most prices, since the increased costs of
the enterprises were financed by increased state subsidies. From
1985 to 1989 enterprise subsidies grew from 66.4 to 97.6 billion
rubles and by 1989 were 20 percent of state budgetary expendi-
tures. I7
Thanks to the subsidies, the increases in wholesale prices were not
considered a problem for the producer until 1990. The main thing
was a worsening of shortages. Barter was the natural response. 18 As
for the consumer goods market, the state was able to control retail
prices more effectively than wholesale prices so that open inflation
at the household level was minimal; from 1985 to 1989 retail prices
increased only 13 percent. 19 Yet goods became increasingly unavail-
able and rationing became much more common than before. 20
Until 1988, the control of personal incomes was the main instru-
ment for maintaining a relative equilibrium on the consumer goods
market. Indeed, next to fulfilling its planned output target, the most
important indicator of success for an enterprise was staying within
its planned wage fund. The situation completely changed in 1987
with the passage of the Law on State Enterprise. From then on, the
wage fund was a predetermined proportion of enterprise revenue
(or, more precisely, the remainder after all the necessary payments
to the budget and deductions into the various funds had been
made). In the overall context of decentralization, the rules for re-
distributing monies out of the wage fund were significantly weak-
17. Ibid., 6.
18. According to A. Vavilov and O. V'iugin, "Reforms in 1991: Money, Prices, and
Finance" (Institute of Economics and Forecasting of Scientific and Technological
Progress, Moscow, 1991, mimeographed), barter today comprises more than 15 per-
cent of interenterprise trade.
19. Statistical Press-Bulletin, 1990, no. 22: 18.
20. By late 1989, potatoes were rationed in 33 oblasts, butter in 20, and tea in 16.
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Table A5
Growth of Wages and Personal Incomes (Percentage Rates of Growth)
PetrO. Aven
1990
1986 1987 1988 1989 plan actual
Average wages of 3.2 3.6 8.2 13.1 n.a. 10.9
workers and employees (32.0)a
Personal incomes 3.6 3.9 9.2 12.9 7.1 16.8
(nominal)
Sources: Statistical Press-Bulletin, 1990, no. 22: 19; for 1990, A. Vavilov and O.
V'iugin, "Reforms in 1991," 4.
alO.9, growth of wages in the state sector alone; 32.0, growth in cooperatives.
ened. The growing right of the enterprises to spend their resources
as they wished served to destroy the wall between the household
(nalichnye) and enterprise (beznalichnye) circuits of money.
As table AS indicates, personal income grew sharply. Various at-
tempts to limit the growth of personal income by-for instance, a tax
on wages-were unsuccessful. 21 The Center was not strong enough
to counter the pressure from below, and the gradual growth of in-
comes became a rule of the game.
In part this new rule was determined by the development of
individual and cooperative forms of management, legalized in 1986
and 1988, respectively. Even though restricted by various limitations
on their activities, by mid-1990 more than five million people
worked in more than 200,000 cooperatives.22 Cooperatives added to
inflationary pressures because they changed social conceptions
about a normal income. Higher incomes in the cooperative sector
put a great deal of pressure on state enterprises to pay higher wages.
The relaxation of controls on economic activity in the USSR ex-
ceeded the rate of change during this period in the other countries
of Eastern Europe. Unfortunately, this decentralization, which was
not accompanied by a hardening of budget constraints, led only to
intensifying inflationary processes, the seeds of which were sewn
during the program of acceleration.
21. See P. Aven and S. Aleksashenko, "The Soviet Tax Reform at the Beginning of
1991," in P. Aven and T. Richardson, eds., Essays in the Saviet Transitian ta the Market
(Laxenburg, Austria: IIASA, forthcoming).
22. Statistical Press-Bulletin, 1990, no. 20 :42. For a detailed analysis of the development
of the cooperative sector and privatization, see S. Aleksashenko and L. Grigoriev,
"Privatization and Capital Markets" (Paper presented at the IIASA Conference on
Economic Reform and Integration, Sopron, Hungary, July-August 1990).
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As the system created by the Law on State Enterprise demon-
strated its flaws, populism began to displace the public's belief in
communist ideology. The new group of peoples' deputies who were
elected in 1989, many of whom made it to the Kremlin by calling for
'Justice," gave populism a new push. At times, it seemed that they
were competing with each other and with the government to prom-
ise the people more. New pension legislation was adopted, expendi-
tures on health care were increased, and the minimal period of paid
state leave was lengthened-all of which added to the state budget
deficit. It was not acceptable to ask how these expenditures were to
be financed; there were no overt opponents of such increased ex-
penditures. Neither the Ministry of Finance nor Gosbank became
counterweights to the populism.
By the start of 1990 the financial system of the USSR was at the
edge of catastrophe. The main factors in reducing government re-
ceipts were falling tax and other payments by enterprises (as a result
of the 1987 reforms) and the decrease in income from foreign
trade. 23 Bad investment policy, the growth of subsidies, and the
populist increases in state spending led to the sharp growth of bud-
getary expenditures, and thus the deficit. As a result, the level of
inflationary pressure in the Soviet economy reached previously
unheard-of levels.
Under pressure from the population (or, more accurately, indi-
vidual social groups) the government adopted various mistaken pol-
icies. The anti-alcohol campaign was one of the most widely known
of Gorbachev's early initiatives. Unfortunately, it was as useless
(from the standpoint of the struggle with drunkenness) as it was
inflationary (from the standpoint of losses to the budget). Its quiet
death in 1989-1990 demonstrated the weakness of the government.
Further, at the start of 1989 a somewhat unexpected campaign
began against the cooperatives. Even at their outset the cooperatives
met with opposition. Public opinion surveys showed that the share of
23. From 1985 to 1989, income from the export of oil fell from 28.2 to 18.6 billion
rubles. Overall income from foreign trade was reduced from 66 to 38.2 billion rubles.
See E. Arefieva, "Opening the Soviet Economy" (Paper presented at the llASA
Conference on Economic Reform and Integration, Sopron, Hungary, July-August
1990).
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the population in favor of closing the cooperatives was never below
40 percent.24 By 1989 pressure on the government and the parlia-
ment led to a sharp limitation on the sphere of activity of coopera-
tives and an increase in their tax burdens. Middleman-type coopera-
tives (the most necessary in establishing a market infrastructure)
were totally forbidden. The consequences for supplies to the market
were felt immediately.
At the end of 1989, people began for the first time seriously to
consider the prospect of a collapse of perestroika (if not the econ-
omy itself). The struggle over the course of the reforms now became
more intense.
IN SEARCH OF A WAY OUT
(LATE 1989-EARLY 1991)
The All-Union Conference on the Problems of Economic Re-
form, in October 1989, marked a new stage in the search for a policy
to deal with the crisis. The conference discussed a paper entitled
"Radical Economic Reform: Top-Priority and Long-Term Mea-
sures," prepared by the Commission on Economic Reform of the
Council of Ministers of the USSR.25 This commission had been
created earlier in 1989 with the goal of working out a comprehensive
program of reform. Academician Leonid Abalkin, an economist
with a reputation as a "market socialist," headed the commission.
The plan proposed that the process of economic perestroika be
radicalized and divided into three parts. The first, in 1990, was to be
a preparatory stage. In the course of this year the requisite market
legislation would be prepared. These new laws were to include mea-
sures on property, legalizing various forms of entrepreneurship, a
new tax system, and a new banking system. The plan also proposed
extraordinary measures to reduce the state budget deficit, limit the
growth of personal incomes, and restrict credit. All loss-making en-
24. Obshchestvennoe mnenie v tsifrakh. All-Union Center for Public Opinion Studies,
Moscow, 1989-1990. various months.
25. "Radikal'naia ekonomicheskaia reforma: pervoocherednye i dolgovremennye
mery (material dlia obsuzhdeniia)," Ekonomicheskaia gazeta 43 (October 1989): 4-7,
henceforth cited as the Abalkin plan.
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terprises were to be transferred to leaseholding. Indexation of in-
comes, considered by the plan's authors to be a necessary precondi-
tion for even a gradual liberalization of prices, was foreseen.
The second stage, from 1991 to 1992, was to see the new market
mechanism introduced. The share of free trade, that is, products
produced above the state orders and sold at unregulated prices, was
to increase sharply. Wage determination was to be completely de-
centralized. All of the loss-making collective and state farms were to
be closed.
The new system was to be fully implemented during the third
stage, from 1993 to 1995. This stage was to include an antimonopoly
program and the introduction of a two-tiered banking system. By
the end of 1993,25-30 percent of state enterprises were to be trans-
ferred to leaseholding, and by the end of 1995 as much as 30-40
percent of state property was to be transformed into joint stock
companies. By this time macroeconomic stability was to be have been
achieved.
The program had obvious weaknesses. Incantations of the na-
tion's "socialist choice" or the "Leninist ideas of NEP" were sub-
stituted for concrete actions. Some sections of the program were
very vague, particularly on financial stabilization. Considering the
seriousness of the situation at the end of 1989, whole sections were
notoriously conservative (for example, the section on property). In
general, the program was more an ideological manifesto of the need
for change than a precise plan of reform.
Still, one should not underestimate its importance. For the first
time in the thirty-year history of Soviet reforms, a scheme of sequen-
tial changes was proposed. Had it adopted this plan, the government
could not have counted on success, but it could have used the pro-
gram as a basis for more radical and detailed proposals.
The government of Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov rejected
even this moderate Abalkin plan, and presented its own program to
the Congress of Peoples' Deputies in December 1989.26 The govern-
ment program looked formally much like the Abalkin plan. Yet it
differed in several key ways. In the Abalkin plan enterprises were to
be accorded the immediate right freely to sell 5-10 percent of out-
26. N. I. Ryzhkov, "Effektivnost', konsolidatsiia, reforma-put' k zdorovoi
ekonomike," Ekonomicheskaia gauta 51 (December 1989): 8-13.
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put, and by 1995 this share was to rise to 80-90 percent.27 There was
to be a gradually widening sphere of free trade (where free trade
meant in terms of pricing, production and the decision to export),
with the growth of the share of commodities produced above gos-
zakazy. In the government program, the emphasis was on the need
to strengthen plan discipline, and the notorious goszakazy were still
to play an important role. For most industrial products, these state
orders were to be reduced only from 100 percent to 90 percent of
planned production. In addition, the Ryzhkov program advocated
new sanctions for unfulfillment of goszakazy, and also rejected the
principle of voluntary acceptance by the enterprises of the state
orders.
The government program included a two-stage plan for admin-
istrative price reform. In 1991 wholesale prices were to be increased,
followed in 1992 by retail prices.28 At the same time, the Ryzhkov
government promised not to raise retail prices without consulting
with the public, a commitment that would complicate matters a few
months hence. The government program was, moreover, silent on
property relations. Although the Abalkin plan was cautious in deal-
ing with property, it did propose that all loss-making industrial en-
terprises be shifted to leaseholding in 1990, and those in agriculture
in 1991. The government plan was adopted by the Congress of
Peoples' Deputies, and even Abalkin expressed his support for the
Ryzhkov plan.
A powerful wave of strikes shook the country in January and
February 1990. Work time lost for those two months alone was al-
most nine million person days, compared with seven million for all
of 1989. Industrial output for the first quarter fell by 0.7 percent in
comparison with the corresponding period of 1989, largely owing to
strike activity. At the same time, the incomes of the population grew
by 13.4 percent in the first quarter of 1990, and the production
27. Over the course of the first four to five years of the Abalkin plan, wholesale prices
for raw materials were to approach in a coordinated way the world prices; the prices
on goods in the processing branches were thus to be freed as the share of products
produced above state orders grew.
28. This, it would later turn out, was the macroeconomic analog of the oldest joke
concerning sequential reform of a socialist economy. It goes as follows: The British
decide to change to the continental system of driving on the right instead of the left.
But to soften the impact on the population, trucks are to begin driving on the right as
of January I, and cars are to follow suit six months later.
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development funds of enterprises grew by an annual rate of 12
percent.29 The availability of consumer goods continued to decline.
The worsening situation radicalized the participants in reform, par-
ticularly the group of specialists who had, in October, prepared the
Abalkin plan and who continued to work in the hope that their new
and more radical proposals would be requested sooner or later. This
hope was tied directly to the president, who had in March been
granted executive power by the Supreme Soviet. Nikolai Petrakov,
well known for his promarket views, was made Gorbachev's personal
economic adviser. His participation with a group from the Commis-
sion on Economic Reform influenced the program that was pre-
pared in the spring of 1990 under the president. Rumors of the
introduction of this radical "presidential" plan spread rapidly.
The presidential program reflected the necessity to deregulate
prices in order to achieve a meaningful enterprise reform as well as
macroeconomic stabilization. Subsidies could at one stroke be elimi-
nated by price liberalization, whereas prices regulated by the gov-
ernment would not permit a hardening of enterprise budget con-
straints. An "unjust" price was a sufficient basis for a firm to request
discretionary reductions in taxes, favorable credit terms, or direct
subsidies.
The question of price deregulation, then, was central to the new
program. In contrast to the October variant, this deregulation was
not tied to a reduction in goszakazy, but rather the goszakazy were to
be carried out at free market prices.
In April the proposed program was discussed twice by joint ses-
sions of the Presidential Council and the Parliamentary Federation
Council. Neither the president nor these bodies decided to support
its Polish-style shock therapy. Rather, on May 24, 1990, the prime
minister presented a new variant of the government plan to the
Supreme Soviet that was similar to Abalkin's plan of October.30 Even
though by past standards the government had been radicalized, it
was still not keeping up with the pace of events. 31
29. Statistical Press-Bulletin, 1990, no. 12:3.
30. "Ob ekonomicheskom polozhenii strany i kontseptsii perekhoda k reguliruemoi
rynochnoi ekonomike" (Report of N. I. Ryzhkov to the third session of the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR, Pravda, May 25, 1990).
31. The sequential appearance of various reform programs gives the impression of a
struggle between radicals and conservatives. In some sense, this impression is correct,
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The core of the May government program (and its difference
from the October plan) was its proposal of widespread and simulta-
neous future administrative price increases. The government real-
ized the seriousness of the inflationary situation, as well as the im-
possibility of increasing only wholesale prices (because the latter
would cause subsidies to increase). On January 1, 1991, procure-
ment prices in agriculture were to increase by 55 percent and indus-
trial wholesale prices were to rise by 46 percent. Consumer prices
were to increase by 43 percent on average, but food products were to
double in price. The government was, however, willing to limit the
price increases, since the share of goods with unregulated wholesale
prices was to be not more than 40 percent, and at retail no more than
50 percent.
The announcement of a future price increase was part of the
government promise to consult with the population, and its impact
was dramatic. Nikolai Ryzhkov had barely finished his speech before
goods began to disappear from the shelves and lines in front the
shops doubled. Under intense political pressure, the government
suffered a major setback in the Supreme Soviet, for the price in-
creases were not acceptable to the deputies and the program was not
adopted. It was sent back to the government with an admonition to
return in September with a new program.
In May and June deposits of individuals in savings accounts
shrank. An unheard of9 billion ruble reduction in retail inventories
occurred. The rate of growth of sales of light industrial products
increased from 2 percent in 1989 to 20 percent in 1990. By October
1990, of the 115 consumer goods that the State Committee on Statis-
tics (Goskomstat) follows, not one was still freely available. By June
1990, prices on the black and collective farm markets had increased
by 18 percent over their level of a year before, and in November by
44 percent.32
The course of events, and the evident inability of the central
government to take the country out of the crisis, led the republics to
work on their own reform programs. Still, all of the institutional
but frequently the same people participated in the preparation of various, often
mutually contradictory, programs. The preparation of these documents was usually
accompanied by many compromises made by the economists involved.
32. See E. Gaidar,"V nachale novoi fazy," Kommunist 2 (1991): 14-15.
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levers and material resources remained in the hands of the Center,
and confrontation between the republics and the Center did not
seem useful to the leaders of the republics. They chose instead to put
pressure on the Center to develop a better program, with all hopes
again resting on the president. The union government continued to
elaborate its May plan, although it became apparent that there was
little hope of change in its views.
Inspired by their economic advisers, a short peace between the
Russian leader Boris Yeltsin and President Gorbachev gave birth to
the well-known Five-Hundred-Day Plan. This program was pro-
duced in August by a group of economists headed by Academician
Stanislav Shatalin, a member of the Presidential Council, and Gri-
gorii Yavlinskii, Head of the Economic Reform Commission of the
Russian republic. 33
The Shatalin-Yavlinskii plan repeated much of the spring presi-
dential program. Nevertheless, the Five-Hundred-Day Plan took a
further turn toward radicalism. Some of the sections, though not all,
were written more precisely, and the question of mutual relations
between the Center and the republics was posed in an entirely new
way.
The core of the program was the idea of a two-stage reform;
macroeconomic stabilization was to come first, starting on October I,
1990. The second stage, price liberalization, was to begin no later
than July 1991. In the first stage, state expenditures were to be
sharply reduced. Given the importance of these reductions in
spending, this part of the Five-Hundred-Day Plan was written in an
exceptionally precise way. The expenditures of the Ministry of De-
fense were to be cut by 10 percent, and those of the KGB were to be
cut by 20 percent. Foreign aid was to be cut by 70-80 percent and
subsidies to loss-making enterprises were to be cut by 30-40 percent.
Capital investments were to be reduced by 20-30 percent. All long-
term (three-to-five-year) investment programs were to be canceled,
and not one budget item costing more than 100 billion rubles would
be permitted. These actions were to eliminate the budget deficit by
March 1991.
33. See Transition to the Market: A Report of a Working Group Formed by M. S. Gorbochev
and B. N. Yeltsin, Part 1: The Concept and Program (Moscow: Cultural Initiative Founda-
tion, 1990). This report is also known as the Five-Hundred-Day Plan or the Shatalin
Report after the Chairman of the Task Force, Academician Stanislav Shatalin.
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A critical part of the stabilization process was to be the privatiza-
tion of state property. The sale of land, housing, and the small- scale
of enterprises was to reduce household monetary assets. Thus, by
the end of 1991, almost 70 percent of food stores and as much as 80
percent of the cafes and restaurants were to be in private hands. At
least half of this ownership transfer was to be accomplished by the
spring of 1991.
Restricting credit by administrative measures and high interest
rates was assigned an important role in achieving macroeconomic
stability. The most obvious antimonopoly measures were to be im-
plemented in the first stage by eliminating production associations
and splitting up enterprises that produce similar goods.
The stabilization program was intended to prevent a sharp jllmp
in prices once they were deregulated in the second stage. There was
to be an immediate corporatization of state enterprises to transform
them into fully independent and self-financing, if state-owned,
organizations.
Of course, the program was not free of internal inconsistencies
and confusing points. Thus, no detailed prescription for corporatiz-
ation was included. Indeed, in the first stage, with regulated prices,
such corporatization would not have been possible. Too many poten-
tially viable enterprises would have been in financial difficulties be-
cause of government price controls. It was planned to reduce enter-
prise subsidies by 30-40 percent at the start of stage one in October
1990; in other words, their budget constraints were to be hardened.
It remained unclear how effectively this burden of additional strin-
gency would be distributed across the economy and the conse-
quences of a complete prohibition on subsidies in the second stage
were not understood, but it was recognized that many enterprises
would need temporary assistance. The Five-Hundred-Day Plan pro-
posed the formation of extrabudgetary stabilization funds to dis-
tribute monies to enterprises. The Polish experience showed, how-
ever, that such funds would remain in the control of the government
and could be allocated according to criteria that have little to do with
competitive effectiveness.
Such a danger seemed more real because the Shatalin-Yavlinskii
plan retained the concept of state orders (goszakazy). Henceforth, of
course, these were to be distributed on a voluntary basis but enter-
prises would receive tax preferences and cheap credit as induce-
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ments. Bargaining over the size of the goszakazy would have been
institutionalized, especially since the bargaining power of enter-
prises would have increased still further. It was not clear why one of
the bargaining chips of the Center could not have been disburse-
ments from the stabilization funds.
Also unclear was the idea to freeze all economic ties between
enterprises (as long as the purchaser confirmed them) until June
1991. This measure was also aimed at stabilizing the current situa-
tion, but it was naive to expect that enterprises, knowing about their
approaching freedom, would temporarily follow the command not
to change the structure of their production. The emphasis (in the
first stage of the reform) on repressive methods to maintain plan
discipline contradicted the general logic of the reform and would
not have been effective. In general, the program failed to overcome
the main shortcoming of all the models of market socialism-the
continued responsibility of the government for market perfor-
mance.
Serious internal contradictions were also embedded in the pro-
posed mechanism of mutual relations between the republics and the
Center. The Shatalin-Yavlinskii plan recognized the sovereignty of
the repUblics over the national wealth located on their territory. The
land and its capital were to be considered the property of the re-
public in which they were located, with a few exceptions. The re-
publics were to conclude an economic union, and together with the
central government were to regulate the economy.
The resolution of the specifics of economic policy would have
required an interrepublican consensus, and this was hardly possible.
In particular, this was true of the management of the central bank-
ing. It was to be a reserve system composed of republic central banks
with representatives of these republican banks and the president of
the reserve system as its managing council. This body was to take all
the important decisions in the area of credit and monetary policy;
the republican banks were to implement these policies. It was un-
clear how this collective organ would work in practice, as the inter-
ests of the various republics seemed too different. 34
34. Defending their plan, the authors of the program cited the U.S. Federal Reserve
system, which, of course, is effectively run by a single Board of Governors in Wash-
ington, and not by representatives of the fifty states. There are about a dozen regional
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A consensus on the price issue also seemed doubtful. The plan
proposed that most regulated prices (mostly on raw materials) be set
on the basis of an interrepublican agreement. Given the contradic-
tions among the various interests, a practical agreement among the
fifteen different points of view seemed unlikely.
Implementation of the Five-Hundred-Day Plan would have met
with some very serious difficulties. In particular, the breakdown of
the five hundred days into stages of one hundred to two hundred
days had a demagogic flavor. However, its adoption would have been
a singular demonstration of the determination to introduce a mar-
ket economy. It would have initiated real action toward mac-
roeconomic stabilization and corporatization. With all the republics
signing the program, it would have provided breathing room to
prevent a collapse of the unitary Soviet market.
The reasons why Mikhail Gorbachev decided at the last minute
not to support the Shatalin-Yavlinskii program are known to him
alone. The resistance of economic managers at various levels must
have been important. Indeed, in a Soviet-type economy a union of
the Communist Party, the government, and the directors of enter-
prises must certainly play an enormous role, since informal coor-
dination and personal ties have always smoothed out the failures of
economic plans. After 1985, this mechanism of informal coordina-
tion was dealt a serious blow. Local party organs, traditionally one of
the key institutions for maintaining coordination, were largely re-
moved from economic life. The apparat lost its orientation as the
generally accepted rules of the game ceased to function.
Yet the mechanism of informal coordination still existed. Govern-
ment officials and most of the enterprise directors remained loyal to
Mikhail Gorbachev. Had he supported the Five-Hundred-Day Plan,
the president would have risked being without their support. The
prime minister announced that his apparat would not carry out this
program, and the president had no other apparat.
The president also gave no support to the latest government vari-
ant, put forward by the prime minister and the Council of Ministers
at that time, though their plan became more market-oriented. The
Five-Hundred-Day Plan, and threats by people's deputies to support
Federal Reserve banks. but these follow the unitary monetary policy set by the Board
of Governors.
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it, had forced the government to radicalize its own proposals, al-
though not on the questions of price deregulation and the rate of
corporatization and the role of the republics.
Gorbachev's action resulted in still another compromise variant,
drafted by a commission headed by Abel Aganbegyan, who
emerged from political obscurity. This plan, however, was too close
to the Five-Hundred-Day Plan for the government's taste. (Shatalin
himself said they were 99.5 percent the same.) In September the
Supreme Soviet rejected both the Shatalin-Yavlinskii plan and the
Aganbegyan compromise.
The public, tired of the arguments and the obstruction of the
various plans, was becoming apathetic and anxious for some kind of
resolution. Thus, on October !9, the Supreme Soviet adopted the
"Basic Directions for Stabilizing the Economy and for the Transition
to a Market Economy."35 Its major authors were Abel Aganbegyan,
Stanislav Shatalin, and Evgenii Yasin, one of the chief architects of
the Five-Hundred-Day Plan and the preceding presidential pro-
gram. This new document was vague-it would have permitted any
interpretation by whomever had the power to implement it-and
Gorbachev placed its fate in the hands of the current government.
During this time, expectations of administratively higher prices
prompted the enterprises to delay concluding contracts at the old
prices and drove collective and state farms to cut back on deliveries to
the state system. By the start of October, only 25 percent of 1991
output had been covered by contracts, compared with 65 percent the
year before.
By the end of September, the fear of going without meat had
forced the government of Russia to increase its procurement prices
then, instead of waiting until the start of 1991, when the union
government planned to increase them. Almost no one noticed that
this decision stood in direct contradiction to the logic of the Five-
Hundred-Day Plan, which the Russian parliament had almost unan-
imously adopted. The Russian decision forced the union govern-
ment to speed up the introduction of the new procurement prices
across the entire country.
Under parliamentary pressure, Gorbachev legislated by decree a
35. "Osnovnye napravleniia po stabilizatsii narodnogo khoziaistva i perekhodu k
rynochnoi ekonomike," Pravda, October 18, 1990.
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new set of prices, effective January 1, 1991. As in the May plan of
Ryzhkov, 40 percent of wholesale prices were to be deregulated; for
these goods the new price lists were to provide only a lower bound.
Simultaneously, Gorbachev decreed all economic ties to be inviol-
able for the entire year of 1991. The actions of the government left
no doubt about the future interpretation of the "Basic Directions."
Although during the course of 1990 a series of market laws was
worked out, including new tax legislation36 and rules for the forma-
tion of corporations, the Center did not really speed up the pace of
reform. Of the two directions of reform in 1988-decentralization
and clarifying the mutual obligations of the Center and the
enterprises-only the second was pursued. On the other hand,
movement backward was possible, as was reflected in the freezing of
economic ties.
Having frozen contracts and raised prices, the government had to
absorb the losses of those enterprises in financial difficulties, leading
to a further growth of subsidies. A reform of retail prices was also
unavoidable, as the gap between them and wholesale prices had
grown sharply, and covering these losses with subsidies was becom-
ing unfeasible. Thus, while the growth of retail prices before 1990
took place primarily outside the state trade network, after that the
prices in state stores started to take off. There was no doubt that
given Gorbachev's rejection of a price deregulation, this process of
periodic administrative price increases would continue.37
The key differences between the government of Valentin Pavlov,
formed in early 1991, and that of his predecessor, Ryzhkov, were its
understanding of the problem ofexcess liquidity and its readiness to
take decisive and unpopular actions. Its measures were shaped by
the old administrative system, and as a result, all its attempts to
reduce inflation so far have met with failure. In early 1991, 50
percent of the resources in enterprises' production development
36. See Aven and Aleksashenko, "Soviet Tax Reform."
37. One thing the government did was to encourage the "creeping" increases in
prices. However, the government later decided to implement a one-time reform. In
part this was owing to stubbornness (the new price lists were already prepared), in
part to pressure from below (neither the republics nor the trade network wanted to
have to answer for the inevitable price increases), and in part to budgetary consider-
ations (dragging out the reduction in subsidies would have been senseless).
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First Quarter of 199 I
1990 (compared to the same period of 1990)
Gross national product
Net material product
Industrial production
Oil production
Ferrous metals production
Construction
Food production
Meat production
Exportsb
Importsb
Personal incomes
-2.0
-4.0
-1.2
-6.0
-3.0
-13.0'
+ l.4a
-3.0
-6.0
-2.1
+ 16.8
-8.0
-10.0
-5.0
-9.0
-7.0
-10.0
-2.0
-14.0
-18.4
-45.1
+24.1
Sources: Ekonomika i zhizn', no. 4 (1990); lwestiia, April 10, 1991; Statistical Press-
Bulletin, 1991, no. 3:53 and 1991, no. 4:5 I; USSR State Committee on Statistics,
press releases, various numbers in 1991.
aFor nine months of 1990 (January-September).
b In current prices.
and material incentive funds were confiscated by the state, but this
had little effect.38 Valueless money continued to be pumped into the
economy.
A January 1991 monetary reform was no help. Fifty- and
hundred-ruble notes were made invalid and they could be ex-
changed freely for smaller notes only up to an amount equal to the
average monthly wage. To convert the rest, one had to reveal the
source of the money. Household savings deposits were also frozen,
though citizens had the right to withdraw up to five hundred rubles
per month. The government hoped that this measure would signifi-
cantly reduce demand while reducing the impact of low income
groups who had little savings.
No serious reduction of demand was achieved. Unjustified sav-
ings were minimal, and there were many ways of getting around the
limits on exchanging the large notes. Under popular pressure, sav-
ings accounts were unfrozen as early as February. The inflationary
38. It was "recommended" to enterprises to use these resources for the floating of
shares of the labor collective. In other words, the resources were taken in return for
the share of the collective in future earnings.
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expectations created by the measure were more significant than the
reduction in the ruble overhang.39
A new factor further contributed to Soviet inflation-the non-
fulfillment by the republics of their obligations to make payments to
the central budget. At the start of 1991, the Center made expendi-
tures as if the revenues promised by the republics would be forth-
coming. In the first quarter of the year the union, however, received
less than 40 percent of these planned receipts.40 On April 2, 1991,
retail prices were administratively increased, meaning that most of
the arrangements between the Center and the republics ceased to
function. By April, the cumulative annual deficit had reached the
level planned for the entire year.
Production has declined sharply because of the financial disor-
der, the overall feeling of indecision, the breakdown of the informal
coordination mechanism, and an increasing numbers of strikes (see
table A6). The increase of retail prices, implemented in April 1991,
indicates the start of a new, previously unknown stage of open infla-
tion. It turned out that the Five-Hundred-Day Plan had underesti-
mated the inflationary pressures in the economy. New prescriptions
were necessary, ones that would be more radical and more painful
than before.
39. It is true that the goal of the monetary reform was not only stabilization of the
consumer goods market but also the imposition of Central control on the banks,
including the republican banks. This goal of the government was achieved.
40. Pravda, April 23, 1990.
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measures to resolve, summarized, 9,
17,20-21,59-60,93,94,96-98,
102-04, 177-78; measures must be
Index
simultaneous, 9, 20, 21, 30, 35, 37,
40-42,53-54,59,85,93,96-97,
102, 107; gradual or partial reforms,
14,20,39-40,48-55,84,89-90,
101-02,178,187-88,194-206;
problems of reform, 15-18, 19-20,
23, 39, 42-44, 81, 89-90 (see also
Low-income families). See also Dis-
tribution; Inflation; Macroeconomics
Currency. See Dollarization; Exchange
rate; Hard currency; Ruble
Current account convertibility, 120-21,
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Czech and Slovak Federal Republic,
155
"D-Day," 9, 96-97,102
Debt, Soviet government, 130. See also
Credit; Deficit
Defense. See Military-industrial
complex
Deficit, Soviet government: role of
banks, 6-7,165,166,169-70,171,
176-77; subsidies and, 20, 21, 24, 31,
41, 86, 99, 106, 193; increased by
partial reform efforts, 20, 21, 86, 91-
92, 190, 193,206; monetization, 21,
24,29-30,91-92,105 n 17,165,
166,169,176-77; and stabilization,
24,31,99-100, 105-07; size, 29, 84,
86,91-92, 119, 130; and ruble over-
hang, 29-30; reductions in spending,
31,99-100,106,199; flow problem,
91-93,99,109, Ill, 112,204; need
for dynamic stability, 106-07; and
the ruble exchange rate, 119, 121; in-
terest on, 169; and enterprise pay-
ments, 190, 193; political pressures
on, 193, 206; and republics, 206. See
also Debt; Macroeconomics; Mone-
tary policy
Demand, excessive. See Distribution;
Supply and demand
Demonopolization, 27, 62, 71-75,145.
See also Monopolies
Deposit insurance, 172, 173
Directors, of enterprises, 61. See also
Management
Distribution: retail, 1,24,42 n 5, 78,
89,191; wholesale, 1,40,54,77,89;
breakdown in, symptom of inflation,
1-3,24,40,42 n 5,48,52-53; by en-
Index
terprises to employees, 2, 42 n 5, 54,
141-42; barter, 2-3, 24, 40, 43, 54,
55-56, 89, 191; queues, 23, 24, 44,
48, 89; improved by deregulation,
24,42-44,46-47,54, 118, 125, 132;
effects of administered reform on,
49-50,52-53,191,197,198,203.
See also Black market; Gossnab;
Hoarding; Retail
Dollarization, 30, 92, 131. See also Hard
currency; Monetary policy
Economic aid, 103, 131
Education, 82
Energy: export taxes after D-Day, 36,
47, 126; prices, 36, 45, 47, 125-27;
supplies, 126-27; lobby, 183; reve-
nues, 193
Enterprises: distribution between, 18,
40,54,73,77,89, 194; barter be-
tween, 2, 24, 54, 89,191; distribute
goods to employees, 2,141-42,184;
conflicts with planners, 8, 182-83,
188-90, 192; should be free to
choose markets, 27, 68-70, 74, 76,
77, 104; free markets under admin-
istrative control, 52-53, 187-88;
contracts between, 54-55, 109, 20 I,
204; number of, 58, 71, 152; current
ownership of, 58-59, 112, 151-52,
159 n 3, 160; capital-intensive, 71;
overlarge, 71, 73; economies of scale,
72; funds held by, 86, 154-55, 190,
196-97,204-05; assets, 112, 154-
55, 158; credit-worthiness, 129-30;
revenues will rise with price dereg-
ulation, 134; will borrow from com-
mercial banks, 170; private banks,
173-74; payments to government,
190, 193. See also Competition; Cor-
poratization; Management; Priva-
tization
Entrepreneurs, 159-60
Equity cushion for banks, 170. See also
Bank accounts; Stocks
Exchange rate: in market economies, 7;
black market, 29, 36, 88; fixed, 35,
36 n 2, 110,119,120,121-23,122;
floating, 35-36, 103, 110, 120-21;
should undervalue ruble, 36, 104,
118, 122, 124, 127; and monetary re-
form, 109-10, 122 n 2; and the defi-
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cit, 119, 121. See also Hard currency;
Macroeconomics; Monetary policy;
Ruble
Exports, 34, 104, 116, 118, 125, 127-
29, 130-31, 196; taxes, 36, 47, 126-
27. See also Trade, international
Five-Hundred-Day Plan. See Shatalin
Report
Flow problem, 91-93, 99, 109, III,
112,204. See also Deficit
Food: vouchers for low-income persons,
23,46; price controls after D-Day, 23,
46, 127; distribution, 24, 78, 93; im-
port subsidies after D-Day, 36, 127;
political importance of, 36, 127, 144,
184,203; subsidy levels, 45-46, 86,
198. See also Agriculture
France, 4, 137, 166 n 9
General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), 125, 132
Germany,32,62,103, 113,131,137,
156, 163, 166 n 9
Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich, 8, 10,
11,12,14,144,184,197,199,202
Gosbank, 31,100,103,165,166-67,
169, 174-77, 193. See also Banking
system; Bank, central
Goskomtsen, 49. See also Planning, Soviet
economic; Prices
Gossnab, 1,183,189. See also
Distribution
Goszakazy. See State orders
Government: level of PMAs, 26, 58, 62,
151-52; local, privatize small busi-
nesses, 28; expenditures, should be
in rubles, 32, 106-07; orders (gos-
zakazy), 53 n 14; orders, after D-Day,
55; local or regional regulation, 56-
57; employment, 140-41; central
bank must be independent of, 166,
175, 176-77. See also Deficit; Plan-
ning; Politics
Gross national product, 3-4, 29, 41, 87
Growth, economic, 3, 5, 179-80, 184,
205. See also Production
Hard currency: black-market exchange
rates, 29, 36, 88; dollarization, 30,
92,131; auctions, 31,100; in COME-
CON trade, 118; limitations on own-
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Hard currency (cont.)
ership, 35, 118-19. See also Exchange
rate; Ruble
Hewett, Ed, 49
Hoarding, 3, 22, 29, 30, 40, 50, 88, 92-
93. See also Distribution
Holding companies, joint-stock, 62. See
also Investment; Stocks
Housing, 45, 46, 80-81, 100, 141
Houston Summit Plan, 9
Hungary, 62, 89, 120. 156, 160, 188 n
14
Hyperinflation. See Inflation
Imports: tariffs, 34, 36, 104, 118, 123-
25, 129; compete with Soviet goods,
34-35,74,117,132; of food, 78;
duty drawbacks, 125. See also Trade,
international
Incomes: indexing, 14,32, 113, 143-
45; lowered by deregulation, 22-23,
142-43; rise in, 29, 30, 39, 86, 89-
90,142,191-92,196; equity, 39,
156,157, 192; private, 86 n 4; de-
regulation may raise real, 125, 143.
See also Inflation; Wages
Incomes policies, 13,32,89,100-101,
113-14, 142-43, 145-47, 146 n 10
Indexation, 14,32,101,106,113,143-
45,172,195
Industrialization, 4, 180-81
Inequality: in distribution, 24, 132,
184; in incomes, 39, 156, 157, 162,
192. See also Politics
Inflation: repressed, 6, 16 n 14, 19,29-
30,42,89,90-93,96, 184,206; in
market economies, 7, 29, 91; with ad-
ministrative reform of prices, 21, 50,
192,193,205-06; with deregulation
of prices, 22, 23, 30-31, 41, 42, 44,
94,101,111-12,114-15,142,171;
expectations, 22, 32, 42, 96,101,171,
205-06; indexation and, 32, 113,
143-44; and government budget, 32,
206; ruble exchange rate and, 35-36,
Ill; and acceleration, 186-87, 191.
See also Macroeconomics; Prices;
Ruble
Innovation, technological,S
Interest rates, 31, 103, 108, 168, 169,
171,172,175. See also Credit
Index
International economy. See Market
economies; Trade, international
International Institute for Applied Sys-
tems Analysis (I1ASA), 10-13
International Monetary Fund, 46, 130,
131
Inventories: and hoarding, 3, 198; at
the time of deregulation, 46-47. 155.
See also Distribution; Hoarding
Investment: government, 99; by for-
eign enterprises, 104, 116,122,129-
30; by Soviet enterprises abroad,
118; funds, 156, 163-64, 174; in-
stitutional, 158, 162-63, 174; by
banks, 163; in command economy,
186-87, 189-90
Ireland, 137
Italy, 137
Japan, 4, 70, 105, 135, 150, 158, 163,
166
Job creation, 134
Joint-stock companies, 26-27, 59, 62,
119, 153-54, 176. See also Corpora-
tization; Stockholders; Stocks
Khandruev, A., 83
Khanin, Grigorii, 179-80
Labor force: size of, 133; mobility of,
141-42. See also Unemployment;
Workers
Laws: property and bankruptcy, 26, 59,
98, 152-53, 164, 196; antitrust, 72-
73; employment, 137; banks and
banking, 174-77; on State Enter-
prise, 187-90, 191. See also Planning
Le Carre, John, 2
Leaseholding, 190, 195, 196
Lenin, V. 1., 177-78
Liberalization of prices. See Prices, need
for deregulation
Local governments: administer food
coupons, 46; privatize small busi-
nesses, 75; administer housing, 80;
and unemployment, 137, 140-41. See
also Government; Republics
Low-income families, 4, 23, 32, 44, 46,
47-48,60, 106, 113, 184
Luxury goods, deregulation of, 52-53
Index
Machine building, 185-86
Macroeconomics: and Soviet crisis, 6,
83-85,90-93,165,199; government
role, 6-7, 120; to control inflation af-
ter D-Day, 23,113-14,143,147; role
of banking system, 165, 166-67, 169,
176. See also Monetary policy; Ruble
Management: of corporations in mar-
ket economy, 57, 61, 120, 157, 159-
62,164; of banks, 173; of enterprises
in command economy, 189-90. See
also Corporatization; Privatization;
Stockholders
Market economies: decentralized and
efficient, 4-5, 6, 7, 50-53, 178; and
international trade, 5; role of govern-
ments, 6, 7; macroeconomics, 7,104-
05; preconditions for, 97-98; need
for private ownership, 150, 177. See
also Competition; Planning, Soviet
economic; Supply and demand
Market socialism, 194, 20 I
Marketing, 118, 128
Means-tested programs, 46, 48. See also
Low-income families
Meat, 45, 184, 203. See also Food
Medical care, 47, 82
Mergers, 72-73
Military-industrial complex, 81,99-
100,151,183
Milk, 45, 46. See also Food
Minsk, protests in, 51 n 12
Monetary policy: partial monetary re-
form, 3, 8,14, III n 19,205; mone-
tization of the deficit, 21, 24, 29-30,
91-92,105 n 17, 165, 166, 169, 176-
77; dollarization, 30,92, 131; mone-
tary reform, 32,109-12, III n 19,
114, 119, 131-32,205; role of banks,
165,166-67,169,176; in command
economy, 165,190-91,192; twocir-
cuits of money, 165, 192. See also
Macroeconomics; Ruble
Monetization of the deficit, 21, 24, 29-
30,91-92,105 n 17, 165, 166, 169,
176-77. See also Deficit; Inflation
Money. See Hard currency; Ruble
Monopolies: and price controls, 27, 28,
67-68,78-80; profits, 27, 62-63;
encourage entry of competitors, 27,
68-69, 145; natural, 27-28, 67, 79-
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80; and international trade, 27, 28;
antitrust laws and agencies, 27, 62,
72-73,74-75, 145; privatization of,
28,72,152,157; Soviet policy, 62, 67,
68, 70; extent of, in Soviet economy,
62,63-67,69-70; one plant/one en-
terprise rule, 62, 71-72, 73, 75; re-
gional, 66-67; incomes policies, 114,
145; banks, 172-73; and reform
plans, 200. See also Competition
Noren, James, 92-93
Oil. See Energy
Opening the economy. See Competi-
tion; Trade, international
Output. See Production
Pavlov, Valentin, 14,204
Pensions, 32,106,113,141,144. See
also Low-income families
Perestroika, 179, 187-206. See also Cri-
sis, Soviet economic
Petrakov, Nikolai, 197
Petroleum. See Energy
Planning, Soviet economic: directives,
1,8; and economic complexity, 4-5,
6,22,49-51,182-83, 186; ro~sof
planners, 5-6, 24, 52,181-84,202;
restoration, 8, 40; difficulty control-
ling enterprises, 8, 182-83, 188-90,
192; partial or gradual reforms, 14,
20,39-40,48-55,84,89-90, 101-
02, 178, 187-88, 194-206; political
pressures on, 49, 52, 183-84; effects
on distribution, 49-50, 52-53, 191,
197, 198,203; elimination of minis-
tries, 52, 60, 62, 120; sector-by-sector
reform, 53-54; microeconomic con-
trol, 104-05; inertia of, 180-81. See
also Crisis, Soviet economic; Market
economies; State orders
PMAs. See Property Management
Agencies
Poland, 17,63,74,92,103,142,155,
160,200
Politics: and Soviet economic crisis, 7,
15-16,17,95-96; pluralism, 147; of
privatization, 154, 156-58; populism,
193-94, 202-03; fear of price in-
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Politics (cont.)
creases, 144, 198, 203. See also Gov-
ernment; Republics
Poverty. See Low-income families
Prices: administrative reform, 8, 14,20,
21-22,38 n 1,48-55,51 n 12,89-
90,92,101-02,103,117,124,195,
196,197-98,199,200,202,203-04;
need for deregulation, 13-14 n 12,
21-22,30-31,38-42,102,107,114;
increase in wholesale with frozen re-
tail, 20, 21, 39, 45,107,191,196,
198, 203-04; market-clearing, 21,
22, 34, 39,4~47,51,67, 102-03;
impact of deregulation, 22-24, 31,
39-40,42-44,48,91, 102-03, 114-
15, 125; black-market, 22-23, 42-
43; controls after D-Day, 23, 28, 46,
47-48, 78-82; and competition, 24,
70,97,104; interdependent, 50-51;
monopoly, 27, 28, 67-68, 78-80; and
government budget, 106; disparities
between Soviet and international,
117,121,125-26,196 n 27; public
fears of deregulation, 144, 198, 203.
See also Inflation; Ruble; Subsidies
Principle-agent problem, 160-63
Privatization: distinct from corporatiza-
tion, 25, 27, 28, 57-59, 60, 72, 98,
149, 153, 177; of monopolies, 28, 72,
152,157; of small businesses, 28, 75-
76,77,151,159; of banks, 31,100,
108,109,149,170,172-73,176,
177; of housing, 80-81; and govern-
ment debt, 112; necessary, 150, 164-
65, 177; of large enterprises, 151,
155-60; preconditions, 151-53, 161;
giving away versus selling stock, 155-
60; time span, 158-59, 160; plans
for, 200. See also Corporatization;
Stocks
Production, decline in, I, 3, 4, 16, 86-
88, 179-80, 206. See also Growth
Productivity, 146
Profits: must motivate corporations, 25,
38,61,120,150,161,164,167,168,
173; taxes on, 25, 57,153; in com-
mand economy, 188-89, 190. See also
Competition; Market economies
Property Management Agencies
(PMAs): level of government, 26, 62,
159 n 3; as stockholders, 26-27, 60-
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62, 156, 157-58, 159 n 3, 162; moti-
vation, 61, 154, 159 n 3; separate
from antimonopoly agencies, 62, 74;
and privatization, 155, 156, 157-58,
159 n 3; for banks, 167, 170, 176;
loans to, 169. See also Corporatization
Public opinion, 76-77, 179, 193-94.
See also Politics
Quality of Soviet goods, 4, 24, 34, 35,
69
Queues, 23, 24, 44, 48, 89. See also Bar-
ter; Distribution
Railroads, 28, 79-80
Rationing, 93, 191. See also Distribution
Rents. See Housing
Repair services, 68, 76
Republics: engage in barter, 2-3, 24,
55-56; and central economic plan-
ning, 8; conflict with union govern-
ment, 14,30,36-37,116,178,198-
99,201-02,206; danger of trade
barriers between, 20, 34, 36-37, 56,
116; as common market, 20, 55-56,
95,116,167,178,202; administer
price controls after D-Day, 23; should
administer unemployment compen-
sation, 33; should be assigned most
enterprises, 58; antitrust iluthorities,
74; labor policies, 147; cent.ral banks,
166-67,175,201
Reserve requirements, 169, 170
Retail: distribution, I, 24, 42 n 5, 78,
89,191; prices, 20, 21, 39,45,107,
191, 196, 198, 203-04. See also
Prices; Queues; Service sector;
Wholesale
Ruble: internally inconvertible, I, 3, 16
n 14, 19, 23-24, 29, 55, 88; exter-
nally inconvertible, I, 118; partial
monetary reform, 3, 8, 14, III n 19,
205; common currency of the Union,
20,24, 116, 167; black-market ex-
change rate, 29, 30, 93; overhang,
29-30,90,92,109,110, III, 112,
114, 118, 157,206; dollarization, 30,
92, 131; monetary reform, 32, 109-
12, III n 19, 114, 119, 131-32,205;
should be made convertible, 34-35,
103-04,110,116-17,118-23,131-
32; money supply, 90-91, 92; in the
Index
foreign exchange market, 120-21;
used by foreign investors, 129. See
also Dollarization; Exchange rate;
Hard currency; Inflation; Mac-
roeconomics; Monetary policy;
Prices; Stock problem
Ryzhkov, Nikolai, 195-96, 198, 204
Savings: hoarding as, 3; effect of price
increases, 23, 198, 205; bank (Sber-
bank), 166, 171-72, 174, 175-76;
treatment of existing, 170-72; guar-
anteed, 171-72, 173, 174. See also
Banking system
Second-hand goods, 68
Service sector, 28, 68, 75-76, 134, 181.
See aLia Small businesses
Shareholders. See Stockholders
Shatalin, Academician Stanislav, 10, II,
14,199,203
Shatalin Report, 7, 9,11-12,13,54.
56, 63, 71, 73, 92, 95, 134, 135, 158,
160,199-203,206
Shortages, I, 16 n 14, 50, 88, 92-93.
See also Distribution
Small businesses: easily privatized, 28,
75-76,77,151,159; entry of new
businesses, 28, 77. See also Coopera-
tives; Enterprises; Service sector
Spain, 136
Stabilization: and the deficit, 24, 31,
99-100, 105-07; loan, 131. See also
Inflation; Macroeconomics; Mone-
tary policy
Stalin, Joseph, 180
State orders (goszakazy), I, 53 n 14,
187-88, 196, 197,200-201. See also
Planning
Stock problem, 29-30, 90-91, 92, 109,
110, 111,112, 114, 118, 157,206. See
also Ruble, overhang
Stockholders, 61-62, 153, 159, 160-64
Stocks in new corporations: conversion
of liquid assets into, 112; mode of
distribution, 155-60; prices, 156,
158, 164. See also Corporatization;
Joint-stock companies; Privatization
Strikes, 147, 190, 196. See also Unions
Subsidies: and government deficit, 20,
21, 107; eliminated with deregula-
tion, 21, 40-41, 57, 60, 70,143,197,
198; current pattern of. 44-46, 90,
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154,184,191; after D-Day, 46, 80-
82, 106; and susceptibility of enter-
prises to failure, 70, 120; credit, 168;
and inequality, 184; in reform plans,
200, 204. See also Prices
Sugar, 127
Supply and demand: in market econo-
mies, 5, 39, 51; in Soviet system, 49-
50, 51 n 12, 52-53, 92-93, 165; de-
regulated prices should obey, 67, 70,
120; determines exchange rate, 121.
See also Distribution; Market econo-
mies; Prices, market-clearing
Sweden. 137, 147
Tariffs, 34, 36, 104, 118, 123-25, 129
Taxes: on corporate profits, 25, 57,
153; "ad valorem" rather than spe-
cific, 31-32, 105, 107; to finance un-
employment benefits, 33, 136-37; on
exports, 36, 47, 126-27; on wages
funds, 89-90, 101, 113, 145-46,
192; rates, 105-06; payment lag,
107; on inflationary wages, 146; re-
form, 204. See also Deficit; Tariffs
Textile industry, 69
Tolkachi, 2. See also Barter
Tractors, 181 n 2
Trade, international: importance of
market economy, 5; to limit power of
monopolies, 27, 28, 34, 35,117,132;
stimulates Soviet enterprises, 34-35,
74,117,132; importance of opening
Soviet economy to, 34-36, 41, 73-
74,104, 116-18,128,131-32; Soviet
trading partners, 118, 123; current
account surplus, 122, 123; in inter-
mediate products, 125; Soviet exter-
nal debt, 130; in reform plans, 196.
See also Market economies; Tariffs
Transportation, 28, 45, 46, 66, 79-80,
129
Unemployment: and the economic cri-
sis, 16; compensation, 33, 133, 135-
37, 138; during transition to market
economy, 33, 133-35; frictional, 94,
134, 135, 137; levels in market econ-
omies, 94, 135, 137-38; disguised,
133, 134, 146n 10; long-term,134,
137-38, 140; statistics, 138-39; ser-
220
Unemployment (coni.)
vices and retraining, 138-41; and la-
bor mobility, 141-42
Unions, 114, 142, 144, 145, 146, 147-
48, 189-90. See also Wages; Workers
United Kingdom, 4, 147, 150, 166 n 9
United States, 4, 64-66, 74,99, 105,
130,135,136,137,140,147,163,
164, 166
USSR State Commission on Economic
Reform, II, 12
Utilities: as natural monopolies, 28, 79;
subsidy levels, 45; local or regional
regulation of, 56-57. See also Energy
Wages: tax on, 89-90, 101, 113, 145-
46, 192; indexing, 14,32, 113, 143-
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45; rates, 142; tariff system, 144;
minimum, 144; controls, 145-46,
191-92 (see also Incomes policies);
and worker ownership, 159. See also
Incomes
Wholesale: distribution, 18,40, 54, 73,
77,89,194; prices, 20, 21, 39, 45,
107, 191, 196, 198, 203-04. See also
Enterprises; Retail
Workers, 159-60. See also Income;
Unions; Wages
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Yasin, Evgenii, 203
Yavlinskii, Grigorii, 199
Yeltsin, Boris Nikolaevich, II, 199
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